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Executive project summary 
 
 
The purpose of the project 
DOMUS had as its stated objective to ‘… study the role of large domestic multinationals 
(DOMs) in the national innovation system (NIS)’. Three specific research questions 
where initially formulated: 
 
1. Identify the factors that influence localization decisions of headquarter functions 
and other strategic (Benito et al 2002) activities, including R&D 
 
2. Map the effects such companies have on the overall capabilities of their respective 
national innovation systems 
 




Corporate internationalisation raises critical questions concerning the conditions under 
which activities abroad may generate knowledge spill-over domestically – into the home-
base NIS; and the conditions under which the knowledge intensive parts of corporate 
activities, and consequently the productive knowledge base, over time can be expected to 
follow simpler operations out the country of origin. These questions are by large 
unresolved in existing theoretical and empirical research, first and foremost as a result of 
a lacking theoretical framework (Narula and Zanfei 2005) that incorporate sound 
perspectives on both localizational decisions under different technological conditions 
(Andersson and Friberg 2005, Herstad et al 2006b); and the workings of the MNE as a 





The research strategy of DOMUS has therefore to a large extent been explorative and 
qualitative; i.e. based on desktop study of existing research and analysis of data gathered 
through interviews in selected, Nordic DOMs. This has been supported by qualitative 
analysis based on Community Innovation Survey, conducted through the DOMUS 
predecessor FOTON (Ebersberger and Lööf 2005) and specifically for DOMUS 
(Ebersberger 2006, in Oksanen and Rilla (eds) 2006). There are several reasons why a 
qualitative research strategy has been chosen; the most important one being a 
combination of quantitative evidence readily available from FOTON and the need for 
explorative research to feed into general theory development. It is our clear opinion that, 
given the existing state of affairs at the research frontier, in-depth firm level analysis with 
the purpose of making analytical generalizations concerning basic socio-economic forces 
at play (Yin 1984, OECD 2006:65) must feed into general theory development which 
only then should be further refined and empirically validated using quantitative methods. 
What qualitative research lacks in empirical representativity it by far compensate for by 
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allowing direct dialogue with representatives of the phenomena in question. It allows us 
to avoid ‘black boxing’ the core actors, firms. This particularly applies when dealing with 
the generation, flow and accumulation of non-measurable resources – knowledge.  
 
The project resulted in three different research module reports, presenting in detail the 
findings of each research module, and a synthesis report which draw on all the different 




Concerning the first question, the project identified market access to be the main, overall 
driver of corporate internationalization. The project further point out that access to cheap 
factors of production at least historically appears to have been a driving force of fairly 
low importance.  This conclusion, however, neglect the large diversity in motives and 
requirements that exist between different sectors.  
 
The project further questioned the extent to which the internationalization of R&D and 
other knowledge-intensive activities are driven by the properties of the places in which 
MNEs invest (the so-called localization-specific advantages highlighted in the traditional 
understanding of MNEs). This question is raised on the background of mergers and 
acquisitions being the dominating mode of entry into a new market. Alternatively R&D 
abroad, in an acquired firm, could be considered an outcome of the in-house 
competencies of that acquired firm, and thus not a localization decision but a localization 
outcome. Evidence from interviewed companies clearly support the project in concluding 
that the internationalization of R&D, and in particular what is traditionally considered 
localization decisions, is a much more complex and differentiated process than what is 
assumed in the traditional theory of the multinational enterprise. As this assumption has 
been guiding most existing studies and policy, further research is needed to provide a 
clear answer to this question. This research need to account for industry branch 
differences between knowledge bases and consequently differences in availability of 
relevant knowledge in different places.   
 
Answering research question number two, the project emphasized that domestic 
multinationals predominantly are key actors in their national innovation system, and 
hence that their activities have a large impact on these. This reinforces the relevance of 
research question number three, on which the project put its main emphasis.  
 
On research question number three the project concluded that DOMs serve as global 
knowledge pipelines for the domestic innovation systems, but predominantly do so within 
sectors and technological fields in which the NIS is already specialized. These are the 
sectors in which the different economies are most likely to develop strong DOMs, the 
sectors on which those same DOMs are most likely to develop strong in-house 
competencies domestically while remaining embedded in linkages to external, domestic 
NIS actors – and the sectors and technological fields in which NIS as a whole most likely 




The project propose a set of complementary studies to be conducted in order to utilise 
and further refine the theoretical perspectives developed by DOMUS, and to build on this 
to significantly increase our understanding of the dynamics and implications of corporate 
internationalisation. Specifically the project also suggested conducting a large study of 




DOMUS – Innovation and the role of domestic multinationals – was conducted in the 
form of three research modules designed to provide complementary insights into the 
phenomena in question – Nordic corporate internationalization and the implications of 
this for the domestic innovation systems (NIS) of international firms. Module 1 consisted 
of a desktop study of existing research at the national levels (Friberg (ed) 2006); module 
2 mapped DOM activities in the Nordic countries (Rilla and Oksanen (eds) 2006) and 
provided more in-depth quantitative analysis (Ebersberger 2006). This module 3 paper 
will present the analysis based on data gathered through interviews in selected Nordic 
DOMs. 
  
The research strategy has to a large extent been explorative and qualitative; i.e. based on 
desktop study of existing research and analysis of data gathered through interviews in 
selected, Nordic DOMs. It follows from this that the project owes a lot to those 
companies and respondents who have been willing to discuss the issues in question with 
the DOMUS research group. 
 
There are several reasons why a qualitative research strategy has been chosen; the most 
important one being a combination of quantitative evidence readily available from 
FOTON (Ebersberger and Lööf 2006) and the need for explorative research to feed into 
general theory development. It is our clear opinion that, given the existing state of affairs 
at the research frontier, in-depth firm level analysis with the purpose of making analytical 
generalizations concerning basic socio-economic forces at play (Yin 1984, OECD 
2006:65) must feed into general theory development which only then should be further 
refined and empirically validated using quantitative methods. What qualitative research 
lacks in empirical representativity it by far compensate for by allowing direct dialogue 
with representatives of the phenomena in question. It allows us to avoid ‘black boxing’ 
the core actors, firms. This particularly important when dealing with the generation, flow 
and accumulation of non-measurable resources – knowledge. 
 
The purpose has not been to conduct full-fledged case studies of the different interviewed 
companies, but qualitative data analysis aimed at increasing our understanding of 
corporate internationalization as a phenomenon, its challenges for corporations and 
national economies – and thus dynamics and possible implications, primarily at the 
national level. Case studies are used as a key element in an exploratory rather than 
intensive research strategy (see contribution by Jónsdóttir, this volume). Hence, the 
different country case study papers presented in the following will not provide 
comprehensive analysis of the histories and internationalization patterns of the different 
case companies. Any attempt to do these companies full justice within the resource 
constraints of DOMUS would not have proven fruitful, and would also have been a 
significant deviation from the purpose of the project as a whole.  
 
Interviewed companies are not empirically representative for any larger population of 
firms; nor have they been selected for that purpose. Rather, they have been selected based 
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on expected information richness (Flyvbjerg 1991); their prospects for providing insights 
into the long-term dynamics of corporate internationalization, and related socio-economic 
processes within and surrounding domestic multinational corporations. This resulted in 
case firms being fairly mature experienced international actors within their respective 
national economies.  
 
Note that the answers given in the conducted interviews not necessarily are reflections of 
company policy or official statements, but merely the respondents’ view of the situation 
for the company in question, interpreted by the interviewer and put into a larger 




Norway: Jotun, Kverneland, Tandberg Data, Aker Yards 
and Wilh. Wilhelmsen Group 
 
 




The companies chosen as data sources for qualitative analysis of Norwegian corporate 
internationalization are Aker Yards, Jotun, Kverneland, Tandberg Data and Wilhelmsen 
Group. Data from these was gathered through 1-3 interviews in each company, with 
respondents ranging from employee board representatives through technology officers, 
managing directors and main owners. Background material and general facts was 
gathered through newspapers, web pages and publications, and interviews where used 
only to discuss key issues of interest.  
 
 
The case companies 
Aker Yards has a history that dates back to 1841, and is now majority owned by 
Norwegian Aker Group, the latter majority owned by the holding company of Kjell Inge 
Røkke. It defines itself as a high-end international shipbuilding group focusing on 
sophisticated a) cruise vessels and ferries, b) merchant fleet vessels and c) offshore and 
other specialized vessels. Following its recent agreement with French industrial group 
Alstom to purchase its marine division, it will become the fourth largest ship-builder in 
the world. Excluding the Chantiers de l'Atlantique and Saint-Naizires Yards of Alstom 
Marine, with in excess of 3000 employees, Aker Yards in 2004 had a turnover of NOK 
12.5 billion and employed approximately 13 000 people world-wide. This includes 4000 
employees at Aker Finnyards (Finland), and 2400 employees at Aker Ostsee (Germany). 
It also holds the responsibility for operating the former Kvaerner Philadelphia Shipyard, 
formally owned by Aker Group subsidiary Aker American Shipping.  
 
Aker Yards develop and manufacture investment goods aimed at professional users, and 
user-producers interactions are very dense. Technologically, the market is mature and 
thus characterized by few radical innovation and well-established development paths. 
Given the life-span of the product in question, the large investments and thus capital costs 
involved, and the sensitivity of customer operating costs towards factors such fuel 
economy and efficiency in harbor operations, the main window of opportunity for 
innovation lies in the ability of yards to combine cost-efficient, high-quality production 
with design dedicated to specific industrial shipping customer needs.  
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As Aker Yards, paint and coatings company Jotun is also a product of what is commonly 
refereed to as the Norwegian maritime cluster. The backbone of Jotun has been, and still 
to a certain extent is, maritime paint systems. According to UNCTAD (2005) it is one of 
the ten largest Norwegian domestic multinationals, with a turnover exceeding 6 billion 
NOK and 4750 employees in 36 production and development facilities world-wide. Of 
these are 130 employed at the R&D lab in Sandefjord, Norway, and only 70 directly 
employed as R&D staff abroad. It is still majority owned by the founding Gleditsch 
family, with Norwegian industrial conglomerate Orkla holding a 40% position. Jotun 
serve professional and consumer markets1, the former technologically demanding, the 
latter increasingly infiltrated by low-cost paints and both subject to strengthening 
environmental regulations and varying demands in different geographical segments. This 
factors in sum forces significant investments in long-term basic R&D, and in market 
adaptation.   
 
 
Kverneland Group develops and produces specialized agricultural and vineyard 
implements such as ploughs and harvesters, and is, if excluding so-called full-liners2, the 
largest international actor in this industry. The Group operates in professional user 
markets that are very geographically and functionally differentiated3, and have shown to 
be very cyclical4. It has a 15 % share of the total market for agricultural implements in 
Europe, and a 40% share of the world market for vineyard implements. It operates in 20 
countries, employing approximately 2800 people, export to 60 countries and describes 
itself as one of the most internationalized mid-sized companies in Norway. 80% of 
employment is found outside Norway, and 98% of turnover stem from international 
markets. In 2004 the turnover was 500 million EURO. Known brand names controlled by 
the group include Kverneland (soil preparation, Norway), Taarup (grass harvesting and 
feeding, Denmark), Rau (soil preparation, seeders and pesticide sprayers, Germany), 
Vicon (grass harvesting and feeding, fertilizers, Netherlands), Maletti (Italy), Gregoirè 
(grape harvesters, France), Lagarde (choppers/road maintenance, vine conditioning 
                                                 
1 Jotun Coatings develop and produce heavy-duty anti-corrosion systems for marine and industrial 
applications, and has production facilities in Australia, Finland, Italy, China Singapore, Spain, Great 
Britain, South Africa, South-Korea, Turkey and the US. This professional user market is characterized by 
fairly dense user-producer interaction and strong requirements as to durability. Jotun Decorative serve 
professional and do-it-yourself markets in Scandinavia with outdoor and indoor domestic paint and wood 
protection products from the Jotun base in Sandefjord, Norway. Jotun Paints serve similar markets in the 
Middle East and South Asia, including corrosion-inhibiting paints for local marine and industrial markets. 
This division has production units in United Arab Emirates, Saudi-Arabia, Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Oman, Thailand and Vietnam. Finally, Jotun Powder Coatings, headquartered in Dubai, is a leading 
international developer and producer of thermosetting powder coatings used for protecting and decorating 
mass-produced industrial commodities. 
2 E.g. companies also producing tractors 
3 Implements must be dedicated to the specific conditions of use in different national or regional markets. 
Such specific conditions include the structure of the farming industry – from industrial farms in e.g. the US 
to small-scale farming in Ireland or Norway – and climatic as well as soil conditions 
4 This willingness has been shown to fluctuate with international agricultural produce prices, in turn 
fluctuate with weather conditions during critical periods of the season, and with changes in the political 
frameworks surrounding farming. 
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equipment, France), Vinestor (vineyard equipment, Australia) and Accord (seeders and 
fertilizers, Germany).  
 
Kverneland was established in 1879, and remained in family control until stock-market 
flotation in 1983 triggered a long period without committed shareholders. Starting in 
2000, and following a collapse in Kvernelands market capitalization caused in part by 
huge restructuring and integration costs in the wake of its international expansion, 
Norwegian Umoe Group, controlled by Jens Ulltveit Moe and his family, increased its 
shareholdings up to the 31.68 percent controlling share held today. Umoe has business 
activities that include marine transportation, maritime equipment industries, shipyards, oil 
& gas services, catering services and IT and telecoms businesses. 
 
Tandberg Data is an international developer and manufacturer of professional 
information storage products, with a main focus on tape-based products but extending 
into disc-based systems. Until 1996 it also had a LCD projector unit, which was de-
merged and floated separately under the name ASK5. It is headquartered in Oslo, and has 
subsidiaries in the US (Tandberg Data Corp.), France, Germany, Norway (Tandberg 
Storage, and its subsidiary company O-mass), Singapore and Japan, as well as affiliate 
offices in India and China. It had an export share of 98% in 2004, reaching a turnover of 
USD 106 million and employing 204 people world-wide. Employment at the Norwegian 
HQ was 84, in addition to 45 employees at the affiliated and co-located technology 
development company Tandberg Storage (se below)6. From 1979 to 1990, German 
industrial conglomerate Siemens held a 58 % share of Tandberg Data7. It is now stock-
market floated, without major shareholders. In 2004 it generated approximately 28% of 
its revenues through OEM contracts with corporations such as Dell, IBM and Fujitsu 
Siemens. The remaining income is generated through direct sales to other professional 
users, mainly private companies or public institutions such as e.g. universities.  
 
Maritime logistics and services group Wilh. Wilhelmsen (hereafter WW) comprises 
maritime activities ranging spanning a wide range, but with a main emphasis on 
international liner activity through Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics (WWL – owned 50% 
by WW), EUKOR Car Carriers Inc (owned 40%) and American Roll-on Roll-off Carrier 
(ARC – owned 50%). Approximately 150 of the 485 car-carriers in the world are 
controlled by WW and its partners.  Other activities within the group include related 
logistics services, partly through a series of joint ventures and subsidiaries. These are 
Korea-based Glovis (owned 25%), France’s Compagnie d’Affrètement et de Transport 
SA (owned 40%), and the US companies Distribution and Auto Service, Inc, American 
Auto Logistics and American Logistics Network (owned 50%).  
 
In 2004 WW acquired Unitor, a ship support service company already one of the larger 
Norwegian domestic multinationals (UNCTAD 2005). This resulted in the establishment 
                                                 
5 Only to be purchased and closed down by US competitor Proxima.  
6 Tandberg Storage was created through a de-merger from Tandberg Data. The latter control 34,9 % of the 
shares in the former, the main business of which are developing and manufacturing storage equipment for 
the small and medium sized enterprises market.  
7 Sold in 1990 when the computer divisions of Siemens and Nixdorf merged.  
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of Wilhelmsen Maritime Services (WMS) comprised of Unitor and existing service, 
consultancy and ship design activities within the group. These include Barwill, Barber 
Ship Management, Barber Marine Consultants, Wilhelmsen Bunkers and Wilhelmsen 
Insurance Services. The establishment of WMS is stated by the company as an important 
departure from the traditional ship owning role and towards more knowledge-intensive 
and higher value added activities.  
 
The main customer base of the linear activity is the car industry, and Hyundai Motor 
Corporation of Korea still holds a 20% ownership stake in EUKOR. These customers are 
stated by the group as very demanding; given just-in-time delivery systems for cars 
precision, reliability and quality in transportation is of key importance. When combined 
with seasonal and cyclical market fluctuations in demand for cars, huge fixed cost 
investments in vessels and the short and medium term inflexibility in capacity, this 
translates into a strong pressure towards optimal use and flexibility in existing capacity, 
and on the logistics and support infrastructure surrounding the actual running of vessels.  
 
WW remain in control of the founding Wilhelmsen family. The group itself has 13 500 
employees, but contribute to the employment of approximately 22 000 people when part-
owned companies are included. Only around 400 of these are found at group and 
divisional headquarters in Oslo. WW has roughly 389 offices in about 72 countries, 
creating an extensive intra- and inter-group global network. 
 
 
Company histories and patterns of internationalization 
Wilh Wilhelmsen was established 1861 as a brokering business. In 1911 Norwegian 
Africa and Australia Line was established as a partnership between WW and another 
Norwegian shipping company, extending the activity of WW into international liner 
services and by 1914 including destinations such as Australia, Japan, India and China. By 
the end of the war, WW had expanded into oil tankers and controlled 92 % of the 
Norwegian tanker fleet. During the inter-war years WW develop a vision of a highly 
specialised international liner fleet, and the linear activity was expanded.  
 
The post war period was characterised by an ambitious new-build programme, including 
the development of the roll on- roll off (RO-RO) vessel concept. In 1972-73 five RO-RO 
vessels built for WW entered service. During the late 1970’s WW entered the offshore 
drilling and service market, and in 1983 it entered into specialised car transportation. The 
start of the war between Iran and Iraq in 1979 triggered a collapse in the RO-RO market, 
and the increasingly important offshore market collapsed during the mid 1980s. A serious 
financial crisis followed, and triggered a restructuring that by the mid 1990s had created a 
corporate group strongly focused on the car-carrier and maritime services markets. This 
focus was strengthened further by the Wallenius and Wilhelmsen joint acquisition of the 
car carrier division of Hyundai Merchant Marine in 2002.  
 
Kverneland was established in 1879 as a local forge, and fuelled growth in its production 
of ploughs by early implementation of steam-based mass-production techniques and by 
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early reorientation towards agricultural implements for tractors. By the mid 1950s 
Kverneland started to look for further expansion opportunities, and developed an 
acquisition programme focused on acquiring producers of complementary farming 
implements. In 1973 Kverneland acquired Plovfabrikken Fraugde in Denmark, thus 
transforming itself into a multinational enterprise. During the 1980s Kverneland acquired 
several Norwegian entities. Throughout the 1990s it acquired implement producers in 
Denmark, UK, Germany, Netherlands and Italy. In 2000 the acquisition programme was 
brought to a hold when the group entered the viticulture market through two acquisitions 
in France and one in Australia. By the beginning of the new millennium it became 
increasingly evident that the group was struggling with fundamental problems related to 
integrating and co-ordinating the new activities. In 2000 alone restructuring costs of EUR 
50 million incurred, and the total restructuring costs in the wake of the international 
expansion is estimated by Kverneland to be in excess of EUR 100 million (Finansavisen 
May 2006).  
 
The predecessor of Aker Yards, Aker Mekaniske Verksted, was established in 1841 and 
thus has a long history as Norwegian industrial group. In 1996 Resource Group 
International, a tax-haven investment company controlled by Norwegians Kjell Inge 
Røkke and Bjørn Rune Gjelsten, acquired a 30 percent stake in what was then petroleum 
and construction group Aker. This triggered a battle between RGI and institutional 
investors led by state pension fund Folketrygdfondet and insurance company UNI 
Storebrand, both shareholders in Aker. Later the same year Aker and RGI merged, 
creating Aker RGI.  Subsequent restructurings included the establishment and stock-
market flotation of Scancem, former Aker cement division; Aker Maritime and 
Norwegian Contractors. Rumours early emerged that the Aker acquisition and 
restructuring was part of a larger RGI aqiuisition plan which included then independent 
engineering company Kvaerner.  
 
The aggressive acquisition-based internationalisation of Kvaerner reached a peak with the 
1996 acquisition of UK-based engineering and construction company Trafalgar House.  
This created one of the largest engineering companies in the world, and the largest 
shipbuilder in Europe8. By spring 1998 it became increasingly evident that the new debt-
burdened Kvaerner had severe financial problems, causing a complete collapse in its 
stock market capitalisation. By October 1998 it was considered to be on the verge of 
bankruptcy, CEO Erik Tønseth was forced to resign and was replaced by former ABB Oil 
and Gas CEO Kjell Almskog.    
 
In 2000 Aker Maritime acquired a large stake in Kværner, triggering a power struggle 
different Kvaerner stakeholders that included employees, the largest Norwegian bank 
DNB and Russian petroleum company Yukos Oil. This eventually resulted in Aker 
Maritime gaining control over Kvaerner9, in turn leading to numerous financial and 
                                                 
8 In 1997 it also acquires a former navy shipyard in Philadelphia, tempted by prospect of substantial US 
public support, and renamed it Kvaerner Philadelphia Shipyard. 
9 In 2001, the second largest petroleum producer in Russia, Yukos oil, acquired 21 percent of Kvaerners 
share capital, positioning itself as the largest shareholder. During November 2001 intense negotiations 
where conducted between Yukos Oil, Aker Maritime and Kvaerners main banks, and the Yukos scheme to 
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organisational restructuring operations within the new Aker umbrella.  Aker Kvaerner 
was formally established in April 2004 and included most of the previous Kvaerner 
businesses providing engineering and construction services, technology products and 
integrated solutions within industries such as oil and gas, refining and petrochemicals, 
power generation, pulp & paper and mining and metals. Certain operational activities, 
mainly former Trafalgar House businesses in the UK, were ‘sold’ separately as Kvaerner 
Plc to its management.  Aker Yards was established in June the same year as a 
combination of the remaining shipbuilding activities of Kværner and Aker. A new 
company, Aker Group, was established as an umbrella for these and other former RGI 
activities, consolidating the present-day Aker Group structure as one of the largest 
Norwegian DOMs.  
 
Jotun was established in 1920, as a regional paint retailer serving the large whaling fleet 
based in southeastern Norway. In 1926 founder Odd Gleditsch acquired a local paint 
factory, and established Jotun Kemiske Fabrikk A/S as a producer of marine paints and 
antifouling agents.  Jotun later diversified into the market for domestic paints, and with 
the 1935 acquisition of Vera A/S into vegetable oils10. In 1951 it built a large, new 
factory in Norway, and an at the time unprecedented large R&D department was 
established.  
 
In 1959 large petroleum reserves where discovered in Libya, then a peaceful kingdom. 
This was expected to create rapid economic growth in the region, and triggered a 
greenfield investment in 1962.  The first Asian operation, a paint factory in Thailand, was 
established in 1968, and throughout the 1970s Jotun acquired or established operations in 
the UK, US, Dubai and Singapore. Proximity to important maritime activities was most 
important driving force behind this. The expansion continued throughout the 1980s with 
the establishment of production facilities in Saudi-Arabia, Malaysia, Egypt, Oman and 
Turkey. Notable developments during the 1990s include acquisitions in Australia, Canada 
and the US, a new factory in Vietnam and the establishment of a paint laboratory in 
South Korea. In 2004 two out of four divisional headquarters (Paints, Powder) was 
relocated to Dubai. Jotun now has 61 subsidiary companies in 37 countries, out of which 
36 are factories located in 22 countries. Jotun also holds significant although minority 
holdings in licensing companies - e.g. major shipyard supplier Nor-Mali Oy in Finland.  
 
The origins of Tandberg Data can be traced directly back to Tandberg Radio Factory, 
founded in 1933 and dissolved into several separate entities in 1979. Several other 
existing companies, notably Tandberg and Tandberg Television, thus share this origin 
with Tandberg Data, the same applies for dissolved companies such as ASK (LCD 
projectors) and Tandberg Audio (high-end audio products).  Tandberg Data established 
subsidiary sales and support locations in Germany, France and USA during the 1980's, 
                                                                                                                                                 
rescue Kværner from bankruptcy by splitting it up into different companies was blocked by Aker Maritime. 
By mid November Aker Maritime had gained a 25 percent share of Kværner, and after intense negotiations 
between Norwegian bank DNB and Aker Maritime during the night between November 27th and 28th the 
battle for control over Kværner was settled once and for all in favour of Aker and its restructuring plan. 
10 Other notable Jotun diversification projects included large-scale pipes made of glassfiber-reinforced 
polyester (GRP), attempts at developing a closed-environment technology for moulding GRP boats; and the 
famous ‘Snurredassen’ dry closet.  
 15
and during the 1990s expanded its foreign presence by establishing subsidiary locations 
in Japan, Singapore, Poland and the UK. The UK and Polish operations are responsible 
for disc technology R&D, whereas the US operations carry out certain tape technology 
R&D complementary to Norwegian activities.  
 
National innovation system origins 
Thus, it is apparent how the case companies share a distinct Norwegian national 
innovation system origin, or have emerged out of specialized regional sub-systems which 
have supported the development of their ownership-specific advantages. 
  
Aker Yards, Wilh Wilhelmsen and Jotun of Norway have a common origin in the 
national maritime cluster, whereas Kverneland is one of the largest companies to emerge 
out of the distinct Jaeren mechanical engineering cluster and agriculture region of South 
Western Norway (Asheim and Herstad 2005). Paint manufacturer Jotun still maritime 
paints and corrosion inhibitors as a key activity, including products both for maritime 
vessels and offshore installations, and state that existing maritime and offshore petroleum 
activities in Norway are a key prerequisite for product development in this area. Wilh 
Wilhelmsen have historically nurtured tight direct linkages to specialized Norwegian 
shipping banks, insurance companies, consultancy and certification agencies, and built 
their land-based administrative and management functions on abundant supplies of 
Norwegian, experienced sea officers. The Norwegian arm of present-day Aker Yards has 
a strong gravitation point at the North Western coast of Norway, traditionally a region 
with a strong shipbuilding industry, and state remaining linkages to both maritime cluster 
actors (specialized offshore vessel operators, equipment suppliers and maritime 
consultancy firms) and to specialized research institutes (e.g. Marintek in Trondheim).   
 
Strategic functions and the nature of core competencies 
As discussed elsewhere (Herstad and Jonsdottir (red) 2006), we use the term “strategic 
functions’ to refer to those corporate activities that directly or indirectly are producing, 
reproducing and accumulating corporate core competencies. These are then distinguished 
from “operations”, similar to the concept of “complementary capabilities’ used by Teece 
(2001), which are corporate functions that enable core competencies to be turned into 
products with commercial value without significant prospects of contributing knowledge 
relevant to technological development. The concept is wider than “research and 
development”; it includes R&D-departments, headquarter-functions but may or may not 
include other functions such as production and marketing. Put simply; it includes both 
R&D as such but also other functions that may be important in providing the knowledge 
resource base on which R&D must build – and thus be integrated with.   
 
Delineating strategic functions from operations require an understanding of basic specific 
characteristics of technologies and work process involved – in specific firms and in 
specific sectors. This is the classic argument by Pavitt (1984) of systematic knowledge 
base variations between industrial sectors (Asheim and Gertler 2005, Fagerberg 2005, 
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Tunzelmann and Acha 2005). Because knowledge bases vary, so do the necessary 
interaction and communication patterns that form the basis for learning processes and 
innovation; the elements involved in these and thus what constitutes strategic functions.  
Understanding the specificities of involved knowledge bases is also necessary in order to 
understand the prospects for, and challenges involved in, creating corporate learning 
networks that span different locations, and the need to link up knowledge providing 
actors externally. Identifying and analyzing such networks, in turn, is necessary in order 
to answer our research question concerning the impacts of a multinational presence on 
home-base knowledge accumulation and by implication home-base NIS  
 
In the following we will apply a distinction between analytical knowledge and synthetic 
knowledge; distinctions that both relate to the process of generating knowledge, the 
process of using knowledge (innovating) and the process of communicating knowledge in 
networks. Analytical knowledge is disciplinary, science-based knowledge generated 
through formal research, easily communicated using well-established codes and easily 
sourced through external labor markets surrounding e.g. universities or other research 
institutes. Synthetic knowledge, on the other hand, is cross-disciplinary firm or sector 
specific knowledge. It is generated more through learning-by-doing and trial-and-error 
than formal research; and it is much more difficult to communicate and interact around as 
there are no generally accepted codes. It can to a much lesser extent than analytical 
knowledge be sourced directly from universities, or from labor markets; thus increasing 
the importance of in-house knowledge accumulation, and it is to a lesser extent generated 
through the formal process of ‘doing R&D’ (see Herstad and Jonsdottir 2006 for a more 
thorough discussion related to DOMUS, or Asheim and Gertler 2005) 
 
According to Asheim and Gertler (2005), shipbuilding is a prime example of an industry 
relying on a synthetic knowledge base. Innovation in shipbuilding primarily takes the 
form of concrete problem-solving on behalf of customers (incremental innovations), 
according to customer requirements and within certain pre-defined budget constraints. It 
only takes the form of R&D-driven radical innovations, and is less research-driven than 
application and learning-by-doing oriented: “We do not conduct R&D for the sake of 
R&D itself, but innovative as an integrated part of running the shop”. It involves a range 
of tasks and knowledge that span from simple hull construction to design and assembly of 
complex, technological systems necessitating interaction between a broad range of 
disciplines. It is knowledge intensive without being science intensive, and to a high 
degree tacit and experience-based.   
 
Our Aker Yards respondent stresses that the knowledge intensive parts of developing and 
assembling a complex vessel are found at the conceptual design and final assembly 
stages11; that these must interact tightly to meet the challenge of designing and putting 
together systems that interact according to need. They explicitly state that ‘you can 
isolate R&D from production, but the result is never good. Others have tried it, and made 
                                                 
11 It is interesting to note that Aker Yards in addition to hull construction define so-called detailed 
engineering as a non-strategic function, outsourced to engineering companies in Russia or conducted at 
own yards in Rumania, whereas production in the sense of final assembly and outfitting is considered 
strategic (see Nilsen 2001 for an analysis of former Aker Maritime) on a level comparable to R&D. 
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a lot of strange things at a very high cost’.  Hence, the downstream parts of production, 
and the upstream parts of R&D are characterized as indivisible, and innovation as rooted 
in ‘the good and close dialogue between marketing, R&D and production’. The mid parts 
of the value chain, detail engineering and hull assembly, are on the other hand 
characterized as mere ‘operations’ without direct linkages to core competency 
development. 
 
Similarly, Tandberg Data explicitly highlight how their knowledge base is comprised of a 
very specific and highly integrated blend of competencies in fields such as micro-
mechanics, electronics and software: ‘We are extremely cross-disciplinary, our main 
strength is our ability to think across disciplines. We therefore have to do most of our 
development work internally, based on accumulated in-house competencies. Our 
experiences have told us that we can only outsource things that can easily be done in 
isolation from everything else. Our OEM customers are very, very impressed with the 
breath of competencies of our engineers, they tend to think more in disciplinary boxes’’. 
According to all three respondents, from a solely technological point of view this means 
that R&D and production must be considered an integrated entity: ‘It is very difficult to 
design-for-production, and follow up and de-bugg new products, without very strong 
linkages between the two’. Initially having outsourced all production to China, in 2004 
Tandberg re-established a pilot production line at its Oslo plant. Respondents still stress 
that they are concerned about the long-term effects of dissolving the linkages between 
large-scale production and product engineering necessitated by the lower production 
costs achieved in China. Again we find that the inter-relationship between R&D and 
production constitute strategic functions.  
 
Paint producer Jotun describes its core competencies as divided between paint base 
development and antifouling polymer development, the latter portrayed as far more 
technologically demanding and strategically important than the former and a direct 
product of its historical emphasis on the maritime market. It is perhaps the case company 
that best illustrate the need to transform science-based disciplinary knowledge 
(chemistry) into firm specific, synthetic (Asheim and Gertler 2005) knowledge (paint 
technology): ‘You don’t learn this at University. Our main challenge is finding people 
with a degree in chemistry that is willing to get their hands dirty, learn this very specific 
trade. We have nowhere to go to find people; they have nowhere to go if they want to 
leave us12.  If we employ somebody new in the R&D department it can take up to five 
years before that person starts generating a return’. However, respondents stress that 
R&D may very well be conducted isolated from production, which is described as a fairly 
generic and simple process, but also that ‘strategic functions’ clearly extend beyond R&D 
and into marketing and direct user-producer interaction. 
  
A more difficult and less clear-cut case is Kverneland, operating in a market for farm 
implements that during the 1990s has been transformed dramatically with the 
introduction new ICT technologies such as GPS positioning, electronic control systems 
and robotics.  The different unit core competencies and knowledge bases can be 
                                                 
12 This is a dilemma that has received extensive attention in work on corporate governance; see e.g. Blair 
(1997) 
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described as firm specific and highly synthetic, being constituted by blend of metal, 
mechanical engineering and ICT competencies, and competencies on farming developed 
in close interaction with users and agricultural universities.  This is the fundamental 
explanatory variable behind Kvernelands international growth through acquisitions, and 
simultaneously the prime reasons for the large investments in and partial failure of the 
corporate restructuring efforts starting in 2000 (Herstad 2000, Asheim and Herstad 2005). 
The Norwegian activities of Kverneland can be described as divided between HQ 
functions, a CoE function for the group as a whole in material treatment and technology; 
and plough production and development.  
 
An even more complex picture is found in the case of Wilh Wilhelmsen Group. Our 
group HQ and owner respondents explicitly emphasize how the core competencies of 
their activities are distributed throughout the global organization, very specific to the 
product market in question, highly synthetic and experience-based: It must, according to 
one respondent, be developed and used as a result of “the handshake between raw 
practitioners and theoretical knowledge” where emphasis must be put more on the former 
than the latter and neither learning nor innovation can occur as a result of “putting bright-
headed people together in a room and make them come up with new solutions to 
something”. Core competencies are described as distributed within the global 
organization, where learning processes occur as continuous learning-by-doing in 
interaction with customers and with other group entities.  Hence, delineating strategic 
functions from mere operations, and identifying the localization pattern of strategic 









Drivers of corporate internationalization 
According to Narula (2002), and following the line of reasoning applied in the sectorial 
systems of innovation approach, the need for proximity to different groups follows from 
different sectorial and technology characteristics, and thus results in different patterns of 
internationalization. In the Narula framework a simple distinction is made between 
mature firms and technologies, following well-defined development paths, and firms in 
emerging sectors where the rate of technological change is high such paths have not yet 
been consolidated. The basic argument is that immature technologies or a high rate of 
technological change imply a need for broad external linkages to monitor and supply  
possible complementary knowledge, whereas mature technologies and lower rates of 
technological change reduces the rationale for such linkages. We have above extended 
this line of reasoning by pointing to different properties of knowledge bases; and will 
below extend it further by also taking into account product market differences.  
 
Existing research on Norwegian corporate internationalization (Friberg (red) 2006) 
clearly show that access to cheap inputs has been one of the least important centrifugal 
forces.  The same bulk of research clearly shows how proximity to markets and 
customers is the single most important reason to internationalize. A reasonable 
hypothesis is that this applies more for markets where the transaction frequency – i.e. 
transactions with specific customers - is high than for markets where the frequency is 
low; and more for activities serving professional user markets than for activities serving 
consumer markets. When a need for tailoring to professional users and a high transaction 
frequency are combined, and dense user-producer interaction is necessitated, the need for 
physical proximity to customers will become particularly strong. This line of reasoning is 
also valid upstream; when dense interaction with universities or research institutes is 
enabled or necessitated by the nature of involved knowledge bases; this may create strong 
centrifugal (internationalization of R&D to specific places) or centripetal (inertia in 
home-base R&D) forces. When the nature of involved knowledge bases results in such 
interaction being less strategically important; the centrifugal (host) or centripetal (home) 
forces exercised by such actors are limited.  
 
The centrifugal forces of markets are to a high degree reflected in the internationalization 
patterns of Jotun and Tandberg Data. Jotun explicitly state that the limited Norwegian 
domestic market for decorative products and the historically large Norwegian shipping 
fleet are the two main reasons behind its early and extensive internationalization. 
Whereas the first stage was fairly opportunistic and related to a specific case of expected 
national economic growth; the following foreign establishment, in Thailand, was 
triggered by contacts with Norwegian shipping and brokerage firms and co-financed by 
key Norwegian ship-owners. The mid-70s expansion in Dubai was further driven by the 
existing regional market for deliveries of paints to vessels in transit, and plans for large-
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scale shipyard activities. The recent relocation of the Paints and Powder division 
headquarters, including regional R&D laboratories to Dubai is similarly a direct result of 
the geographical configuration of the customer base; the same applies for the Decorative 
and Coatings divisions which still is headquartered and has its main R&D facilities in 
Norway. Similarly; when a regional R&D labs for marine paints was set up in South 
Korea this was a direct result of the need to adapt marine paint and antifouling 
technology to the mass production techniques applied at these yards, and Jotuns 1980s 
and 1990s emphasis on establishing production facilities and numerous sales offices in 
China is a direct reflection of increasing shipbuilding activities there.  
 
In general, Jotun respondents stress that “development and production must take place as 
close to the end user as possible, as demand varies significantly between countries and 
customer groups. Proximity to other groups than customers is of little or no importance to 
us, and localization factors other than customers consequently unimportant”.  This, of 
course, is the combined result of a strong necessitated emphasis on in-house rather than 
network learning upstream (the nature of the knowledge base), and importance of market 
adaptation downstream (the nature of the product market).  Thus, whereas ‘research’ is 
conducted in Norway, and highly contingent not on the Norwegian innovation system but 
on in-house competencies of the central R&D lab, the geography of ‘development’ is 
tightly linked to the geography of the customer base. It follows from this that remaining 
‘development’ in Norway, Marine Coatings and Decorative, is tightly linked to the 
customer bases represented by the Norwegian maritime cluster and the Scandinavian 
decorative paints markets respectively.  
 
Tandberg Data internationalized through the establishment of sales and support facilities, 
with one exception being a production facility in the US that later was terminated. Thus, 
the early stages of corporate internationalization was driven by a need for physical 
presence in its product markets, and hence of fronting OEM customers directly13. Its 
later stages of internationalization included limited R&D aimed at disc-based back-up 
technologies in the UK and Poland, as well as certain R&D for tape-based technologies 
in the US. Importantly, the company has an explicit strategy of doing certain R&D 
projects primarily in the US (see below): In the US we can run several projects 
simultaneously, simply buy buying the right people in the labor market and getting rid of 
them once we have finished. In Norway, we have to rely on existing resources, and this is 
clearly blocking the speed of development’. Thus, a division of labor appear to be 
emerging between R&D building on core competencies accumulated in-house in 
Norway, and a more flexible US organization doing R&D that ‘can easily be done in 
isolation from everything else’, e.g. without strong linkages to the Norwegian knowledge 
base.   
 
An earlier study of Kverneland (Herstad 2000) argued that an important driver of 
acquisition-based internationalization of production during the 1990s was the need to 
protect the company against a hostile take-over, by growing in markets characterized by a 
very strong functional (different implements) and geographical (different places) 
                                                 
13 In addition it used the internal distribution channels of Siemens extensively during its years as a German 
subsidiary. 
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differentiation. Thus, corporate internationalization of both R&D and production 
followed as an outcome of a perceived need to grow and diversify beyond what could be 
achieved by exports from Norway, and took the form of acquisitions given the 
importance of immediate access to product market specific synthetic knowledge bases 
and complementary assets such as brand names. This is however only part of large 
picture including the establishment of dedicated sales facilities abroad, to supply critical 
marketing and after-market support service functions in  markets that are very 
geographically differentiated. Hence, it can be argued that internationalization of 
production and R&D has been driven not only by market proximity, as in the cases of 
Jotun and Tandberg Data, but also by specialized in-house competencies of acquired 
firms. Again, the market motive is the prime driver; technology and knowledge enters the 
equation primarily in the form of in-house competencies.  
 
Aker Yards is a special case in that a low transaction frequency and few, professional 
customers in a truly global industry imply that geographical proximity to customer only 
play a very minor role in driving internationalization14. It is also a special case in 
shipbuilding in general with a sole focus on complex vessel design, thus not operating 
only based on synthetic but also highly specialized knowledge bases. These two factors 
combined explain why the main location factors is stated as a combination of external 
actors able to supply complementary although specialized competencies and capabilities, 
including both a regional sub-supplier system and research institutes with specialized 
maritime knowledge, and very large place-specific investments in buildings, machinery 
and infrastructure such as dry docs. Our respondents both in Aker Yards and Rolls Royce 
Marine both point out that when it comes to complex vessel assembly, broader workforce 
competencies are of extreme importance. Hence, the existing core units of Aker Yards in 
Finland, Norway and Germany are all yards with a long history within the maritime 
sector of their respective countries. Low-country activities are limited to the two yards in 
Rumania primarily used for the purpose of building hulls and doing certain standard 
engineering work, but these are in turn a prerequisite for the viability of the high-cost 
country strategic activities of Aker Yards.  
 
Other factors that are stated as very important is flexibility in own capacity, and thus the 
ability to utilize surplus capacity and obtain contracts even at markets peaks. The 
respondent at Aker Yards emphasizes how the group portfolio of smaller and larger yards 
not only means that they are able to supply a variety of product markets, but also that 
their overall capacity is very flexible and able to adapt to such peaks.  Last but not least, 
although not stated by the respondent, a major competitive factor in the specialized vessel 
market is of course the ability to control the total capacity in a given segment, thus being 
able to reduce the level of competition and block new competitors from entering. Given 
the huge place-specific fixed costs involved in shipbuilding; the dependence on external 
environments for support and the synthetic knowledge bases on which all activities must 
build these are requirements that can only be met by extensive internationalization.  
                                                 
14 This requires certain modifications. It is generally argued that a very demanding national and in some 
cases regional customer base has been a key component in the development of the Norwegian maritime 
cluster. This still applies for the linkage between offshore supply vessel companies (customers), and vessel 
development, but it does not apply for e.g. cruise vessel  production and development at Aker Finnyards.    
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Our last case, the Wilh Wilhelmsen group with is portfolio of marine logistics and 
support services is a very special case in that industry actors by definition are 
international actors, in an industry which similarly by definition is global. Further, the 
different service activities within the group by their very nature require physical presence 
in order to be conducted; and conducting these represent the prime knowledge generating 
activity of the company. Hence, the knowledge base of the group is necessarily 
geographically distributed. Further, its self-defined role as driver in ship technology 
development require close interaction with key yards and their ‘external environments’, 
found mainly in Japan and Korea. This implies that the technical ship design 
competencies increasingly are contained in units outside Norway. Last but not least; it 
has an explicit principle of outsourcing to countries with strong competence 
environments in the actual fields – and names the interplay between a weakening 
maritime cluster in Norway and strengthening environments in countries such as India or 
Korea as important in this respect. Again, this centripetal force must be understood in the 
context not of access to cheap labor; but of access to environments holding specific, 
synthetic knowledge.  
Linkages to innovation systems abroad 
Firms thus engage in R&D at foreign locations for numerous reasons, some of which are 
firm-specific (i.e. R&D triggered by in-house competencies of acquired firms), and some 
of which are location-specific. Location-specific factors span a range from characteristics 
of local or national markets (Jotun) to the properties of territorial innovation systems 
more broadly defined, as in the cases of Kverneland or Wilh. Wilhelmsen. Tapping into 
location-specific technological assets require strong linkages that are expensive and time-
consuming to develop (Narula 2002); and hence even when these are a key motive for 
entry it is not given that they follow from presence in the specific location (Narula and 
Zanfei 2005). The obvious challenges of becoming familiar with and integrating into a 
new location may in itself prohibit attempts at establishing such linkages (ibid) beyond 
those that follow from necessary transactions within the value chain.  
 
Kvernelands strategy of acquisition-based internationalization is described as having 
‘…the positive side-effect of including the R&D networks of the individual units’. In 
addition, the Norwegian Klepp plant has a long-standing relationship with steel 
manufacturing companies, in particular in Germany but also in Sweden, who supply steel 
based on a patented Kverneland recipe. These have however been established and 
continue to exist independently of subsidiary presence abroad. Below we will show how 
Kverneland has faced more a challenge of in-house network formation, than a challenge 
of external network formation.  
 
Jotun stresses that a certain degree of direct interaction with professional end user is 
necessary in the professional user divisions, in particular marine as the production 
technologies involved in shipbuilding differ significantly between vessel-by-vessel 
building at specialized yards, and mass production at Korean and Chinese yards.  Apart 
from this, Jotun also stresses that proximity to other groups than customers are of little of 
no importance. Necessary contacts with chemical companies, in particular in Germany, 
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have been established and continue to operate independently of subsidiary presence 
abroad. Hence, apart from user-producer interaction Jotun presence abroad has 
established few linkages to innovation system actors abroad. 
 
Complex vessel design and actual assembly necessitate a broad range of complementary 
capabilities, both at the design stages and that the assembly stages. It also involves a 
significant amount of incremental problem solving throughout the assembly stages. Thus, 
Aker Yards rely on interacting with a broad range of external actors surrounding e.g. the 
Finnyards activities. Hence, through these activities Aker Yards interact significantly 
with Finnish innovation system actors, both on the public funding side and on the 
supplier side. Similarly, Wilh. Wilhelmsen respondents state that they have ‘contacts with 
specialized yards in Japan and Korea that has more character of long-term development 
projects than traditional relationships between customer and producer’, and emphasize 
that this contacts extend into the ‘environments surrounding the yards’. Whereas a strong 
emphasis traditionally has been put on linking design and operational competencies at 
HQ with vessel development projects, the weakening of HQ in relation to activities 
abroad in all respects imply that a consequence of this is not the strengthening of HQ 
competencies on complex vessel design but rather that  ‘our own design competencies are 
increasingly found abroad’.  
 
The perhaps most interesting case in this respect is Tandberg Data, where all respondents 
explicitly stresses the difficulties inherent in a) linking domestic and foreign R&D, and b) 
creating well-functioning linkages to external research environments at home or abroad. 
VP Technology stresses how ‘achieving synergies with external communities have 
proven extremely difficult, and transfer of experiences and knowledge have been close to 
zero. It is not that we haven’t tried, rather the contrary, but we can’t seem to make it 
work. A key element in this picture is complexity of technology; respondents all 
emphasize how R&D personnel must accumulate a lot of firm specific knowledge before 








The analysis above has illustrate how foreign presences may provide vital 
complementary capabilities for the home-base activities of DOMs, and thus strengthen 
these by enabling broader market penetration than what could have been achieved by 
exports alone. From the perspective of home-base R&D and the larger NIS, these are 
indirect effects, working through the financial results of the company and contingent on 
the willingness to reinvest resulting earnings as competence development and R&D in 
Norway. The key question of direct knowledge upgrading of NIS through DOMs 
however remains unresolved: Obviously, important learning processes occur in the 
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foreign subsidiaries; and these are surrounded by networks to external innovation system 
actors representing a certain degree of ‘local buzz’ (Bathelt et al 2004). But to what 
extent, or rather under what conditions, does knowledge developed abroad link up with 
home-base operations, serving as ‘global pipelines’ directly contributing to upgrading 
first the corporate home-base knowledge base, and then, secondly, filter into the larger 
NIS surrounding it? This we have framed as a question of corporate organizational 
principles, and thus inter-unit network formation. Narula and Zanfei (2005:334) explicitly 
point out: ‘It is not sufficient for foreign affiliates to internalize spillovers if it cannot 
make these available to the rest of the MNE’, home-base activities included. Following 
Forsgren (1997) they go on to argue that ‘a dispersion of R&D activities across the globe 
requires extensive co-ordination (…) complex linkages, both within the firm and between 
external networks and internal networks, require complex coordination if they are to 
provide optimal benefits. Such co-ordination requires expertise, managerial and financial 
resources’.  
 
Similar insights are found in Bathelt et al (2004), who argue that ‘to successfully 
establish a global pipeline (…) requires the development of a shared institutional context 
which enables joint problem-solving, learning and knowledge creation. Knowledge flows 
through pipelines are not automatic, and participation is not free’.  They require 
investments in ‘communicative skills’ (Forsgren 1997), in turn limiting the diversity of 
technologies and locations that individual DOM pipelines effectively can cover (Bathelt 
et al 2004:43, Forsgren 1997:74) within a given budget constraint (Herstad 2005). The 
contrast between Aker Yards and Kverneland will illustrate this well.  
 
Corporate organizational principles  
We have elsewhere introduced the two complementary concepts of portfolios or 
industrial systems as corporate international organizational principles, and of control 
through formalization, centralization or socialization as mode of co-ordination (Persaud 
2005, Herstad 2005, Geppert, Mattens and Williams 2003, Herstad and Jonsdottir (red) 
2006). The purpose of  developing and applying these distinctions is to grasp key 
characteristics of the organizational and control system setting within which actual 
communication patters and inter-unit learning processes must occur. They are established 
concepts within certain strands of research on multinational organizations, mainly 
through the work of Bartlett and Ghoshal (1998), related Nordic contributions 
(Granstrand and Sjölander 1994, Forsgren 1997, Forsgren et al 1997) and through certain 
strands of theory dealing with the linkages between corporate control and structure 
(Porter (red) 1992, Fukao 1995, Morgan 2001). They have however not been 
incorporated into work attempting to draw implications of the internationalization of 
R&D through the activities or multinational corporations.   
 
The above has demonstrated how Kverneland expanded rapidly throughout the 1990s, 
and consequently found itself controlling a large and very diverse portfolio of activities 
serving highly differentiated product markets. An earlier study (Herstad 2000) identified 
a strong emphasis on and huge investments in corporate integration in the wake of this 
expansion, establishing a fairly centralized corporate structure. This generated a huge 
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information load on HQ and severe problems of co-ordination between operative units, 
and is now by respondents characterized as ‘technologically a success, but market-wise 
and administratively a complete disaster15’. The idea was to let existing production units 
and distribution networks serve this function only, and concentrate all product 
development in a few key units, including the Norwegian Klepp plant. Following the 
Umoe Group involvement in Kverneland, the group was reorganized as numerous centers 
of excellence for product development, linked tightly to production units, and supported 
by two additional centers explicitly set up for the purpose of serving inter-unit R&D and 
knowledge diffusion functions. In this structure, the Norwegian Klepp plant is Coe for 
material technology.   
 
The overall objective is to increase inter-unit technological synergies without the 
administrative constraints of centralization by allowing for decentralized interaction 
patterns to evolve organically. Hence, Kverneland is at present investing heavily in 
building what is described as a ’unique inter-company organizational structure’, and thus 
industrial system. Respondents stress that this must involve systematic circulation of 
personnel on a long-term basis (i.e. as this involves specialized, synthetic knowledge), 
and exemplifies by pointing to German researchers now present at the Klepp plant.  
 
As a result of this emphasis and the related investments, a distinct inter-unit R&D 
network is in the process of consolidating. Patent analysis (Ebersberger 2006) clearly 
reveals a strong pattern of inter-unit co-patenting; with the defined centres of excellence 
in Norway and the Netherlands as apparent key actors (ibid; Herstad and Jonsdottir 8red) 
2006) 
 
Aker Yards illustrate how three different complementarities can co-exist within a 
international industrial system. First; the establishment of the group itself was motivated 
by recognition that size and flexibility in production capacity is pre-requisite for 
competitiveness in the shipbuilding industry. With the merger of numerous smaller 
specialized yards in Norway, larger specialized yards in Finland, mass-producing yards in 
Germany and low-end yards in Rumania Aker have establish an internal flexibility that 
enable the group to solve a wide range of problems, cope with cyclical fluctuations and 
thus open for new projects even at market peaks16. Further, by locating knowledge 
intensive activities at specialized units in high-cost countries, and either outsourcing all 
non-knowledge intensive activities to low-cost countries or conduct them internally at the 
Rumanian yards, the group has established an internal international division of labor that 
support rather than substitute activities in high-cost countries. Last but not least a strong 
emphasis is put on designing, establishing and maintaining a corporate ‘research, 
development and innovation network’ to harness technological synergies between units. 
Hence, according to our respondent ‘we are putting an enormous amount of resources and 
efforts into creating linkages between the different units; we have a very strong belief that 
                                                 
15 Please not that this illustrate possible tensions between different objectives sought met by the 
organisational principles of the MNE. 
16 The specialised vessel division recently signed its largest contract ever, with Maersk of Denmark. Rapid, 
reliable delivery was stated as the main reason why lower-priced offers from Asian yards were rejected in 
Akers favour.  
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strong synergies may be harnesses. For instance, we want to link Norwegian specialized 
vessel design with Finnish competencies on design for arctic conditions’.  
 
Supporting this is a clear case of co-ordination by socialization (Bartlett and Ghoshal 
1998); decentralization of decision-making power, frequent dialogue and face-to-face 
interaction between a variety of personnel and ‘hands-on management’17 contribute to 
establishing a framework within which the information strain of centralization and the 
strategic and unit segmentation of  formalization is avoided, simultaneously. It supports 
the establishment of a ‘shared institutional context’ (Bathelt et al 2004) by allowing 
‘…free change of personnel between units’ (Granstrand and Sjölander 1994), thus 
fostering inter-unit learning (ibid). The high costs involved are justified only by expected 
long-term impact on capacity to innovate, and is enabled in this form – broad, direct 
personal linkages – by the fact that the number of units and the technological variety to 
be integrated is fairly limited (Herstad 2005, Forsgren 1997).   
 
Jotun operate with a long-standing principle of doing development work ‘as close to the 
end user as possible’, and basic R&D at the Sandefjord plant in Norway. In the present 
corporate structure its regional R&D labs are responsible for market adaptation of basic 
technology developed in Sandefjord, whereas the latter is responsible for quality control 
of all R&D abroad, HSE-issues and co-ordination of R&D. Thus, the corporate 
organizational set-up and the linkages between HQ and regional labs are explicitly stated 
as designed for the purpose of bridging Norwegian research, regional development and 
regional markets, and ‘strong learning effects at the Sandefjord lab’ are stated as an 
actual outcome of this. The respondents also emphasize that while HQ define playing 
rules for the regional labs, these are not financial by nature and units are allowed to cross-
subsidize each other for long periods of time given that the market or technological 
rationale is present. This eliminates individual unit opportunism (Herstad 2005), hence 
strengthening co-operation. The company has a strong emphasis on circulation of 
personnel between units, but state that this is difficult to achieve in practice at a sufficient 
scale because people do not want to relocate abroad or visit Norway for a sufficient 
period of time.  
 
As the very nature of its activities presupposes distributed competencies and inter-unit 
interaction the options faced by Wilh. Wilhelmsen concerning corporate organizational 
principles are fairly limited. Our respondents all however stress that whereas the 
traditional method of co-ordination in shipping has been centralized control-and-
command, the group has systematically built on the principles of local empowerment and 
co-ordination through ‘socialization’: “We have consciously built our competitive 
advantage on knowledge development throughout the organization, and have been careful 
about not applying the command-and-control principle so common in shipping. Rather, 
we have focused on co-operation and enabling individual and collective creativity”. This 
is stated as challenging when faced with the cultural diversity of the group: “However, 
we also need to reduce uncertainty, make sure that everybody acts according to 
expectations towards customers, and in according to intentions towards us at HQ”. The 
                                                 
17 I.e. the principles that managers on ALL levels must have first-hand knowledge of the work or 
development processes they control.  
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group has needed to establish common interpretative schemes (Bathelt et al 2004:43) and 
logics of collective action: “We stress developing an organizational culture independent 
of places, based on what we think of as the Nordic model. This particularly applies to the 
role of hierarchy and operative leaders”. Critical framework conditions in this respect are 
leadership training at the group academy, very extensive mobility of personnel and 
frequent travel between HQ and operational units. As Jotun, Wilh Wilhelmsen 
respondents stresses that the latter poses certain distinct challenges as to making 
foreigners come to Norway, and that Norwegian taxation legislation actively work 
against not having Norwegians stationed abroad, but maintaining the linkages between 
such personnel and HQ18. As a result, ‘we increasingly use Swedish personnel for this 
purpose’.  
 
The corporate structure of Tandberg Data was initially characterized by broad 
decentralization of responsibility to different marketing and sales affiliates abroad, and 
production at the US plant. However, the present-day structure is one of re-centralization. 
Extensive decentralization created problems because sales and support – towards 
professional customers – became far to decoupled from specialized engineering 
competencies of Tandberg in Norway. Re-centralization has in turn implied that very 
extensive traveling between HQ and subsidiaries has been necessitated in order to 
achieve the key connection between technical understanding and customer needs. This 
primarily takes the form of Norwegians going abroad, and inevitably result in Norwegian 
R&D becoming tighter linked to customer needs and preferences than would have been 
possible without sales offices functioning as listening posts. However, the exchange of 
personnel in the opposite direction is stated as very limited; thus also limiting the strength 
of this pipeline.  
 
Very specialized and synthetic core competencies combined with limited mutual 
exchange of personnel further result in technological synergies between HQ and units 
abroad being very difficult to harness. Our VP technology respondent e.g. point out that 
whereas R&D in the US has a long-standing tradition, the unit is still ‘fairly isolated from 
R&D in Norway. The distance is to long. People have to be present here in order to learn 
the products, learn the technology, or we have to send people over there to be present for 
quite some time’. The latter would imply investments in learning interfaces beyond what 
TD now has the financial leeway to conduct19. It is reasonable to expect that a similarly 
segmented relationship will develop between HQ and R&D units in Poland and the UK; 
described as’ fairly new, and interfaces are in the development phase and we do not know 
yet how they will consolidate’.  
 
                                                 
18 Norwegians living abroad can only be present in Norway for 60 days per year, including travel time, 
before they are defined as having moved home and thus made subject to Norwegian income taxation. This 
implies that they can only participate in a limited number of HQ meetings.  
19 On this issue there is a certain disagreement between CEO and VP Technology. Whereas the former state 
that distance can easily be overcome by using modern ICT, the latter insist on long-term face-to-face 
interaction being a prerequisite for knowledge diffusion.  
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Corporate internationalization and strategic control 
Two critical interfaces have been referred to above: The external interface between 
subsidiaries and their surrounding environment, and the internal network interface 
between subsidiaries as such and the home-base activities of DOMs. We have argued that 
both are costly, time-consuming and risky to build, as they require a significant amount 
of trial-and-error and tie up human resources for long periods of time (Bathelt et al 
2004:43, Herstad 2005:75-85, 188-198).  The empirical analysis more than anything 
illustrate these analytical points. Meeting challenges by trial, error, selection and 
temporary consolidation is in turn a process of which we will argue that the outcome is 
highly contingent on strategic control – the committedness and competencies of owners 
and managers (Narula and Zanfei 2005) respectively, the end result they have defined as 
achievable through internationalization and the corporate structure that follows from this 
strategy (Morgan 2001, Porter (red) 1992, Chandler 1962).  
 
Extending this into a system argument we argue that it is not only the national innovation 
system that forms the basis for corporate internationalization; it is also the national 
corporate governance system. The national innovation system provides the technological 
basis for firm internationalization; the corporate governance system provides the basis for 
the structure and strategy of internationalization. 
 
The case of Tandberg Data is clearly illustrative of how this aspect can translate into 
several implications for structure and strategy. From the perspective of DOMUS it is 
most interesting to observe how possible technological dynamism in the interplay 
between foreign and Norwegian R&D is not explored because of budget constraints 
imposed on investments in organizational interfaces. This extends into marketing and 
customer fronting functions of all subsidiaries not being sufficiently utilized as it 
illustrates the seemingly paradoxical situation of a small, high-end developer and 
producer, very dependent on both aggressive international marketing and its ability to be 
at the technological forefront, not being able to invest sufficiently in neither marketing 
nor product development ‘beyond finalizing the projects we are working on at present’. It 
is explicitly stated by the respondents that the main, underlying problem is budget 
constraints imposed by ‘…the short money’ that constitute its present ownership 
structure: ‘It is too much focus on indicators, on what will happen in a few week, our 
owners just don’t understand what we are trying to do and we cant make them understand 
it. We are suffering from a very stressing day-to-day existence, and cannot think ahead’.  
 
This interpretation becomes increasingly plausible when viewed against the background 
of evidence from the other case corporations. Jotun stresses how family ownership has 
enabled ‘commitment to chosen strategies over long periods of time, commitment of 
resources for long periods of time’. This applies for R&D projects, but importantly also 
for internationalization strategies and subsidiary establishments abroad: “We are dong 
things without any consideration as to effect on the bottom line. There are no specific 
requirements as to pay-back time on investments. Units are allowed to cross-subsidize 
each other according to need, and our ability to commit has proven very valuable when 
entering new markets and developing new activities abroad”. A similar picture is 
portrayed by management respondents in Wilh. Wilhelmsen: ‘The only thing that matters 
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is the long-term survival of the company. I doubt very much that we could have put so 
much effort on organizational development, and build the company group we have built,  
if we did not have a committed owner’.  
 
Earlier interviews with Kverneland Klepp management (Herstad 2000, 2003) portrayed a 
company caught between failing markets, escalating costs related to corporate 
restructuring and integration, and a strong perceived threat of a hostile take-over. They 
also revealed a strong resulting focus on protecting the market capitalization of the 
company; necessarily simultaneous with attempts at restructuring and consolidating the 
new corporate group and create the above-mentioned R&D network. The entry of the 
Umoe Group as main owner effectively blocked the threat of a take-over, and the group 
has contributed significantly to Kverneland corporate restructuring – including the 
present-day emphasis on consolidating and strengthening the R&D network of the group. 
Similarly, VP R&D and technology in Aker Yards describes how ‘Aker was owned by a 
bunch of institutional investors who had absolutely no clue about what we where doing 
and that wasn’t particularly fun. We had huge cash reserves, but our management was 
paralyzed and had no idea about what to do with it strategically”. This changed 
dramatically with the entry of RGI, the transformation of former Kvaerner and Aker 
groups respectively and the consequent establishment of the third largest shipbuilding 
group in the world: ‘We are now a dynamic and risk-willing organization’. 
 
As indicated, the purpose with these firm-level examples is to highlight a system level 
argument: Availability of financial resources to support internationalization, with an 
investment horizon compatible with the challenges of international organizational 
development, linked to owner and management strategic competencies on 
internationalization provide one of the key determinants for a) the extent of corporate 
internationalization from any given national economy; and b) the structure and success of 
corporate internationalization. A strong national performance on outward FDI thus 
appears to require a strong national industrial capital (Perez 2002) base (Fukao 1995, 
Ruigrok and van Tulder 1997, Doremus et al 1998, Morgan et al 2001, Collin 1998). 
This, in turn, is a known weakness of the Norwegian economy (NOU 2004, Roland et al 








Domestic embeddedness  
The case companies show varying degrees of home-base orientation in the strategic 
activities; but common for all companies is that those strategic functions that remain at 
home do so primarily not because of embeddedness in external relationships 
domestically, Aker Yards being a possible exception to this rule, but because reliance on 
synthetic, specialized and ‘sticky’ knowledge embedded in those same operations. We 
thus argue that the location of in-house competencies may explain external domestic 
linkages, not necessarily vice versa as often implicitly assumed. The role of the company 
as a knowledge developing entity in its own right, internally producing its own ‘inertia’ 
in R&D location by reproducing its dependence on a knowledge base held collectively by 
its domestic employees, should not be underestimated. This inertia becomes stronger with 
increasing degrees of specialization of synthetic knowledge bases, creating a stronger and 
stronger reliance on in-house competencies; making it increasingly difficult to find 
relevant partners externally and making it increasingly difficult to establish real, working 
linkages to such partners once identified. This ‘dis-embedding’ from external linkages 
has been argued to be an inherent characteristic of maturing, knowledge based companies 
in sectors necessarily operating based on specific, synthetic knowledge bases (see e.g. 
Asheim and Herstad 2005, Herstad 2003). 
 
This line of reasoning can be extended further. When foreign R&D exist on a scale of 
some significance, as in the cases of Kverneland and Aker Yards, this R&D is primarily 
triggered by acquisitions motivated by similar specialized in-house competencies of 
acquired firms – and by their external networks only to the extent that these are part-and-
parcel of the former competencies. As acquisitions are the main modes of entry into 
foreign markets for Nordic DOMs in general (Friberg (red) 2006), this can be expected to 
have validity beyond our specific selection of firms. Only in the case of Jotun do we find 
that R&D is built bottom-up in local contexts; but in this case more as adaptive 
‘development’ than the fundamental ‘research’ that remain based on the specialized, 
synthetic competencies of the Norwegian laboratory – and a consequence of acquisition 
candidates holding relevant specialized knowledge not existing in targeted markets.  
 
A very good illustrative example is Wilh. Wilhelmsen. All respondents highlight the 
importance of competencies embedded in-house at corporate and division HQs in 
Norway as the main source of localizational ‘inertia’ – to such an extent that relocating is 
stated as not an option, only rebuilding what would then inevitably be ‘…something 
different’. These competencies are reproduced through the coordinating role of group and 
division HQs, and thus directly feed on global pipelines. There are linkages to external 
innovation system actors in Norway which are stated as strengthening this inertia, namely 
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Norwegian shipping specialist lawyers and shipping specialist banks20, but these are also 
stated as decreasing in importance with the erosion of the national maritime cluster. 
Similarly, organizational embeddedness of core competencies block Tandberg Data 
cannot relocate R&D because of the. No external domestic linkages are stated as 
important; but the broader context surrounding Norwegian R&D is important in that it 
enable stability and commitment in its engineering workforce.  
 
As WW and Jotun, Aker Yards represent a large proportion of what remains of the 
national maritime cluster. It remains embedded in linkages to innovation system actors 
such as Norwegian Technical University and Marintek, and various ship design 
companies, but stresses that it sees building internal competencies in areas traditionally 
covered by external partnering is emphasized to compensate for weakening cluster 
characteristics and to ease the establishment of in-house R&D networks. Hence, Aker 
Yards strategy involves dis-embedding itself from external co-operation in Norway, 
although to the benefit of domestic in-house competence development in Norway.  
 
Given the organizational competencies that necessarily will be embedded in the domestic 
operations of internationalizing companies, relocating – in practice closing down and re-
building elsewhere - home-base strategic functions will only rarely be sensible from a 
technological point of view. Internationalization and consequent unit specialization 
following from group restructuring will necessarily result in competencies being 
accumulated at HQ, and most likely with group consolidation result in the group as a 
whole becoming increasingly dependent on the coordinating and strategically guiding 
role of HQ, thus further deepening this role. The more complex industrial systems that 
are establish, the more distinct this dynamic will be. The domestic activities of Wilh. 
Wilhelmsen provides a very clear example of this dynamic.  
 
Attempting to complement these activities by establishing strategic activities or mere 
operations abroad – be it marketing, production or R&D – may however be highly 
necessary. And further, given the important role of HQ and home-base R&D in 
coordinating activities on a world-wide scale, it will in the long run only rarely be 
sensible to disconnect home-base activities from foreign activities and/or automatically 
downsize home-base activities when foreign activities grow (not that this implies that 
companies wont do it anyway, as the case of former Kvaerner illustrate with its complete 
relocation to London, only to move home again, or fail in creating sufficient home-host 
linkages). It does however imply that domestic activities changes in nature; i.e. towards a 
stronger emphasis on basic research, certain development activities or administrative 
functions. Thus, it follows from this that domestic and foreign operations in general 
should be viewed as relationships characterized by co-evolution rather than relocation 
and substitution  
 
                                                 
20 The two largest shipping banks in the world, measured by market share, are Norwegian bank DNB NOR 





The analysis has argued that there are knowledge flows occuring between different units 
of DOMs, and that there are assymmetries in the direction of these flows that favour 
corporate domestic operations. Pipelines are existing. The question then becomes what 
these pipelines are supplying to domestic corporation and the larger NIS surrounding it, 
how and what limiations there are. There are clear challengels involved; there is a lot of 
information floating about in corporate networks to the extent that these are established; 
and well-fuctioning pipeline are balancing on knifes edge between excessive integration 
and information overolad on the one side (i.e. initially the case in both Kverneland and 
Jotun), and arms-length relations with few exchanges on the other (i.e. as in the case of 
Tandberg Data). On both sides of the knife edge the outcome can easily the the same; 
lack of real knowlege synergies within the network.  Strong decentralisation enable unit 
adaption to local markets and NIS actors, whereas strong co-ordination and integration 
create precondtions for network formation but limiti the scope for the latter adaption and 
embeddedness. 
 
From the NIS perspective additional factors need to be considered. DOMs only serve as 
global pipelines for the respective larger domestic systems to the exent that linkages to 
these systems are strong enought for externalities to occur; and to the extent that the 
external systems themselves have sufficient abosrptive capacity within the relevant 
syntetic or analytical knowledge fields in question. Quantitative data showing that DOMs 
utilise the domestic innovation system is neither sufficient to make the statement that this 
in turn creates externalities into this system, traceable back to the foreign operations of 
DOMs.  
 
The question of externalities from the DOM and implicitly its foreign operations through 
linkages to national innovation system actors cannot be resolved without in-depth 
investigation the direction of knowledge flows and thus possible assymmetries (Lam 
2002) in knowledge transfer processes within these domestic networks – and thus the 
nature of in-depth vs. arms length research collaboration. In other words; we do not know 
the extent to which the utilisation of the domestic science system occur as outsourcing of 
things that can easily be specified and conducted in isolation from everything else, or 
deeper relationships or a more reflexive (Storper 1997) and co-evolutionary character. 
Our empirical evidence on this is sufficient only for raising the question, not providing 
answers.  
 
In broader perspective externalities will of course inveitably occur through labour market 
mobility; but the extent to which they actually do are contingent on the external moblity 
of personell between different DOMs, and research instituties. In the Norwegian cases 
this mobility appear to be very limited. Limiting this mobility is of course the degree of 
firm specificy in involved knowlege bases (defining the value of researcher knowledge 
outside specific firms (Blair 1997)), combined with a lacking existence of employers 
operating in related sectors. In the words of Jotun; ’...we have nowhere to go to employ 
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researchers, and they have nowhere to go if they want to leave us’. This, in turn leads us 
to conclude that important in securing that NIS externalities occur are the existence of a 
broader cluster of related activities domestically; supplier firms, competitors and highly 
specialised research instituties supplying relevant employment opportunities for 
researchers and other strategic personell initially employeed in DOMs -  thus constituting 
a larger network able to diffuse knowledge generated through its global pipeline into NIS. 
Is these prerequisites are not met; the knowledge generated by the pipeline will remain 
inside the domestic operations of the DOM, and no or very limited externalities into NIS 
will occur.  
 
We thus conclude that domestic multinationals primarily serve as pipelines for their 
domestic NIS to the extent that the latter represent a certain critical mass within relevant 
technological fields; a critical mass consisting of competing firms, tight user-producer 
relationships and specialised research instituties linked by well-functioning external 
labour markets for specialsts. A particular illustrative general example is the Wilh. 
Wilhelmsen Group Norwegian group and divion HQs; representing global gravitation 
points for advanced and specialised (e.g. car carriers) maritime logistics whos remaining 
linkages to a weakening Norwegian maritime cluster provide fewer and fewer channels 
for spill-overs into a surrounding environment with weakening absorptive capacity.  
 
Forsgren (1997) identified the so-called ‘advantage paradox’ of the multinational 
corporation; the trade-off between technological variety (presence in a variety of 
contexts) and technological synergy (integration between different context). Following 
from this, we argue that there from a NIS perspective exist an additional advantage 
paradox between a) strong domestic NIS linkages and thus channels for spill-overs, b) 
strong network linkages within the MNE, feeding knowledge back to DOM domestic 
organisation, and c) strong linkages to innovation system actors in the host context. For 
instance, the ability of DOMs to create internal but inter-unit corporate labour markets 
dramatically increases knowledge flows within the group; but possibly at the expense of 
DOM domestic spill-overs through the labour market. Similarly, if a given R&D budget 
predominantly is used for in-house R&D and acquisition of technology domestically; this 
increases the likelihood of domestic spill-overs but decreases the likelihood of the DOM 
serving a pipeline role – of there being anything to spill over. If it for some time 
predominantly is used on organisational development and multi-unit projects within the 
group, or on R&D in subsidiaries, it dramatically increases the foreign linkage and 





Iceland: Ossur and Actavis  
 
 





The purpose of DOMUS is to “study the role of large domestic multinationals in the 
national innovation system (NIS)”. This Icelandic sub-study looks at innovation activity 
in two Icelandic domestic multinationals with the aim of exploring the links these 
companies create between the different innovation systems they are attached to, through 
their operations at home and abroad. Of special interest is the question of whether 
internationalisation of Icelandic companies has the effect of replacing or complementing 
their innovation activities at home. To do that, it is important to identify factors that 
influence localisation decisions of strategic functions, such as R&D.  
 
 
Internationalisation and innovation 
 
Once Icelandic companies decide to step outside the limits of Icelandic coastline and thus 
expand their markets and possibilities, the question becomes: what explains their 
different internationalisation patterns? New markets do not simply offer possibilities of 
selling more products developed and produced at home or getting them developed and 
produced at lower costs, they have the potential of being an arena of learning, and 
therefore enhancing the possibilities of innovation. To what extent these new possibilities 
are exploited and whether they have the effect of strengthening or weakening home 
functions, especially the knowledge-intensive activities at home, is among other things 
linked to the organisational structure of the company. The organisational structure is, in 
turn, highly linked to the technological and sectorial nature of the firm. Thus, 
technological and sectorial differences can account for some of the differences of patterns 
of internationalisation and organisational structural adaptation, including interaction and 
communication patters, to learning from geographically diffused sources (Narula, 2002).   
 
Various concepts have been used in order to analyse differences in the nature of 
technology and core knowledge, to understand dissimilarities in internationalisation 
patterns. First, a firm’s technology is either mature or immature. Mature technologies: 
 
Evolve slowly and demonstrate minor but consistent innovations over time 
[…] The technology is to a great extent codifiable, widely disseminated, 
and the property rights well-defined. […] Competition shifts towards 
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price, economies of scale and downstream activities in order to add value, 
as the original product is priced as a commodity (Narula, 2002: 796-797).   
 
On the other hand, immature technologies, such as those in emerging sectors, change 
rapidly and are difficult to codify. 
 
Second, different technologies require fundamentally different knowledge-bases. 
Immature technologies are based on highly tacit knowledge. Here we use the distinction 
between analytical knowledge on the one hand and synthetic knowledge on the other:  
 
Analytical knowledge is disciplinary, science-based knowledge 
generated through formal research, easily communicated using well-
established codes and easily sourced through external labour markets 
surrounding, e.g. universities or other research institutes. Synthetic 
knowledge, on the other hand, is cross-disciplinary firm or sector 
specific knowledge. It is generated more through learning-by-doing 
and trial-and-error than formal research; and it is much more difficult 
to communicate and interact around as there are no generally accepted 
codes. It is to a lesser extent […] be sourced directly from universities 
(Herstad, in print). 
 
Most companies use both types of knowledge, but what is of fundamental importance 
here, is which type dominates in the firm’s “strategic functions”, i.e. those corporate 
activities that produce and reproduce competencies that contribute to its technological 




Different mechanisms of coordination and control in MNEs imply different processes in 
the use of knowledge and organisational learning. Technological and sectorial 
characteristics are one of the factors influencing the organisational setup, communication 
and interaction. Here we distinguish between two modes of MNE organisations: 
Industrial systems and portfolios. In portfolios subsidiaries are functionally independent 
units, governed and coordinated through formalisation. The term “formalisation” refers to 
the use of management systems based on formal policies and standards, such as 
performance indicator measures (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1998). In industrial systems, 
however, emphasis is put on harnessing inter-organisational links between subsidiaries 
and headquarters. There is a closer cooperation between different units, more knowledge 
flow and thus, more potential for inter-organisational learning. Control is attained by the 
use of centralisation or socialisation rather than with measurable targets (Herstad and 
Jónsdóttir, in print). 
 
It may be hypothesised that formalisation methods are more easily applicable where core 
competencies are codifiable and rely more on analytical knowledge than synthetic. 
Furthermore, cultural differences in structures of control may exist. Bartlett and Ghoshal 
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(1998) point out that whereas formalisation is a preferred coordinative mechanism in 
American companies, European firms tend to put more emphasis on socialisation and the 
Japanese on centralisation. It is also to be emphasised that MNEs often are complex 
structures and different methods of control may be used all at the same time. Dominant 
modes of control may also be subject to various changes over time.  
 
The case study on domestic multinationals in Iceland 
 
In order to understand the role of domestic multinationals in the home NIS, case studies 
were performed in several Nordic companies. In this report, I describe the Icelandic case 
study companies, Ossur and Actavis in order to answer the question as to what extent 
these companies serve as global pipelines for the Icelandic NIS.  
 
This is essentially an explorative study and, thus, in-depth qualitative analysis is used. 
The qualitative approach’ explorative nature is especially suitable for “how” and “why” 
questions and offers the possibility of developing and clarifying concepts. Furthermore, it 
enables a focus on interactive processes and permits a study of the contextual conditions 
of phenomena and its boundaries. During the course of the study it became clear, for 
instance, that the qualitative approach served as a good way of exploring the processes 
and the meanings of “innovation” for these innovative companies, thus elucidating 
traditional and practical uses of the concept. Furthermore, it is important to note that the 
purpose of this study is not make statistical generalisations about Icelandic multinationals 
and their links to different national innovation systems, but to use them as sources to 
develop concepts and bring up potentially important issues on the question of the role of 
DOMs in the NIS.  
 
Data about the case companies was gathered from multiple sources. In each company two 
managers were interviewed. In two cases, managers were interviewed twice. The 
interviews lasted one to two hours and were digitally recoded. Furthermore, written 
material, such as year-reports, newspaper articles, interviews and web pages, was 
extensively used. 
 
The case companies 
 
Ossur is currently the second largest orthopeadics company in the world and specialises 
in two sub-fields of orthopeadics, prosthetics on the one hand and orthotics on the other. 
Prosthetics deal with the production and fitting of artificial body parts, serving people 
who have through birth defects, accidents or illness experienced amputation. As a general 
rule, prosthetics are prescribed by specialist healthcare providers, although user 
participation in the decision process is increasing. The R&D of prosthetics is based in 
Iceland. 
 
Orthotics are bracing and support products such as ankle and foot supports, wrist braces, 
back supports, collars as well as disposable medical products like scissors, clamps, gauze 
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and bandages. These products are either prescribed by specialists or sold directly to users. 
The R&D of orthotics is based in California.  
 
Ossur has been growing fast and has, in fact, been listed as one of Europe’s fastest 
growing companies. The number of employees ten folded in six years and increased from 
being 120 in 1999 to around 1200 in 2006. In 2006, around 260 (22%) employees were 
situated in Iceland. Eighty employees were in R&D, thereof 45 (56%) in Iceland. One 
fourth of the employees in manufacturing were situated in Iceland. 
 
The demand for orthopaedic products is largely dependent on two factors. First, the local 
healthcare regulatory environment. Local systems of reimbursement can be widely 
variant and complex. Therefore, the procurement process is usually quite intricate. Also, 
because of the dependency on public regulations, the orthopaedic market’s sensitivity to 
economic fluctuations is limited. Second, demographics, such as the age composition of 
the society have effects on the demand. Ageing in Western societies, as well as increase 
in diseases such as diabetes, greatly influences the orthopaedic market. 
 
North-America provides the largest market for orthopaedic products in the world and in 
2005 it accounted for 59% of the company’s total sales. The European market is Ossur’s 
second largest, with one third of the sales in 2005, the Nordic market representing around 
11% thereof. Ossur’s market position in the Nordic-Baltic region is strong and mature, 
providing less opportunities for growth than other regions. In 2005, Ossur strengthened 
its position in the Asian and Pacific region by acquiring a prosthetics distributor in 
Australia. The share of this market in total sales is still minor, accounting for only 7% in 
2005. Ossur also recently opened a small R&D unit in Hong Kong with two employees.  
 
Ossur has been listed on the Iceland Stock Exchange since 1999. Its largest shareholder is 
the Danish William Demant Invest A/S with a 37% share at the end of 2005. In January 
2006 Niels Jacobsen, chairman William Demant, declared that the company did not 
intend a takeover in Ossur (Morgunbladid, 2006). About half of the shares are in foreign 
ownership and about half is owned by Icelandic investors. The largest Icelandic investor 
is Eyrir Invest with about 15% share at the end of 2005. 
 
The generic pharmaceutical Actavis Group is also one of Iceland’s fastest growing 
companies. In 1999 it had less than 150 employees and all of them were situated in 
Iceland. In 2006 the number of employees had risen to ten thousand in 32 countries. 
Around 500 (5%) were placed in Iceland. Actavis is currently one of three to five largest 
companies in the international generic pharmaceutical industry.  
 
The Group has R&D activities in Iceland, USA, Denmark, India, Malta, Turkey and UK. 
Historically, the R&D has been centred in Iceland, but has recently been 
internationalising with new subsidiaries in the USA. The core of the headquarters is also 
in Iceland, although some of its managers are situated elsewhere. 
 
The Group produces 600 medicines in different forms from capsules to lotions for both 
professional and consumer market. The products cover all therapeutic areas, but the most 
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important are antibacterial and cardiovascular drugs. Three fourths of the products are 
marketed under the Actavis’ brand name and about 25% are sold through third party. In 
2004 the company’s name was changed from Pharmaco to Actavis in order to strengthen 
the corporate brand. This marked the Group’s increasing focus on own-label sales. Third 
party sales have accordingly been decreasing. This change has demanded the 
development of a more extensive value-chain than before.  
 
The pharmaceutical market is a very competitive one and it has been consolidating fast in 
the last years. However, most of the pharmaceutical companies either specialise in the 
European market or the American one. Very few operate in both (Birgisdóttir, 2006). 
Until recently, Actavis’ main market was Eastern Europe and the Nordic countries. 
However, in 2005, after two acquisitions in the US, the North-American market became 
the Group’s largest. Today, 42% of the company’s revenues come from USA, 27% from 
Western-Europe and 23% from Central and Eastern Europe. The recent growth in North-
America is especially important for the further development of Actavis since the US is by 
far the largest market for pharmaceuticals in the world. Furthermore, by being on both 
sides of the Atlantic Ocean it is possible to achieve synergistic effects in R&D. In 
addition, the company’s co-operation with pharmaceutical producers in India further 
enables them to remain competitive on the US market with low-cost production 
(Birgisdóttir, 2006). Actavis is a leader in the domestic market which, however, only 
accounts for about 1% of the total revenues.  
 
Actavis is listed in the Icelandic Stock Exchange. Amber International owns around 40%, 
Landsbanki 16% and Straumur-Burdarás Investment Bank 9%. Others own less than 2% 
each. 
 
Pharmaceuticals and therapeutic products were first exported from Iceland in 1990. In 
1995, the value of these exports was less than 20% of the value of imported 
pharmaceuticals. In 2006, the value of exports has outgrown the value of imports in the 
field (Birgisdóttir, 2006). In 2005, the export value of pharmaceuticals in Iceland was 
about 6 billion ISK, and almost 9 billion ISK in 2004 (Útflutningsrád Íslands, 2006). 
Both of the case companies are major actors in this process.  
 
Corporate histories and internationalisation patterns 
 
The Icelandic economy has traditionally built on fishing and agriculture. Neither Actavis 
nor Ossur grew out of traditional industrial clusters. Both are examples of entrepreneurial 
companies that were able internationalise due to the modernisation of the Icelandic 
economy in the 1990’s. The main factors in the economic changes were transformations 
in the fisheries, fully realised in 1990 and allowing capital to flow out of the fishing 
industry; decreasing regulation of flow of funds; the entrance into the European 
Economic Area in 1992; and the privatisation of the Icelandic banks that started in 1999. 
Furthermore, the considerable Icelandic pension funds, provided an important backstop 
for the expansion of Icelandic businesses.  
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Of these factors, the newly privatised Icelandic banks were, in the beginning of the 
Internationalisation, especially important for Ossur and Actavis. The banks’ knowledge 
of the Icelandic economy and the fact that they shared the vision of the companies and 
placed trust in them was an important prerequisite for the case study companies’ 
Internationalisation.  
 
In 1971 Ossur Kristinsson, a twenty-eight year old prosthetic, opened an workshop 
providing orthotics and prosthetics, together with several organisations of the disabled in 
Iceland. The workshop bore his first name, Ossur. During the seventies and most of the 
eighties, the business remained small, restrained by the tiny market in Iceland and little 
access to venture capital. R&D costs were a heavy load and mostly financed by loans 
from the Industrial Development Fund (Idnthróunarsjódur) (Morgunbladid, 1990). 
 
Fifteen years after its establishment, in 1986, Ossur was granted its first patent for a 
silicone liner. The year 1989 marked a beginning of a new period of rapid growth for the 
company. In 1990 it had twenty employees and 25% of the turnover came from export. 
The share of exports in the total sales increased dramatically in the beginning of the 
nineties. The turnover grew from being five million Icelandic ISK in 1989, to 52 million 
ISK in 1991, and further to reach 420 million ISK in 1995. 
 
In the mid-nineties, the company opened three sales-offices abroad; in Luxembourg, the 
UK and on the east-cost of the United States, with the aim of “getting closer to the 
market to get more feedback and to be able to influence the marketing more” 
(Morgunbladid, 1995). Furthermore, Ossur experimented with moving silicone 
production to the United Stated, but that proved to be too costly and the production was 
moved back to Iceland in the late nineties.  
 
Internationalisation through foreign acquisitions started in 2000. That year, two Swedish 
distributors of prosthetic products, PI Medical AB and Karlsson & Bergström AB were 
acquired and united under the name of Ossur Nordic AB. Furthermore, two US 
companies became part of Ossur, Flex Foot Inc and Century XXII Innovations, Inc. Flex 
foot was specialised in feet and Century XXII in knees so both contributed to the 
company’s more complete capacities in prosthetics.  
 
In 2001, the decision was taken to broaden Ossur’s scope of products and redefine the 
company as “an international company in healthcare sector”. The aim was to open up 
new possibilities for the company’s growth. In 2003, the first acquisition to meet this goal 
was actualised when Ossur bought the American company Generation II that was 
specialised in orthetics. In July 2005, another American company, Royce Medical 
Holding, was acquired in the same vain. In an interview with Morgunbladid in September 
2005, Árni Alvar, Ossur’s director of sales and marketing said that the acquisition to be 
an extremely important step in ensuring the continuous growth of Ossur, in particular 
because of Royce’s large size and its access to other companies and specialists in the 
health field. He said that the acquisitions would aid Ossur in its marketing of other 
products (Morgunbladid, 2005). In 2005 and 2006 Ossur acquired four other companies, 
two specialised in design and manufacturing of orthotic products and two in distribution 
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of orthopaedics. In 2006, Ossur’s subsidiaries abroad were eleven, situated in Canada, 
USA, Sweden, UK, the Netherlands and Australia. By then, close to all of the revenues 
came from foreign markets.  
 
Actavis Group’s predecessor, Pharmaco, was founded in 1956 as a purchasing alliance of 
several Icelandic apothecaries. The company started its own production for the domestic 
market in 1960. In 1981 a separate manufacturing unit, Delta, was established and 
remained in the majority ownership of Pharmaco until 1992 when the ties between the 
two companies were severed to preclude a conflict of interest.  
 
Delta started contemplating possibilities of expanding the sales abroad as early as 1985. 
Exporting started in the late eighties or early nineties, focusing on close markets in 
Germany, the UK and Nordic countries. It was, however, not until a decade later, in 
1999, that internationalisation started with Pharmaco’s acquisition of Balkanpharma in 
Bulgaria.  
 
The year 1999 was also an important one for Delta. The company had been going through 
difficult times and a new CEO, Robert Wessman was hired. Wessman’s soon realised 
that the only way for an Icelandic pharmaceutical to grow was to internationalise. 
However, at the time, few Icelandic companies had gone abroad, and Internationalisation 
was, by many stakeholders, regarded as a risky pursuit. 
 
In 2001 Delta acquired a company in Malta and a year later an Icelandic pharmaceutical, 
Omega Farma, founded in 1990. After Pharmaco’s acquisition of Delta later that same 
year a large Icelandic pharmaceutical had emerged. Wessman’s future vision of further 
internationalisation was shared by the new board, that included members who had 
experience of international business, as well as access to the necessary financial 
resources. 
 
Two years later the company’s name was changed into Actavis. The purpose of the name 
change was to create an international generic pharmaceutical company with a single 
brand identity. Although manufacturing and R&D are still key features, the top-
management has actively changed the focus towards a more service, market and sales-
oriented company.  
 
The generic pharmaceutical market is driven by patent expire. The market is highly 
competitive and therefore, it is extremely important to enter the market as soon as the 
patent expires or else the possibility of gaining an important market share is little. Prizes 
also fall rapidly after the patent expire, with the most to be gained in the first months. 
Until 1996 product-patents in pharmaceuticals were not allowed by Icelandic legislation.  
Furthermore, at that time international cooperation on patenting in Iceland was negligible 
so many patents were never registered there. This made it possible for Delta, and later 
Actavis, to start research, development and production long before the patent expire, and, 
in some cases, to stockpile products to be ready for the market as soon as it was possible 
to start the distribution. This gave the company an advantage on the market, since most 
competitors had to wait until the patent expire to begin the research and development 
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process. Early internationalisation of Actavis focused on other countries with an 
undeveloped patent legislation, like Malta and Turkey. Advantages based on patent 
regulation will decrease in the future for three main reasons. First, more patents are 
registered in Iceland than before. Second, most competitors have already established 
R&D centres in countries that allow early development of products, and third, provisions 
for pre-patent expiry activity, such as the Roche Bolar provision in the EU, have already 
been or are being adapted in many Western countries (interview with a manager at 
Actavis;  Landsbankinn, 2004).  
 
The early Internationalisation of Actavis was directed at markets in Eastern and Central 
Europe. From the start of the internationalisation it was clear that entrance into the North-
American market would be important as this is the largest market for pharmaceuticals. 
With two important acquisitions in the US in 2005 the American market this goal was 
realised. One of these acquired companies had large R&D operations. Although, R&D 
has been performed outside Iceland for a longer time, the acquisitions in 2005 marked the 
beginning of large-scale internationalisation of R&D in the Group.  
 
Recently Actavis has been investing in R&D in Iceland and opened a new R&D site in 
the fall of 2005. Furthermore, the managers interviewed felt that it was important to 
continue to keep R&D strong in Iceland, because of the patent legislation and in-house 
competencies. 
 
Currently the company owns twenty-four subsidiaries in USA, Western, Eastern and 
Central Europe, and Asia. In the beginning the focus was on Eastern and Central Europe 
where the markets were growing fast. Production was based in Malta where the cost was 
low, the Eastern and Central Europe market was near and patent legislation allowed early 
development. In general, Actavis’ acquisitions are strategically aimed at increasing 
corporate synergy, enhancing R&D capabilities and enlarging the market-coverage, both 
in terms of location of markets and products. The main aim of acquiring new R&D has 
been to expand the scope of products.  
 
Actavis’ headquarters are based in Iceland, but they are seen as a network of strategic 
functions that are not confined to one location. The finances are, for example, based in 
the UK. The executive board is what one manager I spoke to called a „virtual 
phenomena“ in the sense that they are not tied to a specific location, but meet monthly 
and have weekly phone-meetings. 
 
Motives for Internationalisation 
 
A recent survey of the motives of nineteen Icelandic companies in Internationalisation 
indicated that increased profit and access to new markets was the most common reason 
for investing abroad (Einarsson, 2006: 10B). This is also the case for the companies in 
this study. However, these general motives do not explain how the companies choose 
where to locate their international activities. 
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One of the main motives in Ossur’s Internationalisation, at least in the beginning, was to 
expand the company’s capacities to the construction of a full leg, but in Iceland there was 
mainly knowledge of liners. Thus, Flex-foot, acquired in 2000 was specialised in the 
development of prosthetic feet and Century XXII, acquired in 2003, of prosthetic knees. 
In addition to being located in the United States, which is an important market for Ossur, 
it was essential that these acquired companies have the expertise Ossur was looking for, 
in order to expand the company’s product line. In-house knowledge of the acquired 
companies was thus a significant factor in the localisation choices. 
 
The main motive for the internationalisation of Delta and Pharmaco (Actavis) in the late 
nineties and early 2000’s was securing the future of the business in a increasingly 
competitive environment. With the acquisition of the Bulgarian Balkanpharma 
(Pharmaco before the merger with Delta) in 1999 and Serbian Zdravlje in 2002 the 
company seized new possibilities that emerged with the privatisation of these formerly 
government-owned companies. Delta’s first acquisition abroad was Pharmamed in Malta, 
where patent legislation allowed early development and manufacturing of patented 
pharmaceuticals. In the mid-2000’s acquisitions are aimed at expanding the market or 
acquiring competencies to develop new products. 
 
The challenges of learning globally 
       
In both of the case companies innovation is seen as a core activity incorporated into all of 
the companies’ functions. Innovation activity was, thus, not “placed” anywhere in 
particular within the company, although some locations were clearly defined as more 
“strategic” than others and seen as having enhanced capacities for innovation. In fact, the 
term “innovation” was not often used in the interviews, but rather taken-for-granted that 
innovation was a part of keeping ahead in a competitive environment. One manager 
admitted that the interview itself had provoked thoughts about innovation: “When you 
called to ask for my participation in this research, I immediately thought: why does she 
want to talk to me about innovation? I know nothing about innovation. But of course 
that’s not true. Of course we innovate all the time. We just don’t call it that” (manager at 
Actavis).  
 
Thus, for the case companies, innovation is something that is seen as part and parcel of 
the business itself. In the words of a manager at Ossur: “It’s not just some technical 
department or R&D department that is really creative. It’s not at all cut into different 
departments. So the company culture – everywhere in the company – must be creative, 
not just because with a creative culture more people participate [in innovation] but also 
because it attracts customers and good employees, who think like that too. Nobody in our 
company believes that innovation only happens in the R&D department.” 
 
In both case companies there was an organisational challenge of transforming 
information and experience into knowledge that was likely to result in innovation, or 
more precisely put – from their point of view – competitive advantage. As both 
companies had just recently internationalised, and were doing so in a rapid pace, they 
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were both, in different ways, caught up in the paradox of the multinational corporation 
pointed out by Forsgren (1997: 72): “The greater the variation in the different 
subsidiaries’ business contexts, the higher the prospects for creating new knowledge 
somewhere within the MNC. But the greater the variation in the business contexts, the 
more difficult it will be to exploit this new knowledge on a more general basis.” I will 




In general, the managers interviewed at Ossur felt that the knowledge flow within the 
company was extremely important. They wanted employees to be open and willing to 
share knowledge. Employees regularly move around the company. For instance, people 
from the headquarters sometimes go to work temporarily at subsidiaries and vice versa, 
although the latter is less frequent. Employees must also be flexible and be willing to 
move from one desk to another, sometimes according to which project they are working 
on, but also to distribute knowledge in general. Thus, the sitting arrangement is usually 
changed at least once a year.  
 
For Ossur, incremental innovation is dependent on an active knowledge flow between the 
market and R&D. Investment abroad was an important factor in keeping this knowledge 
pipeline clear and open: “Before, when we were still a very small company, we were in 
cooperation with marketing and sales firms abroad. This worked well when we were a 
small company. However, as we grew, communication with the market became more 
difficult. We broke out of this by putting up our own offices abroad and later by acquiring 
companies with sales and marketing potential. Immediately, we had a much better 
contact with the customers. This resulted in much more dynamism.” 
 
In recent years, the company has also changed its organisational structure in a way to 
encourage learning from the market. This was done by supporting close cooperation 
between the technical lead and product managers, who are responsible for the marketing. 
The technical lead are key employees at Ossur. Each technical lead is responsible for 
R&D in one group of products. They have, without exception, been with the company for 
a long time and have extensive professional knowledge and experience. A manager 
phrased the nature of the lead in this way: “The technical lead is not a position, it is 
knowledge.” 
 
The technical lead work in close collaboration with the product managers. The latter are 
specialised in the marketing of different groups of products. They are placed within the 
R&D department, so they work side by side with the technical lead. Furthermore, the 
product managers are highly mobile, paying regular visits the sales offices abroad. Their 
competencies are cross-disciplinary and they are required to have knowledge of 
individual markets as well as technical knowledge, especially because the customers are 
often specialists who “don’t want a manipulating salesperson. They want to get further”. 
In an interview, one manager stated that it was important to have very qualified people in 
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the product management: “You need knowledge and experience, or else the decision 
making-process becomes too slow and there is greater risk of mistakes”.  
 
Furthermore, product managers play an important role in building up the necessary 
agreement on the product’s utility on the market. This is important for innovation, as one 
manager stated: “The innovation must be valuable for the customer and to succeed we 
must come to an agreement with the market about the utility of the innovation. Otherwise, 
you don’t want to buy it from me and I can’t force you to. This agreement about the 
desirability and the utility of the product or service is becoming more and more 
important [for the business].” 
 
A few years ago product mangers were placed within the sales and marketing division, 
but were then moved into the R&D department. The managers interviewed felt that this 
change altered the ongoing incremental innovation and development process. With this 
arrangement, R&D receives constant and direct feedback from on the market. Processes 
have become parallel and more dynamic. The managers mentioned that the service level 
has improved as well; because technical lead and other technical staff are closer to the 
marketing process and can easily be called on to participate in the sales with their 
technical expertise. They believe that this kind of knowledge-flow has been essential for 
building up a highly innovative and dynamic company.  
 
The R&D of prosthetics is based in Iceland and is quite centralised. There are examples 
of acquired R&D knowledge in subsidiaries being moved to Iceland. For example, when 
Flex-foot was acquired in 2000, two people from Iceland went to work at the subsidiary 
for a year to learn. Subsequently, the R&D of Flex-foot was moved to Iceland, because 
managers felt that the knowledge could be used more dynamically if placed there.  
 
The centre of R&D of orthotics is centred in California. Its operations are more recent 
than the R&D in prosthetics that is centred in Iceland. Ossur intends to implicate the 
same organisational setup there as in Iceland. 
 
Subsidiaries are usually linked to the headquarters by placing people who have extensive 
knowledge of the company there. These are usually people who have been with the 
company for a considerable time and thus have personal ties to the headquarters and 
know the company culture well.  
 
In general, manufacturing can be standardised and easily relocated. However, in some 
cases manufacturing takes place in Iceland to avoid patenting. Patents require extensive 
and open descriptions of products and procedures; they can sometimes be easily copied 
and changed a little to bypass the patent. For this reason, Ossur prefers, in some cases, 
not to patent, but instead keep the knowledge close to home and within a group of key 
employees. This is possible, in particular, in cases of process innovations.  
 
In sum, Ossur’s core competencies are highly company-specialised and in general, key 
knowledge is tacit and acquired with experience. In recent years, the company has been 
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preoccupied with finding ways to encourage interaction and learning, both within and 




Generic pharmaceuticals are constrained by three important factors in their business. 
These have implications for the core competencies of companies such as Actavis. First, 
time is a key element for the generic pharmaceutical sector. Failure or success in the 
marketing of a product can, in the most extreme cases, hinge on as small time units as 
hours. Second, the generic pharmaceutical market is extremely competitive so constantly 
finding ways to reduce costs is very important. Innovation at Actavis is thus essentially 
process innovation, where the main aim is twofold, to gain time and reduce costs: “Our 
innovation is about copying products faster than the competitors. It’s about cracking the 
code faster. […] It’s all about shortening production time and lowering costs.” Third, the 
manufacturing of pharmaceuticals is subject to high quality standards. 
 
Access to competent specialists is of great importance in this context, but personal 
characteristics such as proactivity and ambition are also vital. With the urgency of 
deadlines, costs, revenues and quality, results are, in general, quantifiable. Actavis uses 
measurable indicators to monitor performance, such as Key Performance Indicators. Key 
Performance Indicators (KPIs) are metrics that quantify objectives to reflect the strategic 
performance of an organisation. At Actavis, they are directly linked to the budget, as well 
as to the system of compensations and rewards. In this way, the top management aims at 
reinforcing the behaviour of employees that is in sync with the strategy and the budget. 
Thus, it can be said that socialisation – the systematic changing of values and actions - is 
accomplished by means of formalisation. A fast and dynamic corporate culture, that fits 
the requirements of the business environment, is acquired internationally by focusing on 
a core group of managers distributed among subsidiaries:  
 
“[Our key managers] all have this “blind ambition to succeed”. And they just do what 
needs to be done. Then [they] start collecting people around [them] who also have [these 
qualities]. It is like a benign tumour, you just plug in the right places and little by little 
you get the culture [you want to get] [...]. Then you don’t have to manage that much. [...] 
You just say: “this is the frame, this is what we expect” and if you have people with the 
initiative and the inner need to succeed, you don’t really have to tell them how to do their 
job, they will find a new way. We see this every day.” 
 
Actavis’ mode of organisation is portfolio. Subsidiaries are generally very autonomous, 
especially the marketing companies that are placed in mature markets. In fact, the 
autonomy of the marketing offices abroad is seen as a key element in the company’s 
flexibility: “We admit that we know nothing about running a business in Turkey. We say 
to the Turks: You do that, that’s your job. In this way, we let the Turks sell to the Turks, 
the Russians sell to the Russians, etc”. Moreover, in late 2005, the company’s structure 
was changed in the way that sales, marketing and manufacturing were organised 
according to their geographical location to achieve a higher service-level locally and 
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increased co-operations between local units (Kaupthing bank, January 20th, 2006). The 
relationship of these subsidiaries with the headquarters is not knowledge-intensive. The 
Group is a financial back-up and provides a large pipeline of products as well as 
monitoring results. Only major marketing decisions, that also affect R&D and 
manufacturing, are taken centrally, with participation of local representatives. 
 
However, R&D is quite centralised. The centre has historically been in Iceland, but after 
an acquisition in the United States in 2005, another core has emerged. More routinised 
R&D is performed in subsidiaries in Malta and Bulgaria. The managers interviewed feel 
the centralisation is important to maximise the value of the investment in R&D. The 
centre in Iceland has access to highly-qualified and ambitious scientists: “The R&D is 
quicker in “cracking the code” [of patented pharmaceuticals] when this function is 
centralised.” Furthermore, one manager mentioned that in Iceland there was a very 
dynamic corporate culture that was of much value: “Here the scientists dare go as far as 
possible with in the limits of the ethical [...] So we try everything. And that is why we 
base our R&D in Iceland, because here we have this energy and these resources, because 
R&D is the resource of Actavis.” 
 
The knowledge flow within the Group is mostly in form of numbers and texts, with less 
needs to move people around, contrary to Ossur. For example, the R&D and sales units 
must communicate in order to take strategic decisions in R&D. This is done by looking at 
sales numbers: “So the sales department is constantly helping [R&D] by saying: O.K. 
here is a list of products that sell [...]. Here are 50 products we feel have the highest 
potential and will sell the most. Then R&D says: O.K. of these 50 you say will sell, it is 
relatively easy to develop 20, so let’s start with them.” 
 
In sum, the competitive environment of Actavis requires a corporate structure that fosters 
dynamism, flexibility and speed. The R&D of generic pharmaceuticals involves finding 
quicker and less costly ways of producing a generally well established product. Thus, 
continuous knowledge flow from the market is not important for R&D at Actavis, 
contrary to Ossur. To succeed, R&D requires good scientists with the personal 
characteristics that fit the dynamic and fast environment of Actavis, but corporate-
specific knowledge is, in general, not as essential as at Ossur. As a portfolio organisation, 
Actavis can maximise the company’s need to learn and adapt to local markets, but the 
need of transporting this knowledge back into headquarters is limited. 
 
“Internationalising” small-state advantages 
 
Although learning to do business in an international environment was a challenge for 
both case companies, managers mentioned certain advantages of coming from a small 
country. First, managers mentioned that they had to start learning from global sources at 
an earlier stage than many competitor companies from other countries. A manager at 
Ossur, for example, pointed out that the home-market was almost none, so all market 
knowledge came from abroad: “[Not having a home-market] forces us to serve different 
markets and take the different demands of different markets into consideration from the 
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very start. It is an incredible advantage to be forced to think in this way. Some of our 
competitors have not been as successful, because they feel that they need to try 
everything at home first. But other countries have other demands and you might not be 
able to get the innovation through, using a model from you home country.” 
 
Second, the managers mentioned that coming from a small country, with little hierarchy 
and bureaucracy, they often didn’t see the obstacles and complications that their foreign 
co workers focused on. This could result in easier access to information, quicker 
decision-making and less cost. A manager at Ossur took an example: “We might have the 
confidence to talk to some head of insurance policy in Germany or somewhere. We don’t 
feel it is a problem. We don’t see it as different from calling some uncle of someone who 
is the head of insurance policy in Iceland or the head insurance doctor in Iceland.” 
 
Third, the managers mentioned that the general entrepreneurial or innovative spirit in 
Iceland was an important resource in their international pursuits. In the words of a 
manager at Ossur: “There is a rich innovation spirit [in Iceland], there is not 
organisation or company that sees itself as excluded from it and everyone feels that they 
are participating in innovation. It is not like this in all countries, on the contrary, some 
countries are far from it. This is very important for the company. It affects what kind of 
employees we get, both here and elsewhere. It is important for what kind of investors we 
get. And it is important for policy orientation of the government. If people just see 
innovation as a nuisance and say: why change, we’ve done things this way for many 
years? Then there is a risk that governments actually hinder innovation.” The managers 
of both companies mention that the feel it is important to build up a structure and 
communication modes abroad that incorporate this innovative dynamism they feel at 
home.  
 
The domestic embeddedness of strategic functions. 
 
Both Ossur and Actavis are single players in their domestic market and therefore are not 
embedded by the way of strong domestic clusters. When asked why the headquarters 
were situated in Iceland, three answers were repeatedly given: historical reasons, low 
corporate taxes (18%) and, most importantly, in-house competencies. 
 
In its first years, Ossur developed partly because of a generous public health system 
where “nothing was considered too good for the clients”. Furthermore, in the beginning 
years of the internationalisation the Icelandic banks served as an essential support. In an 
interview in the Icelandic public radio station, the CEO of Ossur, Jón Sigurdsson, stated 
that the banks were “one of the main reasons why the Icelandic internationalisation has 
worked so well. [...] If Ossur hadn’t had the Icelandic banks, that believed in us and 
supported us and participated in projects abroad that have succeeded, Ossur wouldn’t be 
what it is today”. However, today the relationship with the banks is not as important and 
Sigurdsson says the company doesn’t really see itself as belonging to any country: “our 
decisions are based on where it is profitable to be”. However, after the reduction of 
corporate taxes in Iceland, to 18% he feels that “Iceland is about the best country to be in 
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[...] And this fact has resulted in increased operations in Iceland, for example we want 
our intellectual property [...] and patents to stay in Iceland and we can charge our 
subsidiaries for them” (Baldursdóttir, 2006). 
 
Since the start of its internationalisation in 1999, Actavis embeddedness to Iceland has 
been in-house competencies and knowledge, for example of its scientists, as well as in 
favourable patent legislation that allows early development of pharmaceuticals. Its 
growth can be explained, from a macro point-of-view, by the changes in the Icelandic 
economy in the last years, but from a more micro point-of-view, by the commitment of 
its CEO, Robert Wessman, and its owners.  
 
Thus, it can be said that in-house competencies are a major factor in the case companies’ 
embeddedness in Iceland. Low corporate taxes are also an important factor, as well as 




In a short study of the internationalisation of Icelandic firms, Elmarsdóttir (2002) came to 
the conclusion that the recent internationalisation of Icelandic companies has 
strengthened their operations, including their home-based operations. This is an 
indication that internationalisation, with its possibilities to grow, has not had the effect of 
hollowing-out home operations. This is in harmony with the experience of the case study 
companies in this report. In the two case companies, the knowledge-intensive R&D 
functions have remained at home, mostly because of valuable in-house competencies. 
Furthermore, internationalisation has strengthened these domestic functions by opening 
learning pipelines between different locations. This has especially been true at Ossur, 
where the knowledge is tacit and a close connection to the market is very important for 
R&D. Furthermore, there are examples where Ossur has incorporated acquired R&D 
from abroad into their headquarters.  
 
In this report, I have drawn out the characteristics of the core-competencies and the 
organisational structures of two Icelandic companies in order to understand in what ways 
they both serve as global pipelines with externalities that potentially diffuse into the 
domestic NIS. 
 
Ossur’s core knowledge base is generally more synthetic than Actavis. Thus, in the 
internationalisation phase, Ossur’s management has been more preoccupied with inter-
unit and cross-country learning than Actavis, which has been focused on achieving 
synergies to lower cost and entering the market faster. Whereas an active dialogue and 
short links between the markets and different units within the company is essential for 
Ossur, innovation is more linked to the effective use of measurable targets at Actavis. 
Thus, although this does not apply for a part of the R&D work at the company, Actavis’ 
innovation is essentially focused on improving processes. 
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Herstad (in print) hypothesises that for markets where the transaction frequency is high, 
i.e. transactions are mainly focused on specific customers, and where the firm’s market is 
mainly a professional market rather than a consumers market, the need for dense user-
producer interaction is high and, thus, there is a great need for physical proximity to the 
customers. Ossur is an example of this type of a firm. Ossur’s technology is immature in 
the sense that it is a part of emerging sectors and there is still a high rate of technological 
change. The link between local markets and the “core” innovative activity of the 
company is important.  
 
Due to the synthetic and tacit nature of Ossur’s core competencies, its gravitation nodes, 
especially at the headquarters, have strong pull-effects. Ossur’s knowledge flows between 
headquarters and subsidiaries are thus complex and cyclical, whereas at Actavis they are 
relatively pre-defined and simple. Thus, at Ossur, knowledge must constantly flow from 
R&D to the market and back with the help of actual people going back and forth. At 
Actavis, however, the flow of knowledge is by a large part in the form of numbers and 
texts.  
 
The two companies share their main centrifugal force: The extremely small Icelandic 
market. Both companies have mainly internationalised by acquisitions. For Actavis, the 
key motive for its strategy has been fast growth, by first acquiring companies with large 
capacities for growth and then by acquiring companies that allow for a larger 
geographical and product spread. Ossur’s strategy has, however, been focused on 
increasing R&D capacities and bringing the market closer by acquiring and establishing 
important relationships with stakeholders. 
 
In conclusion it can be said that the two Icelandic case study companies both represent 
R&D focused firms that have placed increased importance in becoming more service-
oriented in the last years. They both had a relatively long history as domestic companies 
before internationalising, in the late 1990’s, early 2000’s. However, the nature of their 
technologies is fundamentally different, which to some extent explains their different 
adaptation to learning from geographically diffused sources. Despite, these differences, 













The below DOMUS sub-study, aims at, with five examples of Danish multinational 
companies, to give some insights into these companies´ internationalisation strategies 
with regard to innovation, here primarily understood as R&D. (Four of the companies 
were interviewed). The study, on the background of the companies’ R&D 
internationalisation motives further discuss the impact of the R&D internationalisation on 
the Danish innovation system and of the innovation system prerequisites for 
internationalisation. 
 
R&D is a rather narrow delimitation of innovation. The reason for the narrow definition 
has been both operational, as well as more analytical and policy oriented. Increasing 
internationalisation in the form of moving sales and production activities abroad has 
taken place. Increasing internationalisation of R&D may follow; better understanding of 
the patterns and motives for this internationalisation, may point to both the benefits and 
the negative consequences of this development, internationally and for the national 
innovation systems, and thus also to the possible accompanying policies.  
 
The companies were selected among Danish companies with substantial R&D and with 
R&D activities abroad. This means the representation of two pharmaceutical companies 
and one company with some pharmaceutical activities among the five selected 
companies. The food sector, which in Denmark comes second with regard to the size of 
the manufacturing sector’s R&D with 10% of the R&D in the manufacturing sector, is 
not represented, primarily because we did not find indications of R&D investments 
abroad. 
 




Large companies with high R&D intensity have been selected for the interviews; all 
selected companies have substantial R&D.  The five companies account for 
approximately 30% of private R&D; the pharmaceutical company Novo Nordisk A/S 
alone, accounts for about 16% of private R&D.   
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Though the Danish innovation system often has been referred to as characterized by 
small and medium sized companies basing their development on clever use of 
technologies developed elsewhere, industry and R&D politicians increasingly refer to 
R&D as potentially getting an increasing influence on innovation. Increasing industrial 
R&D in recent years has contributed to this assumption about increasing importance of 
R&D for innovation and growth. 
 
Danish companies are also referred to as increasingly basing their innovation on foreign 
R&D, though Denmark as a small open economy long has depended on foreign markets 
for expansion, as well as having depended on knowledge from abroad for innovation. 
According to Statistics Denmark, 2006, concurrently 623 multinational Danish parent 
companies are registered, having 3680 affiliates in 2005.   
 
A number of large companies have been representatives for the internationalisation by 
establishing affiliates abroad very early. Currently, however, there seems to be an 
additional increase in foreign direct investments in R&D abroad, emphasising that not 
only is the national innovation increasingly being based on formal R&D, this increase 
simultaneously, as a consequence or as a prerequisite requires access to foreign R&D.  
  
This development in foreign R&D investments seems still to take place in large 
companies. Amongst the increasing amount of companies that in Statistics Denmark, 
2006, state to plan on having R&D abroad in the future, there may be more small and 
medium sized companies. However,  much in the existing literature touching upon 
investments in R&D abroad point to the large (already) multinational companies to be the 
ones having or establishing R&D abroad (see for example Benito et al., 2003). 
 
Though the picture consequently is that the big multinationals dominate with regard to 
R&D FDIs abroad, we also looked for examples of small DOMs with R&D abroad. We 
did not find any. But they may exist, and could have added to the picture of how R&D 
FDIs contribute to the Danish innovation system and will in the future probably be more 
important.  
 
This selection of companies with own R&D affiliates may have overlooked the recent 
tendency (after 2000) in outsourcing of innovative and R&D activities to companies 
abroad, which are not belonging to the same company. This development is amongst 
other referred by Maskell et al, June 2005 and also the R&D statistics from CFA (CFA, 
1999-2005 ) show an increasing amount of bought R&D from affiliates not belonging to 
the company. If this tendency goes for large or small companies cannot be said. Two 
hypotheses going in each directions have been forwarded: One being that large 
companies with experience abroad face less uncertainty than small companies when they 
outsource because of their international, or even host country experience; the other being 
that small companies do not have the capital and resources to establish own affiliates, and 




The companies we interviewed are all from the manufacturing sector. It should be noted, 
however, that it seems as if Danish companies in the service and transport sector have 
many more people employed abroad than the manufacturing sector. According to 
Statistics Denmark, 2006, generally only 28% of the employees in industry’s foreign 
affiliates are employed in the manufacturing sector, while 61 % are found in the service 
and transport sector. 
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R&D expenditure, € 74  237 103 678 
Turnover, million € 2378  583.7 1298 803 4531 
Employees outside 
Denmark 
4968  3061  9683 
 
Foreign sales  95%   99% 
R&D intensity (R&D 
expenditure/turnover) 
3  18.2 12.9 15.1  








 Owned by the 
NovoNordisk 
Fund 




Source: Annual reports, websites and interviews. 
 
 
All 5 companies have their headquarters located in Denmark, in or around Copenhagen. 
With exception of Danisco which have a strong part of its R&D in Aarhus in Jutland the 
R&D departments are also in the Copenhagen area. The concentration of headquarters 
and R&D in and around Copenhagen is in general, more prevalent for the chemical and 
pharmaceutical industries than for industry in general. A number of the large 
multinational companies with R&D are found in Jutland (Arla Foods, Danfoss, Grundfos, 
LEGO, Bang & Olufsen), but these seemingly invest less in R&D affiliates abroad and 
have a lower R&D intensity in general. (‘Seemingly’ is used to indicate, that we have not 
collected very rigid data for this). 
 
A request for interview, slightly adapted to the individual company, was sent to the R&D 
director in 4 multinational companies in November 2005. Interviews were taken in 
December 2005 and January 2006, and lasted between 25 minutes (short because of 
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company time pressure) and 1½ hour. In all four cases the interview was taken with the 
addressed person (see list at the back). 
  
The interviews followed the semi-structured project interview guide which was made to 
cover 
 
- company background regarding history, ownership, localisation, production, 
customers, suppliers and foreign direct investments (only if supplementing annual 
reports or company web sites is regarded as necessary) 
- explaining foreign investments and collaborations and their background 
- the importance of foreign investments for  company organisation  
- a discussion of the importance of foreign investments/collaborations for 
innovation in Denmark – preferably with examples (rise or fall in innovations 
with background in Denmark, fewer or more collaborations in Denmark, what 
competences are ploughed back to Denmark, what competences are transferred to 
the host country, shifts in business areas etc.)  
 
A number of surveys have given some indications of the development of R&D in 
Denmark and R&D in Danish foreign affiliates. Together with the referred work in 
chapter 1, some of the questions raised to the interview material are:  
 
1) The general picture of eg. UNCTAD and Statistics Denmark, 2006, is that R&D 
investments are made in high income countries to augment the R&D of the home 
base, and provide the company with knowledge that the national innovation 
system cannot. Several surveys, eg. Statistics Denmark, 2006, foresee this to 
change, so that cost arguments increasingly may be a localisation factor for R&D 
in the future. Companies have been asked on their motivation for the location of 
their R&D, and specifically about where different kinds of R&D are located or are 
planned to be located. 
 
2) Another argument for localisation in high income countries have in literature been 
advanced as market access (in a market with a certain demand). With FDI 
localisation for a large part being in high income countries, it is questioned from 
the interview material, to what extent this argument also goes for R&D 
localisation. 
 
3) The argument or question about localisation in high income countries has been 
taken a little further, by also asking if regulation and specific market requests in 
the country of the affiliate have been a motivation for location near to the 
customers, whether business or organisational costumers or consumers. 
 
4) The issue about if FDIs are made as asset augmenting or asset exploiting, 
becomes important also with regard to the effect on the national innovation 
system. The DI survey (DI, 2003), points to that 70 % of the companies in the 
survey transfer knowledge from the Danish home base to the foreign affiliates to a 
large or relatively large degree, whereas less, namely 50% of companies refer to 
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knowledge going back to the home base from the foreign affiliate to a large or 
relatively large extent; only app. 12% say that knowledge to a large extent is 
ploughed back to the Danish home base. It is thus indicated that 70% of 
companies are asset exploiting, whereas the 50% of companies asset augmenting 
to some degree. 
 
5) Part of the R&D internationalisation discussion has taken up the issue of 
codification, too, in relation to both marketing, production and R&D. In DI, 2003, 
the way of knowledge and R&D transfer was asked, and found often to be a 
combination of personal transfer and codification. The personal transfer however 
was more dominant, than the codified form. It could be hypothesised that the asset 
exploiting strategy to a larger extent would use codification in the form of blue 
prints etc. to transfer well known procedures etc. to affiliate researchers, already 
aquainted with the technology, whereas the asset augmenting strategy, aiming at 
creating or transferring new knowledge, would require more personal, hands on 
education of other researchers.   
 
 




Turnover: 4501 mio. € in 2005 (33760 mio. DKK) 
Employees: 22000 
 
Novo Nordisk A/S is a merger of the two Danish pharmaceutical companies, Novo 
Industry A/S and Nordisk Gentofte A/S, a merger that took place in 1989. Both 
companies were among the largest world producers of insulin. 
 
Nordisk Insulinlaboratorium, later Nordisk Gentofte A/S had started in 1923, Novo 
Teraputiske Laboratorium, Later Novo A/S two years later, when two brothers working 
for Nordisk Gentofte left Nordisk Gentofte and started their own production of insulin 
and syringes. 
 
NovoNordisk A/S on their web site presents themselves as  
’a healthcare company and a world leader in diabetes care. The company has the 
broadest diabetes product portfolio in the industry, including the most advanced products 
within the area of insulin delivery systems. In addition, Novo Nordisk has a leading 
position within areas such as haemostasis management, growth hormone therapy and 
hormone replacement therapy’.  
 




Novo Nordisk A/S’s headquarter is in Denmark, and the company employs 
approximately 22,000 full-time employees in 79 countries, and markets its products in 
179 countries. 55% of the workforce is employed in Denmark, 15.1% (16.5%) is 
employed in R&D, 38.8% in production and 27%. 7% in sales 
(http://www.novonordisk.com/about_us/facts_and_figures/facts.asp, accessed 040506). 
 







Turnover: 9,733 mio. DKK (2004) 
Employment: 4,993, of which 1,932 is employed in Denmark.  
 
Lundbeck A/S is a pharmaceutical company producing pharmaceutical products to help 
patients with problems in Central Nervous System (CNS). Especially in diseases as 
depression, schizophrenia, Alzheimer´s disease, Parkinson ’s disease and insomnia.  
 
85% of revenues come from sales in Europe and the US. 
 
The company has sales offices, production facilities and R&D laboratories in more than 
60 countries. 80% of employment is found in Europe, app. equally dived between 
Denmark and the rest of Europe. 20.7 % of employment is in R&D; and 43.8 % is in 
sales & marketing 
 
Production (Synthesis factories) takes place in Denmark, Italy, and UK 
 
Research is identified to take place in Denmark, headquarter and in Lundbeck Research 
USA, Inc. 
Far the largest part takes place in Europe (see annual report, 2005/Denmark) 
 
Clinical research is stated to take place in Denmark, Europe, Canada 







Turnover: 2378 mio. € (DKK17835 mio. DKK) 
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Employment: 9235 (2004), of which 46.2% in Denmark, Scandinavia and the rest of 
Western Europe, 7.7% in Eastern Europe, 14.1% in North America, 7.8% in Latin 
America and 13.6 in Oceania and the Pacific. 
 
Danisco was established in 1989. But the core is the old national Sugar Company 
established in 1872. According to its web site ‘Danisco is one of the world’s leading 
producers of food ingredients, sugar and technical enzymes, partly produced using 
biotechnology’ (authors’ translation from 
http://www.danisco.com/cms/resources/file/eb93ea452a5afbb/Danisco_DK_screen.pdf, 
accessed 18/11-2005). It is stated that the majority of ingredients are produced from 
natural raw materials. Their products are mainly used in the food industry for instance to 
improve the texture in bread and ice cream but are also applied to feed, cleaning, textiles 
and plastics.  
 
Danisco A/S further states themselves to be one of the largest and most efficient sugar 
producers in Europe. The production has been based on farmer contracts; also the 
development of sugar beet seeds have been important, and were from early on engaged in 
developing genetically engineered pest resistant sugar beets. 
 
The Danisco group employs approx. 10,000 employees in more than 40 countries and has 




The company states a considerable proportion of the employees to be engaged in research 
and development (1000 in 2004), and according to their web site holds 2000 patent or 
patent applications. 
 






Turnover: 803.2 mio. €  in 2004 (6024 mio. DKK)  
Employment: app. 4000, of which half in Denmark. 
 
Novozymes A/S a biotech-based world leader in enzymes and micro-organisms.  
 
In 2000, Novozymes A/S demerged from Novo Nordisk A/S, which was and is a world 
leader in diabetes care. Enzyme production started as a side production to insulin in Novo 
A/S in 1939. From 1941 the enzyme trypsin was commercially extracted from the same 
glands as the insulin, and used in the leather industry to soften the hides. 
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In 1952 Novo A/S produced their first fermented enzyme, a process that has been used 
for enzyme production since then. In 1962 the first enzyme for detergents was marketed, 
and used in Biotex. 
 
In the beginning of the eighties, Novo A/S started R&D in genetic engineering, primarily 
in relation to their insulin production, but with potentials also for enzyme production.In 
1984, Novo A/S launched their first enzyme produced by genetically modified 
organisms, an enzyme for the starch industry. In 1988, genetic modification was also 
used for the production of a detergent enzyme. In 1987, a genetically modified insulin 
was brought to the market. In 1992, expression cloning was invented, which speeded up 
research and development, and brought new enzymes quicker to the market. 
 
With the focus in the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s on environmental sustainability, 
the industrial enzymes were promoted as a technology that could reduce resource use and 
exploitation and which could potentially substitute unwanted chemicals. Enzymes in 
detergents that could reduce washing temperature and water supply, enzymes that could 
substitute stones and chlorine in stonewashed jeans, enzymes that could reduce chlorine 
and water use in paper production, enzymes that could enable more juice to be extracted 
from the fruits in juice production, and enzymes to enhance pigs’ uptake of phosphor 
from feed etc. 
 
 




Turnover: 583.7 mio. € 
Employees: 3370 (2003) 
 
The company was established in 1915. In 1948 all the assets of the company was handed 
over to the J.C. Hempel Foundation, which is sole shareholder of Hempel A/S. Hempel 




The company develops and produces marine paints, container paints and decorative 
paints, which are produced and sold internationally. It has invested heavily (their own 
wording) in innovation in recent years, and are known for addressing for example 
functionalities related to the environment, and different climatic conditions in 
development of their products. An affiliate was established in Barcelona to be able to 
address the warmer water and thus other conditions in the Mediterranean and have 




The company has expanded its R&D in recent years, but does not give figures for the 
number of employees. Hempel A/S states to have 3 research centres, and 3 regional 






Regarding market structure, all companies regard themselves as small companies in an 
international context, but are at the same time among the world leaders within their 
fields: NovoNordisk A/S in diabetes care (51% of the world insulin market measured in 
volume), human growth hormone and blood coagulation products, Lundbeck A/S in 
antidepressives, Novozymes A/S and Danisco A/S in industrial enzymes, and Hempel 
A/S within marine paints, including container paints. 
 
The pharmaceutical companies, NovoNordisk A/S and Lundbeck A/S, deliver products 
and treatment systems for prescribed drugs, and sales go through doctors and health care 
systems. Both companies refer to close cooperation with doctors and health care systems 
on the development of the drugs and the delivery systems. 
 
The other 3 companies – Novozymes A/S, Danisco A/S and Hempel A/S sell their 
products to industrial users. Novozymes A/S and Hempel A/S refer explicitly to 
collaboration with customers or customer contacts as important for their R&D. 
  
Regarding the location of customers, consumers for Danish industrial products are 
primarily high income countries, and also for the case companies, sales in high income 
countries dominate. For NovoNordisk A/S, Novozymes A/S and Hempel A/S, China was 
reported to be a very important and increasingly important market. Some of the more 
specific locations are mentioned below:  
 
NovoNordisk A/S had the major share of its total sales in Europe, followed by the US, 
International operations, and Japan and Oceania. About 70% of NovoNordisk A/S 
turnover is within insulin, and in China NovoNordisk A/S has 60% of the market in 
volume. 
 
Lundbeck A/S has sales offices in 41 countries. Europe is far the largest market with 56% 
of sales, and the US comes second with 29%. In 2002, 80% of Lundbeck A/S’s  products 
addressed depression, products primarily addressing diseases treated in the high income 
countries. Also the new products for the treatment of Alzheimers disease and Parkinsons 
are diseases addressed in the industrialised, high income countries. 
 
The largest markets for Novozymes A/S are the US and China. Many of Novozymes 
A/S’s products are developed to the markets in Western Europe and the US, but 
Novozymes A/S sees large potentials in developing products to the Chinese market. In 
addition, many of Novozymes’ US and Western European costumers move production of 
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amongst other textiles to China, and Novozymes A/S’ follow. R&D in enzymes for 
textile production was formerly located in the US. 
 
Danisco A/S has sales offices and production in a large number of countries, either 
motivated by where customers or raw materials are. 
 
The argument about their industrial customers increasingly being in China and the 
company’s activities needing to follow, is forwarded by Hempel A/S, too. The major 
share of the world’s container production takes place in China, so development of paint 
for these has been established in China. 
 
Regarding ownership structure, all five countries are shareholder companies. Apart from 
Danisco the companies are owned and governed by funds with a strong commitment for 
medical development and independence of the companies . This has in part been taken as 
an explanation of the rather strong home-base of the companies, with headquarters and 
R&D base in Denmark. 
 
Motives for internationalisation of R&D 
The general picture as given in literature has been the establishment of sales offices as the 
first FDI initiative, followed by FDIs in production. This picture may also be seen as the 
main order of succession in the interviewed Danish companies and in NovoNordisk A/S, 
but with important nuances. The localisation of R&D in connection with production 
seems to be a lot less pronounced than referred to in literature. And though, in cases 
where localisation is referred to as related to their markets, the reasons for market 
nearness can be nuanced both with access to customer requests, access to regulation 
environment, closeness to production because of economic benefits of localising 
production close to the customers, and state ‘requirements’, wishes or incentives.  
 
The establishment of R&D departments abroad have in general taken place after the 
establishment of sales, while the relation between production and R&D departments are 
less unambiguous.  
The three most R&D intensive companies - the two  pharmaceutical companies and 
Novozymes A/S - have a modest share of the R&D taking place abroad, and also moved 
R&D abroad very late. 
 
Location of R&D departments primarily takes place in the US and Western Europe, 
though Singapore, China and India are regarded as new locations, and also have attracted 
certain R&D investments. 
 
 A couple of companies state   South America as a potential site for future R&D 
investments, and as an increasing market. For Novozymes A/S this is especially related to 
energy production, including production of bioethanol. 
 
 
Table: R&D employment in Denmark and abroad 
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 Denmark Europe, 
outside 
Denmark 
The US Japan China India Other 
NovoNordisk 
A/S 
App. 3540  21-42  60   
Lundbeck A/S App. 1000  ?     
Danisco 350 350     350* 
Novozymes 
A/S 
600  100 
(+30) 
35-40 50-60   
Hempel A/S 40% 20-25%** 5%  10%  15%*** 
        
 
*Including the US, Brazil, Mexico, Singapore, Japan, Australia and India 
** Spain 
*** Singapore and UAE: 
 
Novozymes A/S has about 80% (app. 600) researchers in Denmark. Though they have 
been expanding mostly abroad recently, the major share of R&D is still expected to be 
located in Denmark. The building up of R&D within micro-organisms takes place mostly 
in the US. Novozymes A/S outsourcing compared to FDIs in R&D is estimated to be 
between 5 and 8% of their R&D. 
 
Danisco A/S refers to 1/3 of R&D taking place in Denmark, 1/3 in the rest of Europe 
(Finland, the Netherlands, the UK, Germany, Belgium and France) and 1/3 in the rest of 
the world. It has thus more employees in research outside Denmark, and has far the 
largest share of the R&D taking place abroad of the interviewed companies. Very few of 
the FDI are green field investments. They outsource to a very limited extent, and mostly 
very specific projects. 
 
In general, Hempel A/S’s FDIs are made close to the markets. Compared to the 
pharmaceutical industry, production costs are important, but there is still limited export 
from low income countries to high income countries. However, because container 
production is located in China because of low costs, the paint production is also located 
here. The application and area specific oriented R&D is located in abroad, whereas more 
general applicable R&D, including R&D in sustainable paints and speed processing 
R&D, are located in Denmark  and Spain. Only 4-5% of Hempel A/S’s sales are in 
Denmark. 
 
The dominating motive for establishing R&D abroad, especially for the pharmaceutical 
companies (Lundbeck A/S and NovoNordisk A/S) and for Novozymes A/S, is for to get 
access to scientific knowledge, not available in Denmark or for to get access to 
knowledge for which there is a shortage in Denmark. Especially for the pharmaceutical 
companies, the knowledge requested is knowledge adding to the knowledge they have 
within specific areas. The motives for Hempel A/S (marine, industry and decorative 
paints) have been different. Here the motives have been a combination of test 




Though the companies, with NovoNordisk A/S as the most explicit in their internet 
information (http://www.novonordisk.com/images/about_us/history/history_uk.pdf) state 
international knowledge to have been very important for their technology development, 
the establishment of R&D affiliates abroad takes place relatively late.  
 
In NovoNordisk A/S sales was established in South Africa in 1959, in Norway in 1965 
and 1974, in Switzerland in 1968, in 1971 in Sweden, in 1972 in Finland, in 1973 in 
Germany, and a lot of European countries followed with sales offices in the following 
years. 
 
Though NovoNordisk A/S states to have started production in France as early as in 1959, 
the next investments are given as having taken place much later. In Japan production is 
stated to have been initiated in 1980, in the US in 1991 and 2005, in China in 1994, in 
Brazil 2002 and in Mexico in 2004. 
 
R&D abroad is referred to be established rather late: In China in 2002 (according to 
www.mediconvalley.com, China was the first R&D affiliate abroad) and in the United 
States in 2005 (NovoNordisk A/S, 2005). R&D collaborations are found to take place 
with a number of American companies and institutions from the 1980s, and R&D has 
further been carried out with the associated companies ZymoGenetics Inc. since 1988 and 
Daco A/S since 1992.  
 
More specifically, R&D was initiated in China to expand NovoNordisk A/S’s knowledge 
in bacterial expression of recombinant proteins and in protein chemistry 
(www.mediconvalley.com). The R&D Centre in North Brunswick, New Jersey in the US, 
has been established ‘to provide additional scientific support for building the company’s 
haemostasis business’. In a press release it says that ‘Researchers at the facility will 
investigate new therapies to prevent or stop critical bleeding, including exploration of 
treatments for intracerebral hemorrhage, trauma, stroke and other bleeding disorders.’ 
Some of the motivation for the US investment has been a number of research institutions 
known for their excellence, and the presence of both industry and academic institutions in 
the area have contributed to the actual localisation in the Greater New Brunswick 
Innovation Zone. 
 
In Lundbeck A/S, sales have generally been internationalised before other functions. 
Production takes place in three places in addition to the production in Denmark, namely 
Hungary, the UK and Italy. In some cases, clinical research has been established together 
with the sales department or as a separate affiliate.  
Packaging facilities are often established in the country where the products are marketed, 
as an ‘employment benefit’ to the country or the state in the country of purchase. 
 
Approximately 1000 of the R&D employees are employed in Denmark (Lundbeck, 
annual report 2005). Investments in the R&D activities abroad are very recent. For the 
R&D investments Lundbeck A/S both in Denmark and abroad, distinguishes between 
early R&D, development and testing, where the early R&D is carried out in a limited 
 62
number of locations, at the moment in Denmark, in the US from 2002 and in China from 
2004-2005, whereas development is carried out in several countries in Europe, Asia and 
Latin America. Developments can be relatively general, or, as for example in the case of 
the activities in Paris, France, very specific. 
  
Lundbeck A/S’s R&D in China and in the US has been established through buying up of 
existing companies. It has been regarded as an advantage to buy into companies that had 
demonstrated their competences and which therefore had knowledge on the society and 
had the contacts. 
 
In both China and the US the contacts to private and public R&D in the area has been 
important, and also regarding the Danish research external contacts to universities etc. is 
referred to be important.  
 
For the early R&D, the main motivation for investing abroad has been access to R&D 
personnel not available or not available in sufficient quantity in Denmark. It is stated that 
when Lundbeck A/S or the industry in general is going into new areas, the critical mass 
in Denmark is too small. In addition, very specific qualifications are requested that 
Denmark may not have. So though they generally find that many things are easier, if 
research is kept in Denmark and carried out by candidates educated in Denmark, and can 
be managed from offices close by, they will probably increasingly invest in R&D abroad, 
compared to the R&D investments made in Denmark. The company has recently given 
money to establish a new R&D professorship at the Pharmaceutical University to make a 
small contribution to increasing the R&D in Denmark, which is stated to be a lot less 
prioritized than in other countries. 
 
Novozymes A/S also mentions a different order of succession for their FDIs, in which 
sales or R&D comes first. Production in Denmark is largest and employs 939 (55% of 
employees in production), the US comes second with 386 employees, China third with 
250, and Brazil and Sweden fourth and fifth with 90 and 55, respectively.  
 
Novozymes started R&D abroad early: In the US in the 1970s (when it was still Novo), 
in Japan in the 1980s (when it was still Novo A/S), and in China in the 1990s (when it 
was NovoNordisk A/S). The motives are given to have been the access to very qualified 
researcher, the access to knowledge on the markets that they serve or that they want to 
serve.  
 
Especially in China, the second largest potential market, a large number of new enzymes 
and applications are expected to be developed in response to demands that are different to 
the western markets. This diversity in developments is regarded as contributions to 
innovation and the growth of new markets.  
 
Costs are mentioned specifically not to play any a role in the localisation of R&D, except 
for, for example, very labour intensive tasks, such as in their large scale laundry in China 
with employment of local non-academic and non-English speaking workers. Novozymes 
A/S dominating position on the market and their technological lead, is referred to be a 
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reason for the strategy of investing where qualifications were high and could bring new 
knowledge into the R&D. This, as referred by Novozymes A/S, is not to say that costs do 
not matter, but they have been able to afford a lead strategy. And the costs of attracting 
English speaking Chinese with the right R&D qualifications were referred to as as high 
and in Western Europe. 
 
Danisco A/S started their international expansion in the 1980s, and it accelerated in the 
1990s. Danisco A/S however did not go after R&D specifically, but had expansion as an 
explicit strategy.  Sugar, within which they had substantial activities, had been foreseen 
to decrease in importance, and the strategy was to expand through investments in foods 
and ingredients. 
 
Danisco A/S refers to acquisition companies and their knowledge as the dominating 
motive for their FDI in R&D. The buying up of companies is part of the strategy of 
becoming larger and the best within ingredients. The R&D comes with the purchase of 
new companies, and the R&D in these is usually embedded in the company and 
environment, and they are therefore attempted integrated into the existing R&D 
organisation rather than moved. An exception was the establishment of R&D in Brazil, 
which was motivated by nearness to an increasing market, where it was regarded as 
important to know of local food cultures, for example. The same argument has been used 
about R&D allocation in China and South East Asia. Costs are explicitly mentioned as 
not being a motive. The company is not heavy on salary, and their products add to the 
value of other products of which they constitute a small share. 
 
The purchase of Genencor to some extent overlapped with Danisco A/S’s knowledge on 
ingredients and biotechnology, but also added important competences in industrial 
enzymes and enzyme production.  
 
The reason for investing in own subsidiaries compared to outsourcing is referred in the 
interview to be the difficulties in protecting the knowledge. The argument about access to 
local authorities, advanced by the pharmaceutical companies, is not referred to as an 
argument by Danisco A/S, neither for production, nor for R&D. They do not consider 
their activities as posing any risk.  
 
Hempel A/S, started exports in 1920, 5 years after its start in 1915. In the following years 
production abroad was started on licenses. The establishment of R&D abroad was 
however not until the 1970s, about ten years later than the initiation of more systematic 
R&D in Denmark. 
 
Hempels A/S’s motivation for establishing R&D abroad is referred to as a mixture of 
access to certain knowledge and to favourable testing conditions, and as access to market 
and regulatory requests. The main share of R&D is carried out in Denmark, focussing on 
developing more environmental sustainable paint (for example the reducing of the dry 
matter content) and on increasing the speed of the chemical process (drying for example).  
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The more systematic R&D activities were started in Denmark in the 1960s and in Spain 
in the 1970s, and have expanded since then. The activities elsewhere are later, in China 
from the mid- 1990s and in Singapore from 2003. Today the R&D activities are divided 
between Denmark with app. 40%, Spain with 20-25%, China and Singapore with app. 
10%, respectively and the rest related to the production sites elsewhere. 
 
Hempel A/S’s establishment of more systematic research and development in Spain in 
1970s, was motivated by a traditional large market for their products in Spain and the 
possibility of testing their anti fouling the paints in warm waters and the year round.  
 
The applied research and development departments in China, Singapore and the small 
application oriented activities in The United Arab Emirates and the US (and earlier in 
Kuwait, Portugal and France) have also been motivated with the importance of being able 
to have market and regulation requests fed back to production. In Singapore state support 
contributed to the decision of localising close to the production facilities. 
 
Closeness to an innovation environment has been an additional factor for localisation in 
Denmark next to the Technical University of Denmark and close to other R&D and 
educational institutions. Also in Spain, the localisation in Barcelona has benefited from 
the closeness to various expertises on marine paints. 
 
Outsourcing of R&D plays a modest role. An estimate is that between 5 and 8 % of R&D 
comes from external, mostly foreign, contracts. These contracts are made primarily with 
private companies, while university collaborations are to a larger extend based on mutual 
exchange. Joint R&D applications to public programmes with universities are regarded as 
too costly, and Novozymes A/S therefore hardly takes part in these any more.  
 
Corporate organizational principles 
 
The corporate organisational principles have been regarded as important as indications of 
the flows of knowledge between both the different functions in the company, the different 
locations of the company and also within the broader innovation systems in the individual 
countries and between countries. 
 
The focus here has been a first attempt to identify indications of how the R&D flow 
between the companies take place and what the prerequisites for these flows to take place 
are, according to the interviewed companies.  
 
This focus thus indicates that it is assumed that knowledge sharing is positive and 
conducive for innovation, and that exchange of knowledge is pursued by the companies. 
This view may be in contrast to views that regard competition between different company 
affiliates and between research institutions, as general drivers of innovation.  
 
The formerly cited survey by Danish Industry, 2003, has asked about knowledge sharing 
between Danish companies and their foreign affiliates. Among the responding companies 
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in the survey, DI, 2003 find a considerable amount of knowledge going from the Danish 
companies to their affiliates abroad, and a lesser amount, primarily technical know how, 
going from the foreign affiliates to Denmark. Concurrently, the survey finds the 
employment in the foreign affiliates to have a higher education, to some extent explained 
by a lower share of employment in production in the affiliates abroad. 
 
However, in our interviews the companies, the ploughing back of new knowledge to the 
Danish headquarter to a large extent is referred to as essential. this is somewhat in 
contrast to the general conclusion by DI, 2003, but must on the other hand be ascribed to 
both the selection of high tech companies and these companies’ knowledge enhancing 
motivate for investing in R&D abroad. Especially the pharmaceutical companies and 
Novozymes A/S, request rather specific knowledge, not available in Denmark. Where 
R&D was established in connection to production to have market and regulatory requests 
reflected in product development, coordination with the R&D headquarter or other R&D 
departments were not so essential. 
 
The companies indicate to be very  engaged in finding ways of exchanging knowledge to 
increase mutual learning. Several of the companies stated the internationalisation of R&D 
as a large management challenge, involving formalisation of exchange via patents, 
contracts, documents etc., as well as exchange of personnel. 
 
Lundbeck A/S referred to their initiatives regarding the exchange of knowledge of what 
they term early R&D. Exchange of personnel is considered very important for the 
exchange of knowledge, and the planning of exchange with the recently acquired Chinese 
affiliates was mentioned as being worked on. Special attention is given to expatriates, as 
many of the expatriates experienced difficulties for the families. 
 
The examples given of personnel exchange were examples of knowledge going from the 
foreign affiliates to the Danish R&D department. To help the travelling of knowledge and 
personnel, laboratories were built alike in all locations. Also knowledge obtained from 
foreign university partners were mentioned to travel via personnel to the Danish R&D 
department.  
 
With regard to development work and clinical testing, rather standardised procedures 
were stated to be used in the different locations. Exceptions to this were Japan and China, 
the latter basing its regulation on the US regulation 30 years ago. The localisation of 
clinical testing and development therefore mainly is argued with nearness to the local 
expertise and to ensure contact to the local hospitals. 
 
Laboratory personnel have been reduced dramatically as a consequence of automation of 
many of the laboratory jobs. The discussion of exchange therefore mainly is taken as a 
discussion about exchange of scientific knowledge, and less about laboratory procedures, 
since these are automated. 
 
Special bonuses were mentioned as being given to the foreign affiliates if living up to 
productivity measures. Bonuses could be up to 30% of the basic salary. In Denmark, 
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conditions in R&D were stated to be different, and characterised by mutual inspiring 
rather than competition; bonuses were therefore given to a few people whose work had 
been especially outstanding.  
 
Also Novozymes A/S devote resources to the development of the research organisation, 
both as a consequence of the increasing size of the R&D organisation, the 
internationalisation the R&D organisation, and the extremely rapid expansion of 
technological opportunities. The increasing amount of information and data, and the 
ensuring of access to this data for all employees in the organisations, is an increasing 
management problem. Finding ways to do that is a major and increasing task in the 
coming years. 
 
Currently, a corporate management group, in which primarily Danish and one American 
representative are members, is referred to take R&D decisions and communicate these to 
the rest of the R&D organisation. Other forms of organisations are and have been 
discussed, amongst them a few large units compared to a more decentralised structure. 
They have so far decided to have several smaller units and to use technology for the 
communication.  
 
Small groups of managers are responsible for coordination within specific technical 
areas, including patenting. In addition, project teams are organised within certain 
products, including sales and marketing. Danes are in charge in all cases but one. It is the 
aim to take out patents in close cooperation with the researchers. They do not monitor 
where the patents are taken out, or within which areas.   
 
They want to move people around between the R&D departments to bind people and 
projects together. But exchange of personnel is referred to be expensive, and the rotating 
activities have therefore been reduced for a while for cost reasons, but are planned to 
increase again. Novozymes A/S are themselves interested in discussions on how it can be 
done, and has participated as case company in a ph.d.-project’s comparative study of how 
different international companies are organised and how knowledge is exchanged. 
 
Danisco A/S refers to different strategies towards the integration of the acquired R&D 
affiliates. In some cases, the acquired affiliates are integrated into existing R&D 
organisations, for example in the case of Genencor which had R&D which was partly 
overlapping with Danisco’s existing activities; in other cases the uniqueness of the 
affiliates or the perceived uniqueness of these are maintained by granting them a large 
degree of independence. 
 
About 2/3 of the personnel in the R&D departments are academics. The share is generally 
larger in the foreign affiliates, and also the share of ph.d.’s are larger there. The 
technicians in R&D are primarily a Danish phenomena. It was indicated that the 
academics sometimes were a little too ‘reading and writing reports’ oriented, while the 
technicians knew more about what worked in practice.  
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Hempel A/S, as mentioned above, has its main share of R&D activities in Denmark and 
Spain, and recently Singapore, which also are the R&D centres with the most radical and 
most generally applicable innovations. The innovations in the other research centres 
could be regarded more as systematic and structured responses to market and regulatory 
requests, specific for the individual markets, and not necessarily of interest for production 
activities elsewhere in the world.  
 
There is for example a rather close cooperation with large new construction ship yards 
abroad. In Denmark, R&D cooperates with the wind mill industry on testing and also 
testing within paints for yachts contributes to R&D. Closeness to public R&D institutions 
are also important. 
 
Hempel A/Ss continued internationalisation and growth is stated to have increased focus 
on management of the operations in general. The annual report 2005, mentions some of 
the important initiatives as optimising the logistics and production capacity, as well as 
efforts to introduce the same management culture in the different subsidiaries. 
 
The embeddedness of strategic functions 
 
In the survey by the Confederation of Danish Industries, Danish Industry, 2003, it is 
stated that 60% of the companies’ R&D is still carried out in Denmark. This formulation 
may indicate that the share of R&D in foreign affiliates may increase, an assumption also 
made by Statistics Denmark, 2006, on the background of the returned questionnaires to 
companies, in which the companies refer to expected R&D investment increases, in 
Denmark and abroad, but mostly abroad. 
 
In the interviewed companies, there seem to be an even stronger embeddedness of R&D 
in the Danish innovation system. The main share of R&D activities in the interviewed 
companies is carried out in Denmark. 85% of R&D employment in the interviewed 
companies and NovoNordisk A/S and except Hempel A/S, is in Denmark; only Danisco 
A/S and Hempel A/S have the major share of their R&D employment abroad. The 
distribution of the R&D activities between Denmark and abroad varied with having 
between 30 and more than 95% of R&D in Denmark.  
  
Some of the differences in the share of home based R&D seemingly reflects the 
companies’ different investment strategies and thus the different motives for establishing 
R&D-FDIs.  
 
A strong R&D base in Denmark was found especially in NovoNordisk A/S and 
Lundbeck A/S. Also Novozymes A/S has a strong base in the national innovation system 
with the majority of activities in Denmark, and with core competences located in 
Denmark. Specialised knowledge from R&D investments abroad is exchanged with the 
Danish company – and vice versa. 
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Danisco A/S referred to a less R&D focussed strategy for their FDIs, and referred to 
business expansions as the main FDI driver. In a number of FDIs, these business 
expansions however implied rather R&D intensive R&D investments, for example with 
regard to the acquisitions of Genencor and Cultura. 
 
Hempel A/S may be the interviewed company with the largest share of production 
abroad. The R&D abroad to a very large extent address market and regulatory requests, 
whereas the base in Denmark  (and Spain) address general and more radical innovations, 
for example regarding antifouling, and other environmental and process specifications.  
 
The pharmaceutical companies refer to the national innovation system as favourable and 
supportive within their area without being specific. Contributing to these favourable 
conditions may however be a favourable R&D climate with relatively large public R&D 
programmes within the companies’ business areas; private-public cooperation, for 
example in diabetes treatment; a strong environmental concern and regulation; and strong 
industrial competences within core technologies. 
 
Though Hempel A/S and Danisco A/S have a larger share of R&D abroad, they both refer 
to language and time barriers for communication as being smaller in Denmark, and 
contributing to still a relatively large share of activities taking place in Denmark 
 
The role of foreign presence for home-base corporate activities and 
NIS 
 
A reason for political concern (and academic interest) in the role of R&D FDIs, has been 
the concern over if R&D FDIs would mean the loss of valuable knowledge because new 
knowledge would be generated and stay abroad, or if the national knowledge base, on the 
contrary would increase, because the Danish companies would be able to draw on a 
larger R&D base.  
 
The interviewed companies all referred to an increase in total R&D. Of this increase the 
relatively largest increase had taken place abroad, and was also expected to do so in the 
future. All companies, however, expected R&D still to be coordinated from Denmark. 
Danisco A/S expressed the least importance of the Danish base though the strategic 
functions seemed to be very much based in Denmark. 
 
The R&D affiliates of the interviewed companies in general plough the special 
knowledge of the specialised foreign affiliates back to the Danish base. Especially this 
seemed prevalent in NovoNordisk A/S, Lundbeck A/S and Novozymes A/S, which refer 
to the aquired or established foreign companies as contributing with knowledge not 
available in Denmark, or not available in sufficient quantity.   
 
All the interviewed companies as well as NovoNordisk A/S, are represented in the R&D 
system in R&D councils, in governmental R&D counselling bodies, in the boards or 
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counselling functions of R&D institutes or institutions, and potentially increasingly so. 
New structures in the management of Universities has meant private industry 
representation, and R&D intensive companies are thus on the board of most universities.  
 
The companies’ access to influence R&D policy can therefore be assumed to have 
increased. All the companies refer to their interest in a strengthening of the Danish 
(natural science based) university research, but explicitly refers to a general strengthening 
of R&D and candidate production compared to the strengthening of specific areas of 
R&D.  
 
Despite these companies’ dominating position with approximately 30% of private R&D 
activity and increasing representation in boards and consulting bodies, all companies 
expressed from concern to severe critique of the Governmental R&D (total ignorance of 
the character and prerequisites of R&D) and educational policy for the continued 
development. Concerns with regard to the R&D policy were stated as the policy  
 
- being without ambitions, regarding both extend  (R&D as well as education) and 
organisation  
- being divided between too many competing institutions obliged to increasingly 
compete for research grants,  
- neglecting the potentials of giving incentives for developing environmental 
sustainable products 
- focussing too much on commercialisation which requires much more and is much 
more costly than the Government assume  
 
In addition, both Novozymes A/S and Danisco A/S referred to decreasing cooperation 
with the public sector, and Novozymes A/S also referred to decreasing cooperation in EU 
programmes, further leading to decreasing exchange of knowledge. 
 
The strong research base in Denmark was also stated to be a prerequisite for acquiring, 
establishing and exploiting foreign R&D. Many of the companies’ investments abroad 
were motivated by getting access to advanced R&D, requiring competences to assess the 
value of the foreign R&D as well as competences to be valuable partners. 
  
And lastly, the current Government’s neglect of visions regarding the development of 
environmentally more sustainable technologies, were scorned. Industrial experiences 
within development of more sustainable technologies and employees’ environmental 





Sweden: NCC, Skanska and Axis Communications 
 
 
By Daniel Friberg, IKED 
 
 
Background and history of case companies 
Axis communications was founded in 1984 by two students within the fields of 
technology and economics. The company is active on a highly competitive market 
producing network video products and print servers. Their primary market is that of 
surveillance equipment selling to “professional customers” meaning airports, schools, 
banks, communities etc. The market within this product line is huge but Axis derives its 
advantage through their digital technology as apart from the more common analogue 
technology. 95 % of their products are exported whereof 50 % to the US and 50 % 
divided between Europe and Japan-lead Asia. Concerning the development of R&D 
expenditure the next few years ahead, shares are expected to stay pretty much the same. 
This is due to the fact that Axis already puts aside 16.5 % in expenditure which is a 
sufficiently high allocation calculated to meet their needs in the future as well. Axis 
board stand for about 50 % of the stocks in the company with the rest spread out to the 
workers. The five biggest owners hold 57 % of shares as well as voting power, and the 
company was floated on the Stockholm stock exchange O-list in year 2000. Family 
ownership together with the fact that the two founders are Swedish makes Axis more 
home bound and there is no intention to relocalise. Foreign ownership furthermore 
consists of portfolio investment (6.5 %) lacking the strategic interest that a direct 
investment entails (passing the 10 % level of ownership). 
 
There is definitely a strategic commitment to the region as Ideon in Lund is a business 
cluster enabling Axis to collaborate with presently five companies within certain shared 
technologies such as the construction of circuit boards. This is one reason for why Axis 
is very much connected to the local resource base. Another reason is the proximity to, 
and collaboration with, the Lund Institute of Technology (LTH) which provides the 
company with students of which some write their masters degrees within the framework, 
and assistance, of Axis and later become employees. These advantages clearly inhibit 
Axis from even considering relocating. Axis currently employs almost 400 people, due to 
rapid expansion, whereof approximately 100 are found abroad.  AXIS has subsidiaries 
with offices in 16 countries, as well as cooperation with distributors, systems integrators 
and Original Equipment Manufacturing (OEM) partners in 70 countries. The subsidiaries 
are located in Australia, Canada, China, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Netherlands, Singapore, Spain, Taiwan, UK, and the US, with sales in some 60 countries. 
 
Skanska is today the second largest construction company in the world and was founded 
in 1887 and started with production of concrete which later turned into building. Ten 
years later they experienced their first international order. Skanska has 54.000 people 
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employed whereof 12.000 in Sweden. The company acts on a market of “perfect 
competition” as regards all developed countries, and their customers (and projects) 
depend entirely upon how the society is formed. In Sweden a lot of the projects (Skanska 
emphasises that they work on a project basis) hence go to public procurement from 
governmental institutions such as building bridges to Vägverket (Swedish Roads) but also 
industrial buildings of special use e.g. for paper mass production or steel melting. 
Skanska has furthermore been important for the development of the Swedish 
infrastructure.  
 
After growing in Sweden, Skanska became seriously international in the 1950s, building 
on strong technical competence and adaptation to local cultures. Skanska’s primary 
markets are Sweden, the US, the UK, Denmark, Finland, Norway, the Czech Republic 
and Argentina. They no longer have any projects in China, India, Africa and Russia 
(currently retrieving) mainly due to corruption. Before, SIDA (Swedish Agency for 
International Aid) worked together with Skanska in some projects which was found to be 
a factor improving obstacles met. SIDA however no longer sponsors any such 
programmes. Skanska is however involved in the 5th and 6th framework program in the 
EC.         
 
Today some 23 % of Skanska’s activities lie in Sweden whereas the US stand for 34 %, 
the rest of the countries amount to between 5 and 10 %. 
  
The construction sector is the second biggest sector (after the care-sector) in Sweden but 
has very little registered R&D spending. Skanska expects their relative R&D-spending to 
be pretty constant (approximately 0.2 per thousand of turnover) over the coming years. 
However there are difficulties in measuring the R&D in the construction sector. As an 
example of this, the project undertaken in Hallandsåsen (building of a tunnel) doesn’t 
have any R&D costs attached to it but a lot of innovative and creative activity has gone in 
to the project. There will therefore be large differences in stated R&D spending 
depending on individual measurement standards and policies for these types of 
companies, which does not mean that there is any real difference, in relative terms, 
concerning actual input.  
 
The company has a broad network of professors at different universities indirectly 
contributing with technology and know-how which is not measured as part of Skanska’s 
R&D. There is now a concern when it comes to R&D/product development because the 
construction subsidies to R&D from the government have diminished by 70 % from the 
1990s and onward (and if it continues the subject might disappear altogether from the 
universities). This should be compared to other countries such as the UK and Finland 
where the governments heavily invest in university programmes and doctors degrees for 
construction R&D meaning that the government indirectly pays up to 90 % of the 
companies’ R&D. If the government destroys the research structure and knowledge base, 
something they are partially doing by not supporting the sector, their might be reasons to 
move out. Skanska reportedly have a difficulty today at finding qualified engineers. 
VINNOVA, furthermore, supports the wood and manufacturing industry but not the 
construction sector.  
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Skanska who is located in Solna in Stockholm has no intention of leaving their current 
location. Although Solna being the most company dense place in Sweden and located just 
next to Sweden’s other three big construction companies NCC, PEAB and JM, Skanska 
claims it doesn’t matter where their HQ is located and that it has no impact on them 
whatsoever where they are. Still they are deeply rooted in Sweden with “Svenska 
Industrivärlden”, specialising in investing in listed Nordic companies, as the biggest 
shareholder owning 7.7 % of shares but 26.9 % of voting power through its 15.000.000 
A-Shares21. Svenska Industrivärlden exerts significant influence through an active 
ownership aiming at long term results in a range of companies where Skanska is part of 
its strategic investments. Other companies include Volvo, Ericsson, Sandvik, 
Handelsbanken, SCA, SSAB, Indutrade etc. which of course opens up for extensive 
networking and information exchange benefiting the companies and possibly increasing 
the degree of “embeddedness” in the national innovation system through providing better 
linkages between business entities. Foreign shareholders amount to 19.5 % of the capital 
and 13.3 % of the voting power and the current CEO is internationally recruited from the 
US.  
 
NCC is the product of a fusion between companies JCC and ABV in 1988, themselves 
products of M&As. Further M&As later proceeded and since the mid 1990s they have 
grown organically. NCC is the second largest construction company in northern Europe, 
heavily focused on the Nordic countries, developing residential and commercial property 
projects, and building offices, industrial facilities, housing, roads, civil-engineering 
structures and other types of infrastructure with a turnover of SEK 45 billion and some 
22,000 employees. NCC also offers input materials used in construction, such as 
aggregates and asphalt, and conducts paving, operation and maintenance operations in the 
roads sector. Around 10-15 companies in the market (main competitor is Skanska). Many 
people view the market as oligopoly but it is “perfect” competition, only exception is 
when it comes to certain tailor made work. Suppliers on the other hand, which NCC is 
dependent upon e.g. when it comes to concrete, have a certain oligopoly position. 
Actually NCC, Skanska, JM and PEAB only stand for some 17-18 % of the total 
bulding/construction market in the Nordic countries (and NCCs share is about 6 %). 
About half of their missions are to public procurement. NCC’s location of customers is 
about 40 % in Sweden around 20 % in each of the other Nordic countries and some 
activities in Germany and Poland, and finally one project in S:t Petersburg in Russia. The 
sector is now more local (except for Skanska) and NCC used to have projects abroad but 
due to risk aversion have retrieved their operations and are currently terminating their 
project in Singapore. It is also difficult to enter into foreign markets due to different 
norms and clients and the own content is less, such as resources to involve newly 
examined students into international projects is close to zero. The number of Europeans 
or Nordic workers, working internationally has also decreased in the different projects. In 
the case of Singapore there are only 7 people from Europe/Nordic countries involved 
when 20 years ago it would have been around 50. 
 
                                                 
21 The 10 biggest owners hold 17.000.000 A-Shares and 47.9 % of voting power. 
 73
The expected stability, respectively increase, in R&D is difficult to speculate about 
because every project is unique with more individually developed products depending on 
the specific case. Current R&D expenditure is around 1oo of turnover but if you include 
product development it is around 5 %. Clearly NCC is measuring its R&D spending 
differently from that of Skanska who reported only 0.2oo of turnover. NCC reports that 
there is a much broader product differentiation today than before and that definitions are 
difficult as the construction sector is very different from the car industry for example. 
There is however more specialisation now and patent applications have increased. There 
is more product development today than before as well with different applications within 
the company group. Local sub-optimation is no longer utilized, rather standardisation has 
proved much more successful due to lower prices.  
 
NCC is primarily owned by Nordstjernan, which is a fourth generation family owned 
investment company targeting Nordic companies and aiming at long term growth. The 
second largest owner is Lundbergsfären. Nordstjernan is, furthermore, since 2004, the 
main investor in the second largest rental machinery company, Ramirent; Sirius 
Machinery, a packaging machinery group and GP Plastindustri, manufacturer of various 
types of injection moulded plastic components - three companies that together constitute 
an important link in the continuance of Nordtjernan’s long-term development of 
companies. The strategic commitment to the region is strong. The company (being in 
construction) has “movable manufacturing and fixed products” and has to be at the 
location where you are operative, which in NCCs case is primarily in Sweden and almost 
exclusively the Nordic market. Concerning connection to the local resource base NCC 
takes on PhDs that are financed to 50 % by them (4-5 positions a year) which is 
something relatively new for the construction sector. Most of the examined PhDs go on 
to work within the company. They furthermore cooperate with VINNOVA with a 
development fund for doctorates. The company works more with engineering-education 
than before and sponsors a “construction school” for children as well as trying to 
awakening an interest for construction in schools at all levels. They are also involved in 
the 5th and 6th framework program in the EC. 
 
There are two types of investments: 
1) Building something that you thereafter sell (for example NCC bought land in 
Limhamn in Malmö, (South of Sweden) as a future investment)  
2) Building something that has been ordered 
 
Main investments are actually made in land possession. When constructing not much 
own capital is used and an advance is given for each project. Machinery is nowadays 
usually rented making the market more sensitive to interest rates.  
 
At least in Sweden the construction sector has an image as being low-tech but in 
international comparison it is not. Concerning concrete casting for example, the Swedish 
cold has provided us with the technology to perform this activity under very unfavourable 
climate circumstances. This competence has led to an expertise in how to cast concrete 




Table 1: Some key figures for the interviewed companies  
 
 
Skanska NCC Axis Communications 
Industry Construction Construction Network video products 
and print servers 
Employees 54.000  21.000 390 
-whereof in Sweden 12.000 10.000 300 
Turnover, million € SEK 125 billion global 
and 22 billion national 
SEK 45 billion global SEK 895 million 
Foreign sales/Projects 
abroad 
77% of activities abroad  
(whereof 34% in USA)  
63% of NCC’s activities 
lie abroad 
95 % is exported 
R&D intensity Hard to estimate Hard to estimate SEK 147 million = 16,4 
% of sales 
Ownership structure Majority votes (A-
shares) owned by 
Industrivärlden (26.9%). 
Foreign ownership 
estimated to 19,5% of 
shares with 13.3% 
voting power 
Majority votes (A-
Shares) owned by 
Nordstjernan AB and 
Lundbergs (74.1%). 
Foreign ownership 
amounts to 2% 
The five largest 
shareholders own 57% 
of both shares and 
voting power (privately 
and through 
companies). 
Foreign share holders 
hold 6.5% 
 
Internationalisation of domestic MNC 
Axis has, as a rule, internationalised through Greenfield investments because they are 
confident in their technology and feel they have what they need in terms of know-how 
and technology which is why the mode of growth is organic. The only exception is the 
buying of a small Danish company with two employees, named Atento, containing some 
useful technology. Axis is not a born global but started their expansion rather rapidly 
only a few years after their founding. The reason behind establishing subsidiaries abroad 
has been to gain market shares through competence exploitation. The necessary 
technology they find at their location in Sweden and they have no intention of going out 
to seek and try and source technology. The only exception was when they located an 
office in Silicon Valley in the US in order to tap in to “mobile networks”; they did not 
find it fruitful however and decided to terminate that unit. Axis has not internationalised 
any strategic resources but solely “operations”, meaning sales and marketing, who then 
report to the HQ in Lund. At one point the office for marketing (to be considered a 
strategic resource) answering for global operations was relocated to the US. The US 
corporate culture was however not seen as compatible with that of the Axis HQ in 
Sweden, one reason being that they focused too much on the US market, instead of 
having a more global outlook. This led to the decision of moving back the office to 
Sweden. Production is conducted entirely by suppliers, primarily from Asia. The products 
are then sent to Lund for assembly and distribution. This line of logistics is in the wake of 
change as products are planned to be increasingly assembled and redistributed from the 
country/region in question where they are produced.  
 
Skanska has only internationalised its activities through M&A. They started out growing 
organically in Sweden and later expanded internationally testing different markets and 
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buying other companies. Expanding by means of M&A has been seen (and is seen) as the 
only viable alternative because of the need to understand the culture they are operating in. 
They also know what works in the respective areas with regards to e.g. climate etc. As an 
example it would have been impossible to construct a Swedish house in Florida as it 
would have been eaten up by termites. In Finland the company structure is very 
hierarchical and in the UK there is a one way communication channel. Sweden is a 
predecessor in this respect as we have, organisational wise, a more flat structure which 
enables knowledge to flow more freely. The UK sponsorship of PhDs to the companies 
makes it an attractive location for gathering knowledge, especially since it is diminishing 
in Sweden. Skanska has however not bought other companies in order to gain new 
technology (construction techniques), instead they rely o their own product development. 
 
Units involved in R&D are present in Sweden, the UK, Finland and Norway and the US. 
Skanska being in the construction sector doesn’t work like other companies but do 
everything on a project basis. It is therefore meaningless to talk about what resources are 
divided on which countries, it depends entirely on what projects they are involved with 
currently. However a change over time can be noted regarding activities in Sweden 
relative to that of the UK and Finland as they are more supportive of the construction 
sector. An example of NCCs Nordic strategy and direction is the closing down of its 
office in China which they terminated and instead opened up a Chinese import office for 
importing equipment to Norway. 
 
In the US they emphasise more robust and secure construction solutions and build more 
on existing experience. In Sweden more emphasis is placed on being effective and 
innovative. In the UK they are very good at risk management which is something that’s 
been copied all through the whole organisation. A concrete example of intra 
organisational knowledge-flows is the copy in Colorado of the bridge in Udevalla, 
Sweden.  
 
Due to the Globalisation NCC as well as other companies have become more national 
which is another effect of globalisation. NCC, just like Skanska internationalised its 
activities through M&As. Due to costly learning experiences with fusions they now avoid 
that.  Nonetheless internationalisation by means of FDI has to be in the shape of M&A 
because of high entry barriers, such as in the form of culture even when entering into 
Norway and Denmark. R&D is now more internationalised than before through increased 
cooperation with similar companies who don’t compete on the same markets, as an 
example NCC presently cooperates with a French construction company.  
 
Imports become more important and these operations are therefore becoming more 
internationalised as suppliers are forming oligopoly situations, for example you are very 
restricted when it comes to burning concrete in Sweden. Otherwise affiliates abroad are 
very autonomous because you sell building and housing differently in different countries 
whereas strategy concerns are centred to the HQ. NCC furthermore considers the 
Swedish membership in the EU important as EU directives decide plenty of the 
regulations important for the industry. 
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Foreign activities impact on domestic (innovation) operations of MNC 
The business activities conducted abroad by Axis are found to be complementary. The 
subsidiaries do not have any R&D functions although France, Japan and the US have a 
small technical support unit attached to their offices. The subsidiaries are independent but 
report to the HQ so that strategies and sales material can be adapted to the markets, this is 
the way in which (and type of) knowledge transfers back to the HQ in Lund. Formerly 
Axis has been driving the market in a “company push” model way, but is more and more 
going towards “market pull” so that Axis needs to adapt to new demands from the 
market. These impulses are collected through the subsidiaries as well as adaptations to 
local culture. Strategies and sales material for Japan is e.g. more tailor made to the 
Japanese market than to other markets. There are no plans concerning changing the 
organisational integration of units (other than starting assembly and redistribution directly 
from subsidiaries).  
 
Foreign Affiliates are not really seen as a source of resources except for market impulses 
and tapping in on consumer needs/wants. Concerning knowledge transfer the HQ in Lund 
regularly arranges sales, products and marketing training for their subsidiaries who then 
visits the HQ. They also hold local conferences about distribution in the respective 
county. The change in this respect is that customer knowledge is increasingly important 
which increases the importance of tapping into that knowledge. Cooperation models and 
partners haven’t really changed due to internationalisation but rather Axis has always 
been closely linked to the domestic and regional setting, although cooperation with 
suppliers concerning production can lead to innovation inputs.  
 
There haven’t really been any hampering factors on innovation except for external factors 
such as the IT bubble which might have caused a psychological pessimism. The 
multinationality has probably had some effect on management culture but it is difficult to 
name anything concrete, the corporate control anyhow remains very locally rooted with a 
far reaching strategy aiming at organic growth. 
 
Skanska sees their foreign operations and strategic resources as complementary. Their 
affiliates are independent but subordinated to strict regulations of conduct. Skanska 
utilizes a best practices system and draws upon all the resources in their organisation in 
order to get the job done. As an example a Czech team was ordered to help out with an 
operation in Finland because the Swedish team would have been slower.  
 
As regards information exchange between Business Unites (BUs) and to the HQ there is 
plenty of exchange. For example through the US BU Skanska found out about a 
plate/board that was extremely water resistant and later was imported to Sweden. In 
Slovakia similarly they gained knowledge of a form for casting concrete. Such 
information sharing is increasing and spreading more and more between the different 
BUs and is managed by the Project Support division. Factors hampering innovation in 




The activities of NCC are likewise complementing each other. Example of 
complementarities: Danish NCC is very efficient at finding forms of cooperation with 
their clients, this is something that NCC in Sweden has learned and utilised. Another such 
thing is the implementation of programs for calculating lifecycle costs that were 
developed in Finland.  
 
Foreign affiliates are enabled to act as a source of resources through meetings with the 
R&D experts, taking place meet 1 or 2 times a year, to discuss and network. One of the 
reasons for this is to not have to invent the wheel twice which is deemed as even more 
important than actually coming up with new knowledge. There is therefore a systemic 
knowledge transfer between BUs.  An example of a technique that is being learned 
through cooperation with suppliers is how to minimize the electricity use through 
developing houses that consume much less energy for heating or cooling down through 
isolation. A lot of money was invested into building “Concept houses”, which are houses 
built in accordance with a model that can utilize and store solar energy. In order to do this 
they formed a project group with ABB, IVT and some other companies.  
 
Finally, product development is today being more emphasised, partly because 
governmental rules for construction is not a limiting factor. 
 
Impacts of multinational activities in the domestic innovation 
environment 
The impacts of Axis on the national innovation system extends itself to mutual learning 
within certain technologies, such as integrated board circuits where there is an 
interchange with companies such as Ericsson. Ericsson and Axis might e.g. share the 
interest of producing a “sound codifier” applicable to Axis when it comes to cameras and 
Ericsson in the case of telephones.  
 
A certain collection of knowledge from abroad, when it comes to marketing, customers 
and strategies, could be overspilled indirectly but not in an intentional or significant 
manner. Except for collaboration with LTH Axis finances a doctor’s position at the 
Competence Center for Circuit Design (CCCD), set up by the Swedish Agency for 
Innovation Systems VINNOVA and some industrial partners at the University of Lund, 
resulting in research results to Axis. Concerning the surrounding NIS and set up in 
general Axis are pretty happy with the way things are. Of course there could always be 
improvement e.g. if the LTH would be a world leading university such as MIT in the US 
that would be even better, even if LTH has a sufficiently high quality to attract leading 
companies as it is. More competing companies in the region could also enable an even 
more dynamic cluster. Producing large volumes cannot be made in Sweden due to 
expensiveness and are therefore conducted in Asia, primarily in Thailand and Malaysia. 
Smaller volumes can be produced in Sweden, however, and Axis utilises two facilities for 
that purpose.  
 
Skanska e.g. builds tunnels for LKAB causing a spillover effect concerning know-how 
to the other involved companies contracted (that in some cases might be gathered from 
 78
other BUs). An Example of this is the power plant construction for ABB which helped 
develop a generator in that company as well as instruments for measuring. Other 
spillovers include the development of improved drilling equipment for Atlas Copco. 
Sandvik furthermore improved their material on the drills to be more resistant as a result 
of the cooperation.  
 
An example of knowledge flows: Knowledge from Sweden was transferred to Trondheim 
in Norway concerning the excavation of environmentally hazardous waste. In Trondheim 
Skanska developed a technique for how to store the waste while excavating. This 
technology enabled them to take the decision not to go through with a similar project in 
Argentina because they knew it could not be applied to the mining industry. Knowledge 
flows also become inevitable when Skanska, building of a power plant in Panama, 
utilizes steel from Sandvik, Trucks from Volvo Machines form Atlas Copco etc. all of 
this international competition, of course strengthens the companies abilities even at home 
and is also contributing to a tougher competitive climate in Sweden thus contributing 
positively to the Swedish NIS. A possible negative effect is that Polish workers are used 
by foreign companies at much lower wages, which can result in increased competition 
resulting in the moving out of R&D and Innovation activities. 
 
 A type of knowledge flows to the national NIS is that of top executives being recruited 
from Skanska to the other construction companies such as NCC and Peab. According to 
Mr Tutti all the top executives in the other construction companies come from Skanska, 
which sets it apart from the other construction companies. 
 
Just like NCC, Skanska focuses a lot on maintaining knowledge which is deemed just as 
important as creating knew knowledge, if not more important! This becomes obvious as 
the same mistakes happen now as happened 20 years ago. 
 
Concerning the use of national technology and national programs: Skanska is involved in 
a number of national programmes, investing SEK100 million in each. The Infrastructure 
program has been going on since 1995 and costs SEK 600,000 per year but it is soon to 
be terminated. Surely knowledge flows to VINNOVA and other actors involved in the 
programmes do occur, however it is not certain to what extent and what kind. 
Programmes include Competitive building Wood research, IT, Indoor Environment, 
Infrastructure, Sustainable building, Management, and Innovation.  
 
Another example of collaboration is the European research project Nanocrete running 
over three years, aiming at creating a form of concrete for roads and tunnel walls with the 
capability of decomposing contamination from cars. Other companies who are joined in 
the project and act as co-financers are for example Cementa. Organisations include 
VINNOVA, Tekes and the Swedish Building and Construction fund. 
 
An example of technology from abroad that is now utilized by NCC in Sweden is the 
concept of concrete that you don’t have to “shake” in order for it to become “tight and 
compact”. This technology is a product of learning from Japan (the idea came from 
Japan) and is highly beneficial to avoid manual shaking which is very hazardous to the 
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health. Of course the spreading to the rest of the NIS can be assumed at least in the longer 
run.  A certain technology of gluing concrete walls is also something that NCC has 
incorporated from input from abroad and something that has surely spread to the NIS. 
NCC has a tighter network and cooperation now with universities than they did before as 
they want to recruit the best. They also have lectures and visits etc. and collaborate with 
programs for doctors as well as involving professors. NCC has driven questions of 
deregulation, ten years ago it was forbidden to build houses higher than three stories etc.     
 
Ministers T. Östros and P. Nuder will put money in the six key areas of VINNOVA, and 
the construction sector did not qualify which NCC, just like Skanska, find to be highly 
wrong as they are an important sector only superseded by the healthcare sector when it 
comes to number of employees. They need support because a strong construction sector 
is the foundation for many other industries such as transportation and infrastructure, and 
real estate. The interest from the government must increase as it is now they have 
withdrawn from basic research and there need to be more resources to relevant 
professors’ titles because companies cannot by themselves employ professors. Gathering 
technology from abroad hence increases but not the actual building there. They scan the 
market for technology, conferences etc and cooperate if they find what they want e.g. 
manufacturer of windows which they import. Trade cooperation is more important now.  
 
“Södra länken” a road and tunnel system constructed in Stockholm is a project where a 
lot of ideas were added from abroad. Lessons were e.g. learned in Boston concerning the 
construction plan implemented by “vägverket”. Other learning procedures are e.g. GPS 
technology that has revolutionised the method of finding the appropriate place for 
construction.  
 
Summing up words 
Axis has no plans on increasing its shares in R&D expenditure because it’s already so 
substantial. It would be more probable with a decrease if cheaper ways are found to 
produce the same technology or if the “air would go out of the market”.  
 
Axis doesn’t see any reason to try and source technology abroad, they find that they have 
what they need at there current location. They once tried to tap in to mobile internet in 
Silicon Valley but the sourcing had no apparent results. There was also the acquisition of 
a very small Danish company with the direct reason of getting hold of the technology but 
that has been the only technology sourcing activity through M&A. Axis conducts 
operations in all Nordic countries but have no R&D facilities, nor have they any plan to 
expand R&D facilities or to close down any subsidiaries. They do however plan to 
expand other parts of their activities such as assembly and distribution taking place in the 
country of production.  
 
Skanska’s R&D-expenditure is project based and it is up to the HR division to maintain 
skilled engineers. Concerning international R&D-expenditure it is more a matter of better 
utilizing existing resources and knowledge through improved analysis concerning were 
the money is best spent. 
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Factors that would influence the company decision to increase R&D is that the R&D 
related to construction at the universities should increase, then Skanska could focus more 
on product development and platforms. Sourcing technology from abroad could happen if 
it cannot be found here. Skanska’s motif has been to enter into other markets in order to 
gain market shares, they might though have gained additional knowledge about refineries 
for example when they acquired a company in Argentina, even though the knowledge 
was an indirect benefit. 
 
NCC emphasises that R&D is more global now, some things can be bought finished from 
china and more energy can be placed on developing other things. There is no plan to 
increase spending on R&D or source it globally, and rather than expanding their activities 
NCC has become more Nordic oriented, which helps them maintain top quality and 
minimize risks.  Innovation seems to increase nonetheless as there are more patent 
applications now than before. Some 50 % of construction investments go to heating, 
electricity, air conditioning etc. much more than people actually realise (making it more 
complex and not as low tech as might be assumed).  
 
Conclusion 
The construction sector is the second biggest sector (after the health care-sector) in 
Sweden but has very little registered R&D spending. However there are difficulties in 
measuring the R&D in the construction sector. There will therefore be large differences 
in stated R&D spending depending on individual measurement standards and policies for 
different types of companies, which does not mean that there is any real difference, in 
relative terms, concerning actual input. Skanska for example reports much lower 
expenditure but their calculations exclude e.g. inputs from universities. In any case they 
are not any less high-tech in their approach and activities than NCC who reports higher 
R&D spending. Clearly this is illustrative of different measurement methods making it 
close to impossible to assess the exact level of R&D input into that sector. Innovation and 
product development are key issues for these companies, as is the maintenance of the 
knowledge already achieved, which is something that cannot be measured, but that is 
probably more important than gaining new knowledge, as the same mistakes are still 
being made today as they were 20 years ago. All three companies expect to maintain their 
current spending on R&D/product development in the future. NCC but especially 
Skanska, being the most global construction company of the two, claims to have a 
problem finding skilled engineers and that there is a lack of support for the construction 
sector from the government to the universities and research institutes such as VINNOVA. 
This of course weakens the National Innovation System (NIS) possibly forcing out 
certain activities to countries like the UK and Finland who are more supportive of the 
construction sector, as they realise that it is not as low-tech as usually perceived, and that 
the sector is utterly important to the business environment as a whole, through engaging 
various sectors and thus yielding a considerable multiplier effect throughout society. A 
SEK spent on the construction sector is therefore highly rewarding in relative terms, 
generating a higher return on investment than in probably any other sector, as well as 
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stimulating cooperation between a multitude of actors, increasing embeddedness and 
creating linkages necessary for spillover effects. 
  
All companies are thoroughly embedded in their NIS with Axis firmly rooted in the 
innovative science park Ideon where they collaborate with at least five other companies 
and get a steady supply of qualified students from the nearby University (LTH). Skanska 
and NCC are firmly rooted as well in the most company dense place in all of Sweden, 
Solna, but their embeddedness seems to be more national than regional and they have an 
extensive network with plenty of universities and companies as well as with European 
and Swedish programmes. They are furthermore companies that form part of an 
investment portfolio mainly owned by some few actors in the shape of investment firms. 
These firms also own considerable shares of other companies with complementary traits 
which undoubtedly lead to higher embeddedness still as well as effective resource 
allocation and diffusion of information. Foreign speculators are also cut out through the 
stronger voting power of the A-shares belonging to the main investors in Skanska and 
NCC. No such system exists within Axis. 
 
Concerning knowledge flows from the subsidiary abroad, in turn tapping into the NIS in 
the host country, to the mother company at home, the answers tend to be rather vague and 
it’s difficult for those interviewed to pin point exact transfers.  Some few examples 
concerning contributions to the company group has been illustrated in all cases such as 
gaining knowledge of foreign markets and adapting sales strategies (Axis) or safety 
requirements and procedures for dealing with waste etc. (Construction sector) but from 
there to being able to pin point actual transfers to the national NIS is difficult, at least in 
the short run, even though all companies agree that such effects surely must occur and 
there are indications of this in the long run perspective.  
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Finland: KONE, Lamor and Neste Oil     
 
 
By Juha Oksanen & Nina Rilla, VTT 
 
Introduction 
This study aims to shed light on links between the Finnish innovation system and 
domestic multinationals from company perspective. Internationalization, interaction and 
companies embeddedness in the domestic innovation environment is studied through 
three company cases. The study is based on existing public material on the selected 
companies and interviews implemented during the early 2006 with company 
representatives. An additional input is provided by the existing literature on 
internationalization of Finnish companies and a few recent studies focusing specifically 
on the role the multinational firms play in Finland and in the Finnish innovation system.  
Multinational firm is here understood to refer any company having activities (subsidiary, 
plant, R&D unit, sales office etc.) with lasting interest at least one foreign country. 
Further, we have understood innovation related activities broadly. Often innovation 
activities are translated or seen more or less as synonymous with R&D. This view is, 
however, too narrow particularly if we look at smaller companies or companies operating 
in fields not known to be particularly R&D intensive. In addition, often product 
development carried out in small and medium sized firms is tightly intertwined with the 
business as a whole, and thus consequently less formalized in organizational terms (i.e. 
having no separate R&D units/departments). Rather we would like to follow here the 
definition given by Harrison and Sullivan (2000, 40) to innovation process: “all firms 
have their own approach and method for developing new or innovative ideas that create 
value. For many technology companies the innovation process is an R&D activity; 
service companies, on the other hand, often have a creativity department; still others rely 
on their employees in the field to produce innovative ideas”.  
The Finnish companies selected for the closer study are KONE Corporation, Lamor 
Corporation Ab and Neste Oil Corporation. Each company is shortly presented below. 
Here it is sufficient to highlight the most evident differences between the cases in their 
internationalization. KONE is a text book example of the gradual internationalization of 
business activities of a large company over long time. Further on internationalization has 
taken place gradually starting from geographically closest countries and proceed with 
time to more remote locations. Neste Oil’s22 history shows that a company’s 
internationalization is not necessarily unidirectional process. Neste Oil has gone through 
a rapid growth of international activities and foreign acquisitions in the 1980s and the 
early 1990s. Since then, though, the firm has divested bulk of its foreign assets and 
                                                 
22The company’s name has changed over the time because of the restructurings. Depending on the context 
Neste, Fortum Oil and Gas division, and Neste Oil are used in the text. 
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refocused most of activities in Finland. Lamor, in comparison to the two others is 
significantly smaller company, SME by definition, operates in highly international niche 
market. Lamor case also highlights specificities relating to internationalisation of small 
and medium sized companies.  
Table 1. The Finnish case companies in figures (2005) 
 
 
KONE Corp. Lamor Corp. Ab Neste Oil Corp. 
Industry Metals & engineering Wholesale of machinery 
and equipment 
Chemical (oil refining 
and marketing) 
Employees 27,2381) 50 4,4861) 
Turnover, million € 3,242 20 9,974  
Foreign employees 90%  40% 24% 
R&D intensity 1.3% (€ 41 million) not available not available 
Ownership structure B shares stock listed, 
majority of voting right 
hold by one family 
Privately owned, a VC 
company having 25% 
stake since 2004 
Stock listed, 50,1% state 
owned, non-Finnish 
share-holders circa 35% 





KONE Corporation, established in 1910, is today the world's fourth largest 
elevator and the largest escalator manufacturer having around 10 per cent market 
share of the global market. The company has approx. 27,000 employees (90-95% 
abroad) and annual net sales € 3,2 billion (2005). Elevator and escalator 
manufacturing and maintenance services are globally mature business area in which 
consolidation is the predominant model to expand market share. This is reflected in 
the fact that besides of small local players globally are left only a handful of large 
companies competing for market shares. The most important customer groups 
include building owners, construction companies and facility management 
companies. KONE operates globally; market in Americas accounted for 22%, Asia-
Pacific for 12% and EMEA (Europe, Middle East and Africa) for the remaining 
66% of sales in 2005. KONE has two classes of shares — the non-listed class A 
shares and the class B shares which are listed on the Helsinki Exchange since 1967.  
The real power in the company is although historically exerted by one family. 
Maturity of elevator and escalator business manifests itself in R&D activities of 
KONE. Research done is mainly applied and new innovations are usually brought 































Neste Oil Corporation’s predecessor, Neste Oy was founded in 1948 to secure 
nation’s oil supply and widening Finland’s industrial base. In the 1980s and the 
1990s the state-owned company expanded abroad in its core business and in 
petrochemicals. The company was merged with IVO Oy (state-owned electricity 
producer and distributor) in 1998 in order to build an internationally competitive 
energy group, Fortum Corporation. The oil businesses were demerged from Fortum 
in April 2005 when the new company Neste Oil Corp. was listed on Helsinki Stock 
Exchange. In the end of 2005 Finnish State had 50.1% of shares, foreign institutions 
34.8% and Finnish institutions and households the remaining 15.1%. Today Neste 
Oil is an oil refining and marketing company with net sales of € 9,974 million and 
4,486 employees (2005). The company operates on professional and consumer 
markets and on niche markets in certain environmental friendly products such as 
high technology oils. Product range consists of high-quality traffic oils and high 
value-added petroleum products. Approximately 40% of production is exported, the 
most important markets by volume being Finland, Sweden, Germany, USA, and 
Canada. R&D activity focuses on developing clean traffic fuels (e.g. bio diesel) and 
on their production technologies. The company’s R&D expenditure reached € 8 
million in 2005.  
Lamor Corporation Ab (Lamor Oy), established in 1982, develops oil spill 
recovery and environmental products to professional market. Company roots reach 
in shipbuilding and ship repair industry. Lamor has around 50 employees of which 
30 in Finland. Turnover for the current accounting period is predicted to be € 20-22 
million, at the moment approximately 95 per cent of production is exported.  Lamor 
is family owned company, whose most important clients are oil companies and 
public authorities. At the moment approximately 95 % of production is exported, 
Russia being the most important export destination accounting roughly for half of 
the turnover. The global market of oil spill recovery products is dominated by few 
international operators of which Lamor is one of the most significant with around 20 
% market share. Manufacturing is outsourced to subcontractor network whereas 
administration, sales and marketing as well as product development functions are 





Internationalization and transformation of Finnish companies into multinational 
corporations has taken place rather recently if compared for instance to Swedish 
companies, as pointed out by Mannio et al. (2003, 11). In the view of Ali-Yrkkö et. al. 
(2004, 12-13) the models emphasizing process nature of internationalization have rather 
well described how companies originating from small and open economies, such as 
Finland, have became international over time. Internationalization of Finnish firms has 
typically advanced stepwise manner via Sweden and Germany to other European 
countries and the US.  
KONE 
KONE provides a text book example of internationalization as gradual learning process 
during which the company expands its presence from culturally, economically and 
geographically close markets to more remote locales with accumulated experience base. 
The theoretical models underlining this view include notion that internationalization 
starts usually with export and only afterwards foreign direct investments come into the 
play.  
In the history of Finnish industry KONE has played a pioneering role in 
internationalization. The company has been in the vanguard to acquire major factories 
and markets shares abroad and to employ foreign employees. KONE started to export 
elevators mainly to neighborhood countries already in the 1920s, 1930s (Herlin 1960, 
89). After the World war II KONE contributed elevators, electric hoists and cranes to the 
war indemnity deliveries being paid to the Soviet Union. These contributions forced 
KONE to expand its capacity, rationalize production processes and learn to meet 
demanding manufacturing schedules and paved the way for subsequent visionary 
internationalization strategy. (Marchan-Piekkari 2003)  
KONE’s efforts to build up connections to foreign markets intensified in the late 1950s 
when orders in domestic market diminished as a result of economic slow-down. First 
foreign subsidiary was founded in 1957 in Sweden. Since then KONE has typically 
expanded its international presence through acquisitions, first example being the take-
over of substantially larger Sweden-based Asea-Graham and its Norwegian and Danish 
affiliates in 1968. Successive acquisitions followed one after another during the 1970s 
and 1980s whereas greenfield investments abroad have been exceptions. Decision to 
enter to a market through greenfield investment has been a 'last resort' if there have not 
been possibility to acquire a local company. An example of this was KONE’s decision to 
invest into a new plant in China in 1998 after it became clear that acquisition strategy was 
not feasible.    
Over time KONE's production structure diversified and it became one of the world's 
largest hoist and crane manufacturers as well as a producer of high-tech electronic 
hospital and laboratory equipments. In the early 1990s when global recession had set in, 
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KONE's response was to divest shipboard cargo handling business, crane23, wood 
handling and piping systems businesses, and the steel foundry and electronic medical 
instruments business in course of 1993-1995. Maintenance of automatic building doors 
was hold within the company and given an extra boost by a few strategic acquisitions and 
alliances; the skills required are in many ways common to those needed in the elevator 
and escalator business and customer base is often overlapping. KONE also set out to 
strengthen its position as a worldwide elevator and escalator supplier through 
acquisitions, by investing in the new factory in China and through strategic alliances — 
Toshiba alliance being the most significant.   
A new major manoeuvre was made in 2002, when KONE acquired Partek, a Finnish 
industrial engineering company with net sales equal to KONE figures. Partek's business 
areas consisting of container handling, load handling, forest machinery and tractors 
became to comprise KONE’s Materials Handling division. However, soon after tractor 
and forest machine businesses were sold. The remaining activities of the division 
comprised of Kalmar container handling and Hiab load handling, was renamed as KONE 
Cargotec in January 2004. In the end of same year acquisition of MacGREGOR, a global 
marine cargo-flow solution and service provider, added shipboard cargo-handling onto 
business of the division. The reorganization was finalized in summer 2005 by splitting 
KONE into two separately listed companies on the Helsinki Stock Exchanges; elevator, 
escalator & building door service business continues to operate under the name KONE 
Corporation while Cargotec Corporation, established through de-merger, comprises 
former Kone Cargotec’s business areas.  
Today, KONE’s local operations and services are provided through some 800 service 
centres worldwide in over 40 countries. Research and development is carried out by the 
Global R&D Centres locating in Finland, the US, Italy and China. Escalator R&D 
activities are centered in Germany and the US. In addition, a software development 
centre has been operating in India since the mid-2001.  KONE has activities in other 
Nordic countries also, but no R&D functions. KONE’s international orientation is 
reflected also in the foreign sales figures (well above 90%). 
Familiarity with regional customers' needs and local conditions plays important role in 
the development and delivery of new elevators and escalators, and in provision of 
maintenance services which is reflected in geographical division of KONE activities. 
Existing building/housing stock differentiates the global elevator market segments. In 
Asia in general and in China in particular, the market is characterized by rapid growth 
and accompanied by strong demand for elevators and escalators. Presently, over 25% of 
the world's new elevators and half of new escalators are installed in China alone. In 
Europe, where situates about half of the current stock of the world's elevators and 
                                                 
23 The sell-off the operations of crane division to a group of institutional investors led by Sweden-based 
Industrikapital and members of the crane division's senior management gave birth to KCI Konecranes. 
Today, the KCI Konecranes is with it's 5000 employees a globally operating engineering group specialising 
in advanced overhead lifting solutions and maintenance services. The corporate headquarters of KCI 
Konecranes locate in Hyvinkää — in the same town where KONE has major activities including production 
and R&D center. 
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escalators, renovation and modernisation of existing housing stock constitutes a sizeable 
share of local elevator market. In line with this fact the services account for a 
substantially larger share of KONE sales in Europe than new equipments. (KONE 
Annual Report 2005) 
Neste Oil 
Acquisitions, divestments and mergers are characterizing also history of Neste Oil, which 
predecessor Neste was founded soon after the World War II to secure Finland's oil 
supply. Ensuring national control in oil trade and refining was at that time understood to 
be a critical question. Neste was also conceived as a building block for industrial 
diversification in the country one-sidedly dependent on forest industry. During the Cold 
War years, Neste management alongside Finnish political elite balanced between East 
and West. Majority of crude oil refined by Neste was imported from the Soviet Union, 
whereas technologically and financially the company was relying on leading-edge 
American engineering know-how and large Western credit institutions. (Kuisma 1997, 
338-355) 
By the end of 1960s Neste had grown the largest oil refining company in the Nordic 
countries and by turnover second largest industrial firm in Finland. Neste adopted early 
on a forward looking strategy in which in-house R&D had a role to play. The first 
research laboratory linked with Naantali refinery was opened in 1960. In-house research 
centre was founded next to Porvoo refinery in 1967. (Larsio 1974) 
Neste’s ambitious and controversial goal in the late 1960s was to build up base for 
plastics industry in Finland. The company continued actively to explore opportunities in 
plastics industry in the following two decades and was participating in restructuring of 
the Nordic plastic industry. Also the scope of businesses expanded in value chain. 
Decision to participate in crude oil exploration and drilling in North Sea was made in the 
early 1970s. This was paving way to expansion of the company’s oil and gas exploration 
and production activities not just in North Sea but in Oman, North-America and Russia in 
the course of 1990s and early 2000. During this phase foreign acquisitions were common. 
Neste commenced also activities in international crude oil trading in the 1980s. (Kuisma 
1997, 361-364) 
By the mid-1990s Neste had achieved a position in which it was in control of the whole 
oil product value chain from oil exploration to shipping, refining and retailing combined 
with stakes in petrochemicals and basic plastics production. The economic down-turn in 
the early 1990s hit hard the company, though. Neste’s situation was complicated by 
heavy debt burden: international expansion in chemical and plastics businesses were to a 
large extent funded by outside capital. In addition, the political upheavals in Soviet Union 
in 1991 ended the bilateral trade, which was the basis for regulation of oil product 
imports to Finland benefiting Neste. (Kuisma 1997, 542) 
Facing bleak situation Neste divested its petrochemical activities; Neste and Norwegian 
Statoil combined their petrochemical and polyolefin businesses into the new Borealis 
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Group in 1994. Neste Chemicals' units in Finland, Belgium, Portugal and Sweden were 
merged into the new firm. Some years later Neste sold its 50% stake in Borealis. 
Business activities of remaining Neste Chemicals24 were concentrated on adhesive resins 
and industrial coating applications to be ultimately sold to Swedish Industri Kapital in 
1999. In the following year, the owner merged the acquired businesses with Norwegian 
based Dyno Asa to form a new company, Dynea Oy headquartered in Helsinki. 
The Ministry of Trade and Industry’s initiative to merge Neste with IVO, state-owned 
electricity producer and distributor, into a new internationally competitive energy group 
was approved 1997. The new company, Fortum Corporation, started in the early 1998 
and was listed on the Helsinki Exchange. The combined resources of IVO and Neste and 
returns gained through divestment of a range of possessions (many of which previously 
part of Neste) provided Fortum economic resources to grow a leading energy company in 
the Nordic Countries and other parts of the Baltic Rim.  
Having divested former Neste Chemicals activities the company — now Fortum Oil and 
Gas division — focused on the remaining business areas. Soon after though, because of 
strategic reorientation of activities, assets in oil and gas exploration and production were 
divested, too. Oil production assets in Oman were sold in 2002 as was oil and gas 
exploration and production in Norway. Divestments have been continued after the 
separation of Fortum oil businesses to newly founded Neste Oil Corporation in April, 
2005. The company sold in autumn 2005 its 50% holding in SeverTEK to LUKOIL. 
SeverTEK was joint venture having license to exploration and production at an oil field 
in Northern Russia. Further, Neste Oil announced in early 2006 intention to sell its 10% 
holding in a polypropylene and gasoline component production plant locating in Saudi 
Arabia to SABIC, a local corporation.  
After divestments Neste Oil is a pure oil refining and marketing company with own 
shipping fleet.  The company operates on consumer and professional markets and has 
production facilities in Finland, Belgium and Portugal, and through two joint-ventures in 
Canada and Sweden — via the latter Neste is also involved in refining in the UK. Neste 
Oil’s retail networks are at place in Finland and Baltic Rim covering St Petersburg region 
in Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. Most of the oil products produced in-
house are still sold on the domestic market (57% 2005) even though the export share has 
been growing over time. In domestic market Neste Oil's share of oil products wholesale 
was 77%, in retail sale of gasoline 27% and diesel 41% in 2005. The main gasoline 
export markets are in the other Nordic countries, Germany and North America. The main 
export markets for diesel fuel are Sweden and Germany, to smaller extent the other 
Nordic countries and other countries in Europe.  
                                                 
24 Including following acquisitions: 1988 Chembond of the US, 1991 MCN of the Netherlands, 1992 




Lamor Corporation Ab has over 20 years experience in developing and manufacturing of 
oil spill recovery equipment. Today it develops and manufactures for example patented 
oleo-philic brush skimmers, oil containment booms, transfer pumps, power packs and 
aluminium workboats under Lamor (LArsen Marin Oil Recovery) brand. Lamor has 
stayed family owned whole of its existence, at the moment 70 per cent of company is 
owned by family members. In 2004 an international venture capital company 
strengthened company's financial resources by acquiring 22.5 per cent of company 
shares. Lamor's senior personnel hold the remaining shares. The most important clientele 
for Lamor products are oil companies. In addition, ministries, harbours and other public 
authorities as well as private oil spill recovery companies purchase oil spill recovery 
equipment.   
The company gained experience of oil spill recovery already early on, e.g. acting as a 
subcontractor for the Finnish Ministry of Environment buying oil spill recovery 
equipment worldwide. Lamor spotted a business opportunity on market and started to 
develop more innovative own products and construction of the first oil spill combatting 
vessel in 1986. In the midst of early 1990s economic recession and shipyard crises the 
company was forced to diminish operations into minimum. However, afterwards this 
incident proved to build some positive effects to the company. Firstly, as a result of the 
shipyard crises, company shifted operations exclusively to oil spill recovery technology 
and most of the 1990s were used for developing new innovative products. Secondly, 
overall scarcity led company to establish a wide subcontracting network in order to be 
able to supply products to customers. Only the most valuable part of operations, product 
development alongside of marketing and selling, was kept in-house. The model is still in 
use today, and has proved to be efficient and flexible.  
In the beginning Lamor faced the same obstacles common to several innovative 
companies; the lack of references hindered commercialization of product. After 
company's products were tested to be the top in international comparison, credibility 
augmented and led to first large order from Swedish Border Guards in 1993. After 
completing Swedish order, company supplied oil spill recovery equipment to Baltic 
States and Russia jointly with Finnish Environment Ministry. First foreign companies 
were acquired in the early 2000s even though company has operated on international 
environment from start; first contacts to international trade were established already in 
the beginning of company history when Lamor served ex-Soviet Union customers in 
shipyard operations.   
In 2002 Lamor acquired two competitors that improved its technical competencies 
significantly. Acquision of a Finnish LMP Patents Oy provided large patent portfolio, 
widened product range with LORI products and ended a patent dispute going back to the 
end of 1980s. The acquisition of British competitor, GT Pollution Technology Ltd, 
opened important contacts to US and Japanese markets. The participation of venture 
capital company strengthened Lamor's shift towards performance provider.  
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Lamor has evolved from single oil spill recovery manufacturer into whole oil spill 
recovery system specialist which offers comprehensive products to customers — i.e. not 
solely devices but services such as training and worldwide customer support functions. 
Company is determined to become a total solution provider in oil spill recovery. To this 
end Lamor has developed the regional Environmental Action Centres (EACs) concept. 
EACs established in close co-operation with local firms and authorities aim to raise 
preparedness to respond occurring environmental incidents quickly and effectively, and 
to prevent possible accidents. The first EAC, called Lamor-Yugra, was recently opened 
in Russian’s largest oil production region in East of Ural Mountains. EAC based on 
public-private partnership principle operates in the supervision of Lamor who provides 
stockpile of oil spill recovery equipment. Furthermore, teaching, instructing and overall 
coordination are company's responsibilities.  
Lamor has three foreign affiliates, in China, the United States and the United Kingdom. 
Sales offices are located in Malaysia, India and Russia, whereas distribution and sales in 
over 50 countries are handled via agents. At the moment approximately 95 per cent of 
production is exported. The domestic market for company's products is very limited, and 
largely saturated with Lamor's products. 
Nowadays Lamor exports to over 50 countries. It has conquered some 20 per cent of 
world market, being a market leader with such a share. The world wide oil spill recovery 
market is  highly concentrated, having only few large operators of which Lamor is the 
largest equipment supplier. The three most significant competitors are located in Norway, 
Denmark and the UK.  
 
The nature of core competencies 
Each company has a unique mix of competencies and even though in-house R&D is 
generally highly valued, its significance may well vary over time. KONE’s history 
exemplifies how changes in a company function, like in product development are linked 
to changes in the company's business environment and to firm's strategy. According to 
Hasu (2004, 119) evolvement of in-house R&D at KONE over the past 30 years has been 
characterized by the transition from locally managed machine development controlled by 
individual pioneers to centrally managed global R&D system. In pioneering years up to 
1960s product development was closely linked to management and those involved were 
generalists rather than specialists by approach. In-house R&D under-went expansion 
during the years of intensive internationalization in the 1970s and 1980s during which the 
R&D personnel was used to assess product and technology portfolios of the companies 
KONE was acquiring. The key focus of business was new, expanding markets and 
selection of competitive, suitable products from the existing portfolio to respective 
markets rather than development of new products. (ibid. 82-99) 
The radical technological invention (KONE EcoDisc®) and on this based new machine 
room-less elevator concept (MonoSpace® elevator) elevated in-house R&D to a new role 
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within KONE. The innovation gave to the company competitive advantage and status of 
technology leader on market. KONE’s core competencies in product development are 
comprised of a unique company specific knowledge concerning elevator systems on the 
one hand, and development of strategic area specific components on the other. In the 
latter case new technologies from outside are absorbed to in-house component 
development.  
Neste Oil presents a company which core-knowledge is a firm-specific blend of 
chemistry, process technologies and specialized expertise developed in-house over the 
years. Particularly the know-how and technological competencies needed in Neste Oil’s 
product development are to large extent firm-specific, whereas process technologies draw 
from more general knowledge base. At least to certain extent this ‘specificity’ of know-
how needed in the product development is explained by the background of the company. 
In practice, Neste Oil has been only company in its field in Finland and it has had to 
create in-house competencies needed in development of refining technologies and oil 
products. In-house R&D is a characteristic distinguishing Neste Oil also from many oil 
refining companies abroad; having in-house developed proprietary technologies is 
unusual within refining business. It is more common for refineries to purchase 
technologies developed by specialized technology companies.    
The company’s own proprietary technologies are nowadays in the core of Neste Oil 
strategy. At highly competitive market, Neste Oil’s strength is on development of cleaner 
traffic (bio)fuels and fuel processing technologies — i.e. the company targets those 
market opportunities which introduction of new products specifications and regulations 
opens for innovative firms. The cornerstone for in-house development of environmentally 
cleaner products was set in the aftermath of oil crises in the 1970s and decreasing 
domestic oil consumption. Decisions made in the 1980s put more emphasis on product 
development aiming to fulfill tightening environmental requirements (Kuisma 1997). 
Since then, as Hernesniemi et al. (1996) remark, the company’s "effort to make 
environmentally superior products (...) evident in all its activities" has turned out to be 
one of the company's distinctive advantages.  
As Lamor in 1990s had to restructure its operations, the core competences that company 
wished to keep in the company were formulated. At that time research and development 
was an obvious function to be kept in-house due to strategic focus on development of oil 
spill recovery equipment. More generally, the core competences of Lamor Oy are based 
on close customer contacts and coordination of subcontractor network. Main driver for an 
increase in know-how has been close co-operation with customers since the beginning — 
ability to listen and learn from customers is highly valued in the company. After 
outsourcing manufacturing to subcontractors Lamor has been able to concentrate more 
fully on core competencies and broadening product range.  
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Motives for internationalization 
The major driver in internationalization of Lamor has been the superior technology 
compared to competitors and global scope of oil spill recovery niche markets. Another 
issue that has aided company's strong internationalization is wide local market 
knowledge. Knowing your customers and acting accordingly is essential especially on a 
highly concentrated and specific niche market such as oil spill recovery market.  When 
straight customer contacts play a central role in internationalization will company’s 
operational scope enlarge significantly. At the moment approximately 95 per cent of 
production is exported to tens of countries. The domestic market for company's products 
is very limited, and largely saturated with Lamor's products. 
Mergers and acquisitions have been a way to complement Lamor’s existing assets and to 
gain know-how and market knowledge. For instance the acquisition of a British 
competitor, GT Pollution Technology Ltd in 2002 brought complementing products for 
product range, and provided contacts to new markets, especially in Asia and the US. GT 
Pollution Technology Ltd's strong knowledge and know-how in oil spill response field 
reinforced Lamor's global position as a market leader. The acquisition of Finnish LMP 
Patents Ltd provided Lamor an opportunity to form a joint venture with an American 
partner in 2003. The acquired firm Hyde Marine Inc. acted previously as an agent for 
Lamor products in the Americas. The US partner had long experience of oil spill 
recovery business, and therefore held vast knowledge about local markets, as well as, 
industry as a whole. Their knowledge has strengthened Lamor's know-how in several 
areas.  
KONE 
Parallel with Lamor, the internationalization of KONE has been distinctively market 
driven. Through acquisitions the company has actively bought market shares and 
maintenance networks in international markets since the 1960’s; Pekka Herlin, the long-
time President, COO and the major owner of KONE, saw that small Finnish elevator 
manufacturer had essentially two future options; either start growing internationally 
through acquisitions or to be taken over by an international elevator manufacturer. Herlin 
and KONE chose the first alternative and since then acquisitions have had standing 
position in the company strategy.  
The adopted strategy has fitted well together with the characteristics of elevator 
manufacturing and services business; the question is about globally mature business in 
which consolidation is the predominant model to expand market share. According to 
Marschan-Piekkari (2003, 152) "in the elevator industry, large volumes are a prerequisite 
for profitable business and value is derived from local service networks in each country". 
Access to these networks is the key driver for acquisitions elevator and escalator 
business.   
This is not the whole story, though. The company has used acquisitions to acquire know-
how and competences needed when establishing its presence in new or hard to conquer 
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markets. This is well illustrated by purchase of the fourth largest US elevator 
manufacturer Montgomery Elevator in 1994. Through the acquisition KONE gained not 
only new know-how on high speed elevators but also technology and production system 
fitting to the American market into which KONE had had difficulties to penetrate before. 
Alliance and joint-venture arrangements have also provided KONE a way to enter to new 
markets and a means to nurture collaboration with strategic partners. KONE has had a 
global strategic alliance with Toshiba Elevators and Building System Corporation 
(TELC) since 1998. Through the alliance, Toshiba has the right to manufacture and 
market elevators based on KONE’s machine-room-less technology in Japan and KONE 
has right to use drives developed by TELC. The relationship was strengthened through 
cross-ownership in 2002. In this context, the President and CEO of TELC were elected to 
KONE Board. In 2005, the companies established an independent joint-venture for 
escalator production in China. 
Neste Oil 
From Neste Oil’s history emerges two key motives for internationalization. The older one 
relates to expansion of activities up- and downwards in the value chain. The more recent 
one to utilization of in-house developed technologies on international markets. Gloomy 
growth prospects for the company's oil products in domestic markets in the late 1970s set 
tone for decisions transforming Neste gradually into an international oil and 
petrochemicals corporation. The management arrived at conclusion that the firm had to 
diversify its activities to new markets and business areas especially in petrochemicals and 
plastics. Expansion through foreign acquisitions was essential part of this strategy. 
Besides of market access, important was the access to production capacity and in-house 
competencies of the acquired firms.  
In its core business line, being involved in the whole vertical value chain from oil 
production to retail was one of long-lived aspirations of the company management. 
Already in the early 1970s the company had decided to participate in crude oil 
exploration and drilling in North Sea. Decision to establish in the early 1990s Neste 
service station chains in the Baltic Rim region was based on opportunities identified 
being among the first in the emerging new markets. Development of service station 
chains around Baltic Sea continues to be one of the company’s strategic focus areas.  
Nowadays Neste Oil has concentrated on its core businesses in refining and fuels 
components. Key activities locate in Finland and share of operations abroad is currently 
significantly smaller than 10-20 years ago. Opportunities to new expansion abroad in 
future are, however, under consideration and possibilities to non-organic growth through 
acquisitions, mergers, strategic partnerships, or other corporate transactions are neither 
excluded. Besides of the growth of oil retail chain around the Baltic Rim, seeds for Neste 
Oil’s future activities abroad are planted in those very areas which the product 
development of company has invested in last years. In practice, the company has been 
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looking for international partners especially in premium lubricant components and 
biodiesel.25 
 
Corporate organizational principles 
Questions concerning organization and management of business operations in general 
and foreign operations in particular are central for internationalizing firms. There is 
however no one-size-fits-all solution available; companies have opted for quite diverse 
organizational arrangements as Lovio (2004, 54-55) found out in the study on 
international R&D networks in the large Finnish multinational companies.  
Neste Oil provides an example of a more focused company, where corporate level has 
significant role in R&D. Today the company has in practice concentrated all the R&D 
operations at the corporate technology centre in Porvoo, immediate vicinity to the 
company's major oil refinery in Finland. Overall, Neste Oil has been relatively integrated 
by its corporate structure over the history especially in relation to R&D.  
Also KONE with its current structure clearly qualifies for the category of more focused 
companies. Over the past 10 to 15 years, the organisation of intra-company linkages and 
integration of foreign units in KONE’s corporate structure has evolved from a loose 
portfolio model to model in which the foreign units are tighter integrated into the parent 
company. It was recognized in the late 1980s that the old organizational model was not 
feasible at the long run and since the mid-1990s the company has persistently aimed to 
standardization and harmonization of products, processes and procedures of operations. 
In practice, the standardization carried out has meant tightening the integration of foreign 
subsidiaries and consolidations and divestments at the level of foreign production plants 
as well as introduction of global product platforms and standardized production method 
for tailored elevator solutions. 'One name and one brand' policy was implemented across 
the organization in 1999. (Marschan-Piekkari 2003, Annual Report 2005) 
With the hindsight, the machine-room-less elevator concept made at KONE’s R&D 
centre in Finland, was not only a break-through in the global elevator business but also 
internally within the multinational organisation. Marchan-Piekkari (2003, 155) concludes 
the innovation gave a clear technological advantage for KONE on market and provided a 
common technological platform to the whole group, and simultaneously strengthened 
employees identification with the company across the corporation.  
KONE has reorganised its activities into the matrix model in 2005. According to KONE’s 
current operational principles, the local organisation is in charge of activities at customer 
interface, whereas global organisation is responsible for product development and 
operational modes as well as for common resources. The aim is to give local organisation 
                                                 
25 Neste Oil has announced that it negotiates and evaluates with a number of foreign firms possibilities to 
jointly build production plants abroad based on the Finnish company’s in-house developed proprietary 
technologies.  
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opportunity to focus on customer service, while business line directors take care of the 
competitive product portfolio and business infrastructure. Among others, the new model 
is expected to increase interaction, intra-organisational knowledge flows and awareness 
about different regional needs in global market areas. (KONE Annual Report 2005)  
Lamor 
Organizational challenges faced by Lamor, being a SME with around 50 employees in 
Finland and abroad, are different from larger companies. Lamor’s challenge is not that 
much intra-firm connections and knowledge flows than orchestration of a wide network 
of subcontractors and key suppliers for manufacturing and logistics; Lamor has 
outsourced functions that are not regarded as core business to subcontractors. Only 
administration, sales and marketing, and product development are located at the 
headquarters in Porvoo.  
The networking model allows flexible production that is crucial because Lamor is 
engaged in project trade — i.e. equipment is not produced into stock. Furthermore, 
production that operates on networking principle allows rapid product development 
projects, and is well suited to global business environment. In the beginning the 
subcontractor network consisted of regional companies, but with time the network has 
grown broader in geographical terms and includes also some foreign suppliers. The 
supervision of the supplier network of some 200 subcontractors proved however to be 
difficult and led Lamor to re-organize structure. The solution proved to be the reduction 
of the number of suppliers directly connected to Lamor.  
Currently Lamor has 10 key suppliers which are situated close to Lamor’s core processes. 
The key suppliers, which at the moment are all based in Finland, are regarded more or 
less as strategic partners who on their behalf manage several suppliers each. The 
expectations laid for key suppliers are higher to other companies operating in network. 
Periodic production requires initiative from a key supplier as it has itself several 
subcontractors to manage. This requires also fluent communication with customer, which 
means that procedures need to be well established.  
Lamor uses worldwide sourcing in order to find suitable companies to join the network. 
In several cases, know-how is available without further development but the most 
suitable knowledge might take effort to find. Subcontractor network is based on mutual 
trust and companies are carefully selected. The network operates on few rules; firstly 
subcontractor has to produce high quality, and secondly the agreement has to beneficial 
for both parties (win-win situation). Lamor is not any subcontractor's sole customer, in 
practice it orders less than 50 percent of a subcontractor’s production capacity. This 
forces subcontractors to focus on efficiency and to find their own specific advantage.  
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Location of ‘strategic’ functions 
Each of the case companies is rather deeply embedded in Finland through corporate 
management, product development activities and links with domestic co-operators. In 
case of Neste Oil even during the 1980s and 1990s, when the company through foreign 
acquisitions and joint ventures became a multinational having activities in a number of 
countries, the core functions, refining and R&D were firmly concentrated in Finland. 
Also, majority of the company’s employees has always been in Finland; 21% of 
personnel were abroad in 1983, around 1/3 in 1994, and 24% in 2005. In this sense 
development diverges from most other large Finnish companies having increasing share 
of employees abroad. 
Neste Oil’s foreign operations focus on production and sales whereas R&D activities are 
concentrated in Finland.  The units abroad do not have any significant input into R&D 
carried out at the technology centre; as it seems the technology transfer within the 
corporation takes place uni-directionally from Finland to foreign units. The model in 
which R&D is centered in Finland has been in place since Neste started to expand 
internationally. Today, Neste Oil’s refineries in Belgium and Portugal as well as the 
Canadian plant owned jointly with Chevron are all using technologies and components 
(fuel and oil additives) developed in Finland. 
Neste Oil is concretely anchored in the domestic soil through its two, on international 
standards advanced refineries. With continuous investments the refineries have been 
developed over a long time “on a par with the top European refineries” (Hernesniemi et 
al. 1996, 137). The corporate technology centre in Porvoo employs around 100 
employees in R&D and another hundred experts in quality control. In addition, at the site 
locates offices of Neste Jacobs Engineering, with which the technology centre closely 
collaborates especially in process development.26 Overall, the geographical vicinity of 
R&D to actual production is considered to be especially important when new products 
are developed, but less in relation to process development.  
Location bound factors are also highly significant in terms of logistics which has an 
important role in oil business. Neste Oil’s domestic refineries and production plants 
locate close to primary markets in Finland and around Baltic Sea as well as to Russian 
crude oil terminals from which most of feedstock used today at the refineries are shipped. 
North Sea oil fields have been another important origin of crude oil. The switching 
between different crude oil sources has required development of flexible and complex 
refining technologies: crude oil from the North Sea is light, demands less procession and 
is priced higher whereas crude oil from Russian oil fields is heavier, sourer and priced 
lower. Neste Oil’s competitive advantage lies just here: the company has built up over 
years refining expertise and technologies and invested in the refineries which give it 
today ability to produce variety of products and cleaner traffic fuels from lower cost 
heavier crude.  
                                                 




KONE’s business operations comprise of two lines of activities, i.e. delivery of new 
elevators and escalators and maintenance services on the other.27 Nowadays some 60% 
of the company revenue originates from services and maintenance. Services and 
maintenance business is strongly location bound and "requires the company be present in 
all the countries that are important markets" (Lovio 2004, 25). Also manufacturing is 
dispersed geographically even though standardization of production processes together 
with introduction of global product platforms have made it possible to consolidate and 
divest production plants especially abroad.  
In comparison to manufacturing and maintenance services, R&D activities of KONE 
have been internationalized to a lesser extent. The company's global R&D unit locates in 
Hyvinkää, Southern-Finland. Key elevator technologies are developed in Hyvinkää in 
cooperation with mainly domestic research organisations and partner firms. Localisation 
of technologies takes place in globally distributed R&D-centres and other units, which 
have the first-hand knowledge of local market. (Hakala 2005)  
KONE’s R&D-centre in Hyvinkää is responsible for the key technologies and the global 
R&D portfolio which is shared with the R&D centres abroad. Hyvinkää R&D centre has 
on the payroll approx. 150 people. In addition, in the same premises are working over 
100 employees from subcontracting engineering and design firms. KONE’s R&D centres 
abroad employ together less people in product development than Hyvinkää R&D centre 
alone.   
The typical R&D project at Hyvinkää R&D centre involves experts from the company’s 
R&D-centres abroad. In order to facilitate interaction common meetings are organised 
and ICT applications, such as e-mail and video-conferences are extensively used for 
communication between geographically remote units. Practical challenges in intra-
company R&D projects spring from time differences and cultural specificities reflected in 
local business cultures. Potential ideas for new products and services are collected from 
all the KONE's units through intra-company software solution. Also staff mobility 
between the units is used for dissemination of knowledge and know-how and 
strengthening the linkages between units and the belonging to the concern. 
KONE’s R&D-centres locating outside of Finland are functionally complementing each 
other. The R&D centre in the US focuses on North-American market, the centre in Italy 
on volume products and the centre in China on local requirements. Escalator R&D is 
carried out in Hattingen, Germany and Moline, the US. The software development centre 
in India serves the whole group. In addition, development of some technologies has been 
subcontracted. The R&D centre in Hyvinkää collaborates mainly with Finnish partners 
(subcontractors, research organisations etc.) but also international subcontractors are 
cooperated with especially if superior understanding on local conditions, market and 
                                                 
27 Maintenance services have been integral part of elevator and escalator business from the very beginning. 
As a historical curiosity "the elevator care-unit" of Kone Oy had more than 900 elevators to look after in 
Finland and more than 30 employees in1933. (Herlin 1960). 
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users are needed. The company's globally distributed production and R&D units have 
their own subcontractor networks.  
The fact that large multinational elevator producer’s major research and development 
activities are deeply embedded in the small Finnish town of Hyvinkää can be interpreted 
as an outcome of long historical process stretching over the last 60 years.28 Also the way 
in which KONE's overall internationalization has occurred weights here (cf. Lovio 2004, 
47). The company's existing global R&D centres, except the centre founded through 
greenfield investment in China, has came into being as a 'by-product' of acquisitions of 
foreign elevator and escalator manufacturers. 
Lovio, (2004, 47) provides another significant explanation for the concentration of 
KONE’s key R&D activities in Finland.  According to him "the extent to which 
company's products are based on global technologies has an effect” on share of foreign 
R&D: “the more similar the technology, the easier it is to concentrate R&D operations in 
the company's home country". As seen above KONE has since the mid-1990s 
standardised not only its products but also processes and procedures and thus integrated 
the foreign units more tightly with the corporation.   
Lamor 
Due to the network model adopted by Lamor, the firm's foreign activities are mainly 
complementing rather than substituting domestic ones. The company searches the best 
suited subcontractors to join the existing network regardless of location. The model 
developed over time mainly with Finnish subcontractors has proven to be viable even 
with foreign subcontractors. Lamor’s key suppliers, like Factorix Oy, have contracted and 
orchestrate foreign subcontractors with success. Notwithstanding this the model seems 
although to be sensitive to prevailing business principles in different locales. Few years 
ago Lamor made efforts to set up in the US similar subcontracting network to use in 
Finland with scant results.29 Lamor turned out to be too a small customer for several 
potential subcontractors which by size were much bigger than the Finnish company. Also 
the networking principles that Lamor has built subcontracting were not suitable for local 
culture. As the company representatives say, "trust is understood differently in different 
cultures".    
In the present situation, the main role of Lamor’s foreign affiliates and sales offices is to 
connect customers and R&D functions and management located in the headquarters. 
Ability to listen customer preferences is one of company's strengths in which transferring 
information between customers and R&D personnel is highly important. For this purpose 
Lamor values and uses agents who have long experience of oil spill recovery industry. In 
the industry small affiliates possess R&D know-how through individual experts not huge 
R&D departments as many operators in the field are quite small in size. Motive for 
                                                 
28 The elevator production was started in Hyvinkää in 1966. However, KONE had had production in 
Hyvinkää since 1944, when the firm's new crane factory was opened there.  
29 Initial motivation was to protect company’s production and local competitiveness against potential 
exchange rate changes between euro and dollar.  
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acquiring foreign companies has often been expertise. Not to forget marketing and sales 
knowledge that Lamor’s affiliates are able to offer. Sales contacts and channels are 
important for a company which exports 95 per cent of production and sells products in 
over 50 countries.  
Lamor’s embeddedness in local operational environment rely on several factors: as a 
family business the company has a direct link to the surrounding community; centrality 
of flexible network model for production together with mainly domestic collaboration 
partners in the company operations; and linked to trust-based relationship with network 
partners which takes time to root. Even though Lamor considers continuously 
opportunities for global sourcing, the networking model adopted by the company for 
manufacturing and logistics is well rooted in Finland and has turned out to be not that 
easy to transfer to other countries, at least not for the moment. On the other, Lamor is 
company constantly looking for ways to develop its operations further for instance in 
logistics, production and supply chain.  
 
The role of foreign presences for home-base corporate activities and 
NIS  
In light of the Finnish experience it seems evident that foreign operations in various 
forms are a prerequisite for companies coming from a small open economy in order to 
reach markets and customers abroad. The small domestic market does not leave much 
room for companies willing to grow and hence going international appears to be a matter 
of survival on long run. Of course, individual companies and industries are in different 
positions in relation to internationalization but certain current trends, such as focusing on 
core competencies and outsourcing as well as growing customer and user orientation, are 
further ‘pushing’ firms to look for possibilities on international markets.  
Among Finnish firms foreign presence as a pipeline to knowledge sources abroad is 
generally valued and on attitudinal level there seems to be no hindrances tapping foreign 
knowledge sources. Indeed, Lovio (2004, 60) argues that Finns have been “more used to 
importing than exporting technology, at least in comparison with the large OECD 
countries”. Our case studies support this argument. For instance Neste Oil’s predecessor 
Neste used extensively foreign know-how and expertise when planning and building up 
its refining capacity or making decisions concerning technology sourcing/transfer and 
expansion of business activities. KONE has also clearly shown preparedness to absorb 
knowledge and technologies at place in the acquired foreign firms. For Lamor knowledge 
got through acquisitions of the UK and US based companies has strengthened Lamor's 
know-how in several areas.   
In KONE case it can be argued that transformation into a multinational corporation with 
units all over the world has strengthened KONE's domestic operations. The corporate 
headquarters are in Finland and clear majority of top management is still manned by 
Finns — no matter the fact that the company is one of the pioneering Finnish companies 
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having top level foreign executives and board members. Also the company's key research 
and development activities have trough a long historical process deeply embedded in 
Finland and Hyvinkää. 
The global presence and familiarity with regional customers' needs and local conditions 
plays important role in the development and delivery of new elevators and escalators and 
in provision of maintenance services which is reflected in geographical division of 
KONE activities. Foreign affiliates are highly important as a "front-desk" towards local 
customers. They have also know-how of local market taste and requirements. Innovative 
ideas are gathered via intranet solution from the global units.  
Lamor’s presence in several countries is extremely beneficial for the company. New 
product development is largely based on hands-on experience and direct customer 
response gained from oil spill recovery operations.  Lamor values the co-operation with 
experienced agents who are able to communicate ideas back to R&D personnel as in 
various cases new ideas origin from customer contacts. The company participates also 
actively in international conferences, exhibitions and fairs. This kind of international 
professional gatherings provides a temporary pipeline or channel for “information 
exchanges between suppliers and customers about recent market trends, experiences and 
requirements for future products and services” (Maskell et al. 2005, 6). 
One characteristic related to whole oil spill response industry is companies' close co-
operation relations. For instance Lamor has formed co-operation agreement with a 
Norwegian competitor, NorLense AS who produces high-end oil booms. Companies' 
product ranges are complementing, that enables them to serve customers better together 
than operating individually. Forming of strategic alliances and co-operation agreements is 
not extraordinary but a common practice in the industry. These co-operation 
arrangements can be thought to play a role in knowledge transfer between the involved 
companies.  
Neste Oil differs from the other two case companies having the major strategic assets in 
Finland while operations abroad concern manufacturing plants and marketing/sales 
offices. At the moment the units abroad cannot be considered as a vital source of new 
ideas for company R&D: the foreign activities are based on R&D done in Finland not 
vice versa. What comes to future orientation of R&D at Neste Oil, it can be anticipated that the 
focus on biofuels and components may require intensified cooperation with foreign actors having 
competences in these areas while the expertise does not exist in Finland.  
Currently KONE is aiming to accelerate sales growth in fast growing economies of Asia 
and especially in China which is today the world's largest single market for major 
projects. For this purpose activities in China have been strengthened and for instance 
R&D operations and production has been expanded recently. In coming years the focus 
on developing Asian markets is likely to continue which probably is reflected also in 
R&D operations. On the other hand the remaining differences between national and regional 
elevator and escalator markets demand presence of local service provision and research and 
product development activities in all the major markets also in the future.  
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Linkages of DOMESTIC operations to DOMESTIC innovation system  
All the case companies have established linkages with domestic innovation system. Many 
Finnish large firms, such as KONE and Neste Oil, have also a long track record about 
participation in national R&D programmes. Lamor has conducted product development 
projects largely with income financing, even though has been recently granted co-funding 
for its individual product development projects from Tekes, the Finnish Funding Agency 
for Technology and Innovation. Lamor has also used Finpro’s internationalization 
consulting services, and obtained export credits and guarantees from Finnvera. Overall, 
the management of the company indicates that support to internationalization and R&D 
exists widely in Finland but the best assistance for company needs might be difficult to 
find.  
KONE and Neste Oil, as flagship companies in their respective fields, have developed 
close co-operation with domestic universities and research institutes having expertise in 
areas relevant for the companies. Neste Oil’s representative commented also that Finnish 
universities have turned out to be flexible and attentive to needs of the company. 
Experiences of collaboration with foreign institutions has been less encouraging in terms 
of flexibility and long lead times required for setting up a co-project. Early on in its 
history, Neste was even engaged closely in the development of domestic education and 
research in chemistry: a shortage of competences needed in oil refining, but also the 
'societal responsibility' gave an impetus for the company to establish in 1964 Neste 
foundation to promote and support Finnish chemical industry as well as research and 
education in chemistry (Larsio 1974, 61-63).  Lamor’s co-operation with domestic 
research and educational institutions is more occasional, which may reflect firm size and 
characteristics of technology and business in general.  
The companies studied have not experienced specific difficulties in recruitment of R&D 
personnel in Finland. For instance KONE’s R&D centre in Hyvinkää recruits both newly 
graduated engineers from universities and more experienced experts from other 
companies. At Neste Oil the level of education in the subjects important for the company 
is deemed to be generally good in Finland. In spite of that it takes couple of years to a 
new co-worker in R&D to grasp firm-specific knowledge on which products and 
technologies are developed in-house. In addition, the firm-specificity of knowledge base 
and requirements on flexibility and swiftness in product development restrict 
collaboration with actors outside the company. 
 KONE and Lamor have recruited foreign employees also in their operations locating in 
Finland. Neste Oil’s Technology Centre has less experience of foreign co-workers. In 
case of KONE, foreign staff members have been part of Hyvinkää R&D centre for a long 
time. The majority of the foreign experts are recruited to Hyvinkää from the other KONE 
units abroad, most of them being expatriates with a 2-3 years contract. The only real 
challenge encountered here is common to many other Finnish companies as well: it has 
turned out to be rather difficult to convince the best foreign experts to move to Finland. 
The companies studied seem to differ markedly in intensity of cooperation with other 
domestic firms. Comparisons between companies domestic co-operation activity is 
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although difficult because in KONE and Neste Oil cases attention has been on 
collaboration in R&D and product development stage, not on cooperation as such.  Still, 
inter-firm cooperation has particularly prominent position at Lamor which has outsourced 
not just manufacturing but also logistical functions and ‘only’ orchestrates the network 
together with key partners. Lamor also uses a couple of domestic R&D service providers 
in its product development depending on the project and resources available.    
Neste Oil cooperates rarely with other Finnish companies in development of new 
products or processes. The company representative anticipated that in future there may 
well be more space and need for collaboration with domestic forest industry and some 
other companies with relevant and complementing know-how in areas of interest for 
Neste Oil. KONE R&D centre in Hyvinkää has close cooperation with a number of 
Finnish collaborators covering partner firms and subcontractors, universities of 
technologies, research organisations and alike. From the R&D unit’s perspective it is very 
important that collaborators locate 'next door'. Particularly intensive co-operation is with 
Design Center Oy, a joint-venture founded in 1999 as a result of KONE’s decision to 
outsource planning of special elevators. The joint-venture has offices in the same 
premises with KONE R&D Centre.  
In Lamor’s case its first of all business know-how rather than knowledge related directly 
to R&D which trickles to domestic operational environment. The company’s experience 
of global business can be seen to spill over especially to those firms belonging to 
subcontractor network. Mutual learning has also occurred in the process of constructing 
the wide subcontractor network. Small subcontractors have gained business know-how 
and Lamor has been able to build a well-designed production model that suits well to 
global environment. From a key suppliers' point of view Lamor's international operations 
have brought merely positive effects. Overall understanding of requirements of 
international business has intensified. These not solely mean large changes in way of 
operating but also smaller-scale adjustments. In addition, with its international contacts 
Lamor offers channels for other Finnish companies operating in the environmental 
technologies field.   
Conclusions  
The case companies — as in general Finnish MNCs — internationalization has been 
distinctively market driven; if there is one major motive for internationalization of 
Finnish companies it has to be access to foreign markets. Small size of domestic markets 
‘push’ firms to look for opportunities abroad. This is well illustrated by the history of 
KONE; decision to grow through foreign acquisitions has been for the company the way 
to survive in the mature elevator and escalator business. Equally important 
internationalization has been for Lamor focusing on highly specialized niche market in 
oil spill recovery technologies and services. In fact, Lamor resembles so called "Born 
Global” companies targeting from early on international markets and aiming to become 
leading international actors in their own business areas. Also in the case of Neste Oil, 
internationalization in the past provided a major way to expand company activities across 
the value chain. Today Neste Oil’s focus is on international utilization of in-house 
developed proprietary technologies and on growth opportunities this may provide.  
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In comparison, overseas R&D activities have had a secondary role to play in 
internationalization of the case companies — which again is common for majority of 
Finnish multinationals. Typically, existing R&D units abroad have harbored in the hands 
of Finnish MNCs as a by-product through acquisition of foreign firms. Greenfield 
investments in new R&D units abroad have been rare so far. By and large, technology 
and knowledge transfer flows have been from headquarters and R&D centers in Finland 
to overseas subsidiaries — i.e. companies have tended to follow the asset-exploiting 
strategy. Accordingly emphasis in R&D abroad has been on ‘D’, development and 
adaptation of technologies, processes and know-how originating from the parent 
company to local market. Today, there are clear indications that also Finnish companies 
with activities abroad have started recently to re-consider “their strategies and perceiving 
R&D activities abroad as ways to augment and acquire new assets” (cf. Criscuolo and 
Narula 2005, 1).  
Its worth remembering, though, that from the management perspective in-house R&D is 
important, but not only source for growth and renewal of a company. There are various 
means available for the management to maintain the company's competitive advantage 
and for instance its stock value — i.e. the firm’s core competencies may well change with 
time depending on perceptions of management. This, undoubtedly, has to have effect on 
position and significance, R&D or any other function has within the company in a certain 
moment. (cf. Hasu 2004, 79) 
Our company cases supports findings made in several studies before concerning the 
strong path dependency included in location of company R&D activities. Locally 
embedded competencies and accumulated know-how are often tacit by nature and hard to 
turn into codified information and thus difficult to transfer even within a common 
corporate structure. Furthermore, transaction costs involved in transferring R&D 
activities to abroad or another domestic locale are high especially in terms of social 
capital, networks and co-operation arrangements developed over time with other actors in 
the local innovation environment. 
The transfer of manufacturing to the fast growing developing economies raises although 
important questions concerning the future location of Finnish R&D activities. Literature 
and our case studies point out that there are certain complementarities between 
manufacturing and R&D operations; product development calls often for interaction 
between the R&D unit and production as well as feedback from markets. The issue is if 
and to what extent R&D follows manufacturing in the future.  Still today many domestic 
MNCs have the interfaces and operations facilitating interactions needed in R&D are at 
place in Finland. (cf. Ali-Yrkkö & Palmberg 2006, 26-27) 
Intuitively domestic multinationals as knowledge nodes and channels to global 
competence and know-how flows seems self-evident. However, impacts of foreign 
presence on companies activities on home ground and surroundings domestically are hard 
to grasp because foreign operations are closely entwined and natural part of firms all 
operations. With closer look there emerges though a number effects which can be 
connected to companies international operations. First, domestic multinationals provide a 
 104
model for other companies aiming on international market. Especially strong this effect is 
among those domestic firms co-operating close with the multinational, the latter being an 
‘engine’ which partner companies and subcontractors follow abroad.  It is neither unusual 
that (large) Finnish multinationals encourage key suppliers to locate activities in close 
vicinity of their own facilities abroad.  
Domestic multinationals can also understood to be 'training houses' which expose the 
staff of the company and domestic collaborators to international competition. 
Accordingly, there are identifiable domestic spill-over effects related to experience of 
international business activities and networks. There is strong incentive for collaborating 
firms to progress towards standards required by the MNC. Through mobility of people 
international experience gained in one company ‘is transferred’ even in to larger group of 
domestic firms.  
With historical perspective it is also clear that companies in general, and MNCs in 
particular are never in steady state; companies are continuously restructuring business 
activities not just through internal changes between units but through acquisitions, 
divestments, management-buy-outs, spin-offs, strategic alliances, joint-ventures, sub-
contracting and outsourcing which take place both in domestic and international markets. 
Restructuring of domestic MNCs for instance through foreign mergers and acquisitions 
together with industry consolidation and divestments has in many instances led to 
establishment of new internationally competitive businesses (cf. KCI-Konecranes, 
Cargotec, Dynea, Borealis etc.).   
To conclude, as the above case studies indicate companies’ strategic operations both 
domestic and foreign are in a constant flux. The same holds true also for status of 
companies’ innovation activities which differ considerably among firms and even inside 
a firm over time. In addition, the core of intra-company R&D and innovation activities 
evolve which shows in a type of R&D activities company engages abroad, and in their 
significance to company. The core R&D operations seems to be embedded to domestic 
ground while the outer layers of knowledge may spread geographically to companies’ 
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